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Abstract  
This thesis shows how financial market anomalies may arise from the strategic 
interactions between market participants acting under strategic uncertainty. In the first 
essay, I show how market overreactions to IPO price revisions occur when investors 
have speculative motives to coordinate investment in hot IPOs. I derive and test 
hypotheses outlining how market reactions magnify when speculators acquire 
information in anticipation of the IPO. The empirical results support my hypothesis 
and suggest that IPO underpricing is an inevitable consequence of the book build 
mechanism: the more information the investors acquire before bidding, the more 
effective the book build performs in producing accurate offer prices and the larger 
the subsequent market reactions to offer price revisions. 
            In the second essay, I derive and test how an investment bank can use the 
IPO roadshow as a persuasion mechanism to influence the issuing firm’s beliefs about 
the state of subscription demand by strategically inviting pessimistic investors to 
roadshow presentations. I find that the timing of downward price amendments 
during the IPO roadshow is related to the persuasion efforts of the underwriter which 
supports the roadshow persuasion hypothesis. Specifically, greater persuasion efforts 
by the underwriter induce earlier downward price amendments. 
            In the final essay, I examine an adverse selection problem that arises in an 
over-the-counter stock loans market where arbitrageurs and stock lenders vary in 
their ability to learn and resolve strategic uncertainty. I find that the adverse selection 
problem is an inherent feature of the over-the-counter market for stock loans due to 
the fact that lenders passively observe arbitrageurs arrive to borrow stock. I provide a 
 iii 
number of testable implications regarding the types of lenders who are able to take 
advantage of arbitrageurs, and the likelihood of recalling stock loans. I further 
analyse the implications of implementing transparent disclosure regimes that reduce 
the lenders’ information advantage and find that arbitrageurs may short sell more 
aggressively as a result. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
	
1.1  Background and Motivation 
Financial market anomalies—such as those regularly documented in finance 
journals—are price distortions that contradict prevailing financial market theories. In 
a series of papers, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) formalize a theory of financial 
market equilibrium when agents have rational expectations. The purpose of this 
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) framework is to highlight the process by 
which financial markets incorporate information from many individuals, with the 
understanding that competition amongst rational arbitrageurs would bring about an 
outcome where “security prices at any point in time ‘fully reflect’ all available 
information” (Fama, 1970, p. 388).  
Together with the REE framework, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
provides the context from which we declare certain market phenomena as anomalies. 
These frameworks are celebrated since they only rely on the weak assumption that 
“small” price taking arbitrageurs would systematically identify and correct all 
mispricings. This “no arbitrage” assumption is made both for convenience and 
tractability, allowing economists to quantify the information content of news events 
(Fama, 1965; Mandelbrot, 1966; Ball and Brown, 1968) without having to explicitly 
model complicated strategic interactions between arbitrageurs.  
In his 1995 Nobel prize lecture, John Harsanyi lamented that economic 
theories, including the REE framework, abstract away the strategic interactions that 
are relevant in determining how market participants behave in response to their 
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competitors’ countermoves, which may provide clues as to why certain market 
anomalies persist. He mused that “in principle, every social situation involves 
strategic interaction among the participants. Thus, one might argue that proper 
understanding of any social situation would require game-theoretic analysis. But in 
actual fact, classical economic theory did manage to sidestep the game-theoretic 
aspect of economic behavior by postulating perfect competition, i.e., by assuming 
that every buyer and every seller is very small as compared with the size of the 
relevant markets, so that nobody can significantly affect the existing market prices by 
his actions” (Harsanyi, 1995, p. 293). This means that agents could act without 
giving thought to what their competitors were doing since their competitors’ actions 
cannot alter their payoffs. We know from the theory of coordination games that this 
is not always the case (Nash, 1950). Thus the very strategic interactions that the no-
arbitrage frameworks attempt to sidestep invites a different set of strategic 
interactions, which when ignored, can be responsible for seemingly irrational market 
phenomena.  
Harsanyi’s emphasis on strategic interactions in social situations is consistent 
with the subjective character of all economic theory which Hayek, the original 
proponent of the capital market price system, believed distinguishes the social 
sciences from their physical counterparts. In a number of essays leading up to his 
1952 “The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason”, Hayek 
reflects on a number of philosophical differences between the physical and social 
sciences. He argues that “objects of economic activity cannot be defined in objective 
terms but only with reference to a human purpose” and that “the purposes of social 
study cannot be defined in the objective terms of the physical sciences but only in 
terms of human beliefs” (Hayek, 1952, p. 94). His emphasis on human purpose and 
 3 
beliefs as the main drivers of human actions is closely aligned with game theoretical 
views of decision making under uncertainty, which treats preferences and beliefs as 
fundamental building blocks for analysis. 
It is from these philosophical grounds that Hayek poses the original market 
efficiency problem: “How do we secure the best use of resources known to any of the 
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals 
know?” (Hayek, 1945, p. 520). By “ends”, Hayek referred to “the knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place” that only specific individuals throughout 
the economy could possibly possess. Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) take this to refer 
to the private information that is dispersed throughout the economy. However, in 
capital markets, “ownership of the stock implies not only ownership of a dividend 
stream but also the right to sell that dividend stream at a future date.” (Harrison and 
Kreps, 1978, p. 323). The possibility of resale gives rise to speculative motives for 
market participants. Therefore, if by “ends” we suppose that individuals purchase 
stocks for speculative purposes, then the idea that competitive arbitrage will lead to 
informationally efficient markets quickly becomes untenable. Clearly if “ends” are 
driven by speculative motives, markets may reflect more than just “all information”, 
devolving into a guessing game where investors attempt to predict the average 
opinions of their peers (Keynes, 1937). 
Once we consider the possibility that arbitrageurs may be more concerned 
with how others perceive the value-relevant facts at hand, it becomes clear that 
arbitrage may fail to materialize. If an arbitrageur believes that fundamentals are 
poor, he may avoid short selling because he is unsure whether his peers also believe 
fundamentals are poor. In turn, each of his peers may avoid short selling because 
each is unsure that others will short sell. This is because no individual knows for 
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certain whether others also believe fundamentals are poor. Yet higher orders of 
uncertainty about the beliefs of peers are relevant in determining the outcome of 
these coordination games. It turns out that successful coordination can only occur 
when arbitrageurs know that others know, that all others know, and so on, up to an 
infinite degree (Rubinstein, 1989). That is, perfect coordination requires the set of 
value-relevant facts to be common knowledge among decision makers. Any 
uncertainty in this infinite hierarchy of beliefs, also known as strategic uncertainty, 
can lead to coordination failure. 
The degree to which fundamentals are commonly known amongst investors 
raises important implications for market efficiency. In conventional finance theory, 
any value-relevant information should be instantly incorporated into the market 
price, irrespective of whether such information is privately known, mutually known 
amongst a number of individuals, or common knowledge. Yet the crucial insight 
from the higher order beliefs literature is that subtle differences in whether 
information is commonly known or merely mutually known by all market participants 
is enough to cause pricing inefficiencies. Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) 
demonstrate that lack of common knowledge about trades can cause bubbles to exist 
in finite period economies. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that lack of 
common knowledge about the time a bubble begins can cause delays in price 
corrections.  
One example where the distinction between common knowledge and mutual 
knowledge of fundamentals appears to have profound market effects is discussed in 
Huberman and Regev (2001). By their account, a New York Times article reporting 
that biotech company EntreMed was on the verge of a cancer cure caused stock 
prices to jump by approximately 250 percent. The breakthrough in cancer cure 
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research was however, stale news; having previously been reported in science journal 
Nature and other publications five months beforehand. The increase in EntreMed 
stock prices was permanent even though no new information had been divulged. 
Why then did the price correction occur after such long delay? What caused the 
resulting price correction to be so dramatic? 
The “global games” literature (Cass and Shell, 1983; Carlsson and van 
Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998) suggests that events which are particularly 
“public” are an effective means of obtaining common knowledge. The reason is 
because public events allow a decision maker to deduce that his peers have seen the 
event (and know that peers know that others have seen the event), since everyone 
shares the same vantage point with respect to the public event. Therefore, events that 
are publicly observable and thus common knowledge can coordinate switches from 
one equilibrium where no one takes action, to one where everyone takes action and 
buys EntreMed. The stale information in Huberman and Regev (2001) appears to be 
information that was not commonly understood by the public. Perhaps the expert 
financial analysts reading Nature did not believe that Nature was a “public” enough 
platform for news, or did not believe that the implications of the research findings 
were widely understood. Once the implications of the research results were made 
clear in popular publication New York Times, there was a common understanding 
over what the implications meant for the biotechnology industry, causing stock 
prices to surge.  
What we can learn from the EntreMed example is that public events do not 
necessarily need to convey any new information to cause abrupt market movements. 
While it seems counterintuitive that simply reiterating the same news could prompt 
large market reactions, once we consider how strategic uncertainty influences the 
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behavior of market participants, seemingly irrational market anomalies can be 
justified as rational phenomena. 
 
1.2  Thesis Aims 
The main aim of my thesis is to further our understanding of “irrational” market 
phenomena by introducing aspects of coordination motives and strategic uncertainty 
into investor’s preferences. In particular, I focus on how market anomalies unfold as 
(i) market participants resolve strategic uncertainty, (ii) prevent others from learning 
about strategic uncertainty, or (iii) resolve strategic uncertainty more effectively than 
others. 
My first aim, which is discussed in the first essay in chapter 2, is to develop a 
theory of speculative bidding in the market for IPOs to explain why IPOs appear 
persistently underpriced. In doing so, I show how particular features of the IPO 
book-build mechanism promotes persistent overreactions from investors. In my 
model, a prospective investor wishes to invest when other investors participate in the 
offer but is unsure how peers will act. Instead, the investor bases her investment 
decision on offer price revisions, rationally overreacting when the investment bank in 
charge of selling the securities revises offer prices. 
My second aim, which is discussed in the second essay in chapter 3, is to 
examine how certain market participants may attempt to manipulate another’s ability 
to learn about strategic uncertainty for their own benefit. I take the perspective of the 
issuing firm of an IPO which faces strategic uncertainty as to whether institutional 
investors will participate in the offer. The underwriter wishes to price the IPO 
conservatively but must convince an over-optimistic issuer to rationally agree. I 
show how IPO roadshows can act as a convenient “belief design” mechanism that 
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allows underwriters to manage an over-optimistic issuer’s price expectations. In 
particular, underwriters can manage an issuing firm’s pricing expectations by 
strategically revealing (relatively) pessimistic information to the issuer during the 
IPO roadshow. Since the underwriter has control over who to invite to the roadshow, 
the underwriter can design an IPO roadshow itinerary (an information environment) 
and invite critics to bias the issuer’s beliefs about subscription demand. 
My final aim, which forms the basis of the third essay in chapter 4, is to 
examine how certain market structures, such as the over-the-counter market for stock 
loans and IPO book builds, may allow some agents to learn about strategic 
uncertainty more effectively than others. In doing so, I examine how market 
participants can become asymmetrically informed about the actions of their peers, 
creating an adverse selection problem. 
Each essay aims to provide new insights on various financial market 
anomalies, including the persistence of IPO price pops, why banks do not appear to 
suffer reputational losses for underpricing deals (Loughran and Ritter, 2002), and 
why seemingly obvious arbitrage opportunities, such as IPO lockup expirations 
(Field and Hanka, 2001), may remain unexploited for prolonged periods of time. 
Using these examples, I demonstrate how game theoretical concepts such as strategic 
complementarities in actions, strategic uncertainty, and higher order beliefs may 
further our understanding of anomalous market phenomena. 
 
1.3  Contributions 
My contributions are as follows. First, I show that IPO offer prices act as a 
coordination mechanism which causes rational speculators to overreact to offer price 
revisions. The more precise the offer price, the greater the overreaction since 
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investors will place greater weight on the price revision. Recall that IPOs are 
essentially large auctions which aggregate bids from investors in order to produce a 
more precise and accurate offer price. Thus, when investors acquire information 
before bidding in IPOs, the resulting offer price revision becomes more precise 
which amplifies overreactions. By showing how offer price revisions serve as a 
coordination mechanism to eliminate strategic uncertainty amongst IPO investors, I 
show how IPO underpricing is an inherent feature of the book-build mechanism. 
Second, I highlight the role of IPO roadshows as a persuasion mechanism to 
manage pricing expectations and provide an explanation for the puzzling observation 
that IPO book-builds have replaced the more efficient method of IPO auctions 
around the world (Jagannathan et al., 2015).  
Third, I describe a form of adverse selection in the equity loans market which 
arises because stock lenders are able to become better informed about the true timing 
of an imminent price correction by observing arbitrageur arrivals. The adverse 
selection problem is unique since it occurs due to differences in degrees of strategic 
uncertainty, rather than differences in knowledge about fundamentals. I show how 
this particular form of adverse selection is inherent in the current design of the equity 
lending market, creating a type of strategic short-sale constraint which limits 
arbitrage. The model contributes to our understanding of existing short selling 
anomalies and explains why seemingly obvious arbitrage opportunities (such as the 
expiration of IPO lockups) are not capitalized upon by rational arbitrageurs.  
The common theme among these contributions is that the anomalies 
described arise due to the design of the market: the IPO book-build and the 
decentralized matching market for stock loans.  
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1.4  Thesis Layout 
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. In the next chapter, titled 
“Coordination Motives and Overreactions to IPO Price Revisions”, I discuss a 
theory of speculative investing in IPOs which models the decision to invest as a 
global coordination game. I first discuss theories of IPO pricing with the book build 
mechanism before turning attention to the theoretical framework, testable 
hypotheses, and empirical results. Chapter 3, named “Managing Price Expectations 
with IPO Roadshows”, discusses how an underwriter can use the IPO roadshow as a 
persuasion mechanism to influence an issuer’s beliefs about the state of subscription 
demand. I review the conflicting incentives underwriters face when pricing IPOs, 
before moving on to develop testable hypothesis from the theoretical framework. 
Empirical results and discussion on alternative theories follow. Chapter 4, titled 
“Coarse Clocks and Adverse Selection”, examines an adverse selection problem in 
the stock loans market that arises because arbitrageurs and lenders learn about the 
time a price correction will occur at different rates. Chapter 5 provides a summary 
and conclusion. Limitations and suggested areas for future research are also 
discussed in this section. 
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Chapter 2:  Coordination Motives and 
Overreactions to IPO Price Revisions 
	
2.1  Introduction 
Extant IPO pricing theories leave little room for speculative behavior. Yet investors 
often wonder whether the book build pricing process is carefully engineered by 
investment bankers to produce speculative price pops. These suspicions stem from 
the observation that average IPO initial (first-day) returns are abnormally large, but 
typically only after underwriters amend offer prices upward (Hanley, 1993; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Bradley and Jordan, 2002). As part of the book building 
process, underwriters record subscription bids from prospective investors and amend 
the offer price in response to this information.1 Price amendments may occur several 
times before listing, with underwriters controlling both the pricing and allocation of 
shares. It would thus appear that the association between IPO initial returns and price 
revisions, known as conditional underpricing, is no coincidence. 
Intuitively, conditional underpricing presents an easy profit opportunity for 
investors who simply subscribe to IPOs that amend offer prices upward before the 
roadshow ends. Given the public nature of price amendments, many investors would 
independently arrive at the same conclusion. Suppose an investor follows this line of 
thought after observing an upward price amendment and deduces that his beliefs are 
shared amongst his peers. He then believes that it is commonly believed that the IPO 
will become oversubscribed. The investor’s motives to subscribe to the offer are now 
																																								 																				
1 We distinguish between price range amendments, which occur during the roadshow, and final price 
revisions, which occur at the end of the roadshow. The literature focuses on final price revisions. 
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even stronger. Investors therefore have coordination motives to identify and invest in 
hot IPOs.  
Crucial to this narrative is the role of price amendments as a coordination 
mechanism. As underwriters amend offer prices in response to investors’ bidding 
behavior, offer prices contain more information than just the face value of 
fundamentals in the prospectus; they reflect peer investors’ beliefs about the 
attractiveness of the offer. Thus, when investors observe upward price amendments 
and believe the IPO will become oversubscribed, their bidding behavior in 
anticipation of large initial returns may instigate further price revisions. Minor shifts 
in offer prices may therefore cause abrupt changes in precarious equilibria which 
manifest as the conditional underpricing anomaly. 
I formalize this argument and show how conditional underpricing arises 
naturally from the book build process when investors have coordination motives. 
Using the global games framework of Morris and Shin (2003), I allow investors’ 
incentives to bid in IPOs to be driven by shifts in higher-order beliefs.2 In doing so, I 
show that the current book build method, which is necessary for efficient price 
discovery, also promotes speculative bidding. This phenomenon becomes more 
severe once investors engage in information acquisition. An unfortunate corollary is 
that conditional underpricing is inevitable and occurs even when underwriters refrain 
from deliberately underpricing the IPO.  
I derive and test two theoretical propositions on the pricing of IPOs. First, 
there is an attention-amplification effect, where information acquisition by bidders 
(henceforth ‘attention’) increases the sensitivity of market reactions to price 
																																								 																				
2 Specifically, investors rationally overreact to shifts in offer prices as the public nature of price 
revisions allows investors to know the beliefs of peer investors, which improves coordination. 
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amendments. Second, there is an attention-price-pressure effect (Barber and Odean, 
2008), where an increase in attention increases the size of the offer price revision.  
Based on a sample of 1,234 IPOs from 2005 to 2014, my results provide 
strong support for the attention-amplification effect. As attention increases, the 
sensitivity of market reactions to price amendments, as measured by the strength of 
the association between the size of price amendments and the size of subsequent final 
price revisions, increases. A one unit increase (about 10 percentage points) in 
investor attention increases the strength of the association between the first price 
amendment and the final price revision 1.2 fold. I find a similar positive association 
between IPO price revisions and initial returns. A one unit increase in investor 
attention increases the strength of the association between the final price revision and 
IPO initial returns 1.38 fold. These findings suggest that greater attention strengthens 
the conditional underpricing effect.  
 The empirical results also shed light on whether price pops are deliberately 
engineered by underwriters or are an inadvertent market reaction to an underwriter’s 
innocuous attempts to amend offer prices accurately. If underwriters deliberately 
amend offer prices in order to create an illusion of demand so as to attract additional 
demand (Shiller, 1990), we should find a momentum effect between the first price 
amendment and the final price revision. However, I do not find any evidence of such 
an association, after controlling for attention and price amendment interaction 
effects. This suggests that price pops are an underwriter extrinsic problem, i.e., 
conditional underpricing occurs irrespective of whether underwriters aim to revise 
prices upward fully or partially. Underwriters must conduct book builds and amend 
offer prices in order to price the IPO efficiently; yet the more efficient the pricing 
process, the more sensitive investor reactions become to price amendments. These 
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implications are consistent with the observations made by Loughran and Ritter 
(2002, p. 431) that “investors are well aware of the conditional underpricing 
anomaly and an increase in the offer price generally results in increased demand 
because it is signalling to investors that other investors want to buy the IPO”. They 
note that this speculative motive can actually cause a positively sloped demand curve 
for shares. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews market-
based theories of IPO underpricing. Section 2.3 develops the theoretical framework 
and hypotheses. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the data and empirical methodology 
respectively. Empirical results follow in Section 2.6, and Section 2.7 concludes.  
 
2.2  Literature Review 
The traditional view of IPO underpricing provided by auction theorists argues that 
underpricing is necessary to incentivize investors to bid truthfully (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989) and to cover the costs of information acquisition for investors 
(Sherman and Titman, 2002; Sherman, 2005). In these auction theory frameworks, 
underpricing is a mechanism (a pricing and share allocation rule) that the underwriter 
designs to jointly maximize offer proceeds while pricing the offer accurately. When 
the IPO mechanism makes flawed assumptions about investors’ information or 
imperfectly captures their incentives, investors engage in unexpected behaviors that 
lead to underpricing anomalies.  
One of the critical assumptions previous auction theory frameworks share is 
that investors view shares as common value assets, meaning that investors share the 
same value for the share but have different information about its value. Many 
theoretical results in the IPO literature follow by endowing investors with different 
 14 
information structures which lead to a diverse range of adverse selection problems 
(Rock, 1986) and their mechanism design solutions (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; 
Biais et al. 2002; Parlour and Rajan, 2005).3 These frameworks abstract from the fact 
that with common value assets, there is a motive for agents to buy the asset in 
anticipation of resale in secondary markets which can provide an explanation for 
why investors will overpay for IPO shares. 
I refer to such theories as market-based explanations of conditional 
underpricing, which are broadly related to sentiment-based theories of abnormal IPO 
returns. Sentiment theories rely on the fact that some investors are more optimistic 
than others. In the presence of short sale constraints, optimism creates upward price 
pressure (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978).  
There are several ways in which investors may come to hold differing beliefs 
about IPO prospects. Some suggest overconfidence in private signals is responsible 
for the divergence in beliefs (Daniel et al., 1998; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003), 
while others suggest that some investors revise their beliefs more slowly than others 
(Hong and Stein, 1999).  
Cornelli et al. (2006) link sentiment-based theories to IPO returns and 
examine European grey markets, which are pre-listing markets where investors trade 
IPO shares (on a forward basis) concurrently with the book build. In their model, 
grey market retail traders purchase aftermarket shares only when they are optimistic. 
They find that when grey market prices are greater than book build prices, IPO 
aftermarket prices are abnormally high, whereas there is no relation when grey 
market prices are below book build prices. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) provide a related 
																																								 																				
3 Specifically, the adverse selection results refer to the Winner’s curse and other informational rents 
extracted by either the underwriter or institutional investors. For example, in Biais et al. (2005) the 
underwriter has private information about subscription demand and colludes with institutional 
investors who have private information about IPO fundamentals. The authors propose an IPO 
mechanism to limit the information rents lost by the issuer. 
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model where shares are allocated to institutional traders who then sell the stock to 
sentiment traders. As there is risk involved in holding share allocations in 
anticipation of selling to sentiment traders, shares must be discounted. 
The sentiment investors described in these theories may refer to retail traders 
who are typically less informed and are more prone to cognitive biases. Kaustia and 
Knupfer (2008) find that retail investors who experience positive initial returns in 
prior IPOs are more likely to participate in future IPOs in the Finnish market. Dorn 
(2009) provides further evidence that retail investors aggressively purchase IPOs that 
exhibit large first-day returns in the German IPO market. Barber and Odean (2008) 
suggest such trading behaviors occur more frequently with deals that attract greater 
investor attention, providing evidence that retail investors are net buyers of highly 
publicized and newsworthy stocks. Da et al. (2011) present evidence for Barber and 
Odean’s (2008) attention-price-pressure hypothesis by linking measures of investor 
attention in the lead up to official listing with short run abnormal returns and long 
run underperformance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). These results support the idea 
that some groups of investors may be more prone to speculative bidding behaviour in 
IPOs.  
Sentiment-based theories also rely on short selling constraints to generate 
upward price pressure. Hanley and Edwards (2010) find that IPOs are not that 
difficult to short sell in practice so long as brokers satisfy regulation SHO and 
demonstrate reasonable attempts to mitigate failure-to-deliver. However, the authors 
document that short selling IPOs is largely unprofitable. 
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2.3  Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1  The Morris and Shin Benchmark 
The model setup begins with the investment game of Morris and Shin (2003). 
Players in this game include the underwriter and a continuum of investors N ∈ [0, 1] 
who choose to subscribe to an IPO (ai = 1) or abstain (ai = 0). Nature draws θ from a 
normal distribution which serves as a common prior about the firm’s quality. The 
state fundamental is centered on 0 so that a deal is poor quality when θ < 0. This 
prior incorporates all relevant information about firm and market-level fundamentals 
available at the time of initial pricing (t=0).  
The underwriter observes bids accumulate over the roadshow period, and 
decides whether to amend the offer price range upward (aU = 1) or maintain status 
quo (aU = 0).4 The underwriter’s optimal action is a function of subscription demand 
(K): 
"# $ ∈ argmax*+∈{-,/} "# 1	34(1|$)  
where P(θ|K) is the posterior distribution of θ. The underwriter considers an optimal 
action to amend the offer price by averaging over posterior beliefs of θ, given her 
observations of subscription demand K.  
Investors hold common priors on the state fundamental θ. They observe two 
signals of θ: a private signal si = θ + σiεi, and a public signal sp = θ + σpεp, where εi 
and εp are distributed N(0, 1) and uncorrelated. Signal precisions are τi = 1/σ2i and τp 
= 1/σ2p respectively. Investors do not know ex ante if the deal will be oversubscribed 
or undersubscribed, and their posterior beliefs of θ are normal with precision τi + τp 
and a precision weighted mean: 
																																								 																				
4 We assume that underwriters only amend offer prices upward in response to subscription demand. 
Introducing an additional action (downward amendment) complicates the model unnecessarily. This 
threshold rule also captures the fact that underwriters may only wish to amend prices upward when the 
offer is highly (say 2x or 3x) oversubscribed. 
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1 = 	9: 1|;:, ;< = 	 =:;: + =<;<=: + =< 	. 
The investors’ payoff is (θ - c) if they subscribe, where c ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed cost 
uniformly distributed with a mean of ½. They get an additional +1 if the underwriter 
revises the final offer price upward (au = 1): 
Payoffs Revision No Revision 
Invest (ai = 1) θ + 1 - c θ - c 
Abstain (ai = 0) 0 0 
 
Investors invest according to the rule: 
": ;:, ;< ∈ argmax*@∈{-,/} ": (1 *+B/ + 1 − D)	d4(1|;:, ;<) . 
A perfect symmetric Bayesian equilibrium includes: (i) investors’ beliefs and 
strategy profiles that are consistent with beliefs; (ii) aggregate subscription demand K 
that is consistent with the subscription behavior of individual investors (ai); and (iii) 
underwriter actions (au) that maximize investors’ payoffs after observing 
subscriptions.  
Proposition 1: There exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
characterized by linear threshold strategies where investors subscribe (ai = 
1) if and only if their expectations of the state fundamental θ exceed a critical 
value s*, with the underwriter revising the offer price upward (au = 1) when θ 
> 0 given her observation of K. 
A linear threshold strategy (monotone equilibria) means that investors subscribe 
when their posterior expectation of θ is greater than the cutoff value θ*: 
": ;:, ;< = 	 1								FG	1 > 	1∗0								FG	1 ≤ 	1∗	. 
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Given θ, an investor believes the probability that any other investor with a signal 
above her own (sj > si) is G = 1 − Φ( =: ;: − 1 ) , where M  is the cumulative 
normal distribution function. As investors have symmetric strategies, the proportion 
of investors with signals above si equals the probability that any individual invests. 
For any value of f, equilibrium s* and θ* must satisfy:   
;∗ = 1∗ −	ΦN/ G=: . (2.1) 
Investors believe offer prices will be revised upward when Ei[θ|si,sp] ≥ θ* with 
probability: 
4O 1 ≥ 1∗ = Φ =: + =< =:;: + =<;<=: + =< −	1∗ . (2.2) 
In that case, investors get an additional 1 payoff with probability Pr(E[θ] ≥ θ), so the 
value to investing is v(si, sp) = θ + Pr(E[θ] ≥ θ]) - c. Investors are indifferent to 
participating when v=0. In equilibrium si = s*, so substituting (2.1) into (2.2) we 
obtain: 
1∗ + Φ =: + =< =<;< +	=:1∗ − =:MN/(G)=: + =< −	1∗ − D = 0	. (2.3) 
This payoff function has a unique solution (the proof can be found in Appendix A) 
when: Q = =<=: + =< − =: ≤ 2S	. 
Morris and Shin (2003) refer to α as the “publicity multiplier”, which increases with 
the precision of the public signal, and decreases with the precision of the private 
signal. This parameter scales market reactions to shifts in offer prices. When α is 
small, investors ignore price revisions and invest according to their private 
assessment of firm fundamentals. There are no overreactions to offer price revisions 
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in this case. Morris and Shin (2003) show this result breaks down when the publicity 
multiplier is large (α > 2π). For a precise public signal, an investor who observes a 
price higher than her reservation value believes that others are more optimistic than 
she is. She invests even though she believes the IPO is overpriced. There can 
therefore be tension between coordination motives and private assessments of firm 
fundamentals.  
In Figure 2.1, investor payoffs exhibit multiple equilibria when α is greater 
than 2π, identified by the cubic function. As α increases and tends towards the 
perfect information limit, non-linearity in the payoff function becomes more 
pronounced. Minor price shifts within the [-0.5, 0.5] interval can lead an IPO to 
become overwhelmingly over- or under-subscribed. Outside of the [-0.5, 0.5] 
interval, the investor either always invests (s* > 0.5) or never invests (s* < -0.5). For 
large price revisions, the investor’s convictions are strong enough as to cause her to 
ignore what others are doing and invest rationally. This may explain why large 
downward price revisions (full adjustments) are typically followed by initial IPO 
returns around zero rather than negative values (Ritter, 2011). In contrast, upward 
shifts in the public signal (sp > 0) are expected to cause overreactions whenever the 
publicity multiplier is large.  
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Figure 2.1: Investor Payoffs in the Morris and Shin Benchmark.  
  
Notes: The y-axis is the value to investing: v*(s*) = θ + Pr(E[θ] ≥ θ]) - c, where c=1/2. On the x-axis 
are price signals, where the equilibrium trigger signal s* is centered on 0. Above this value (s* + ε), 
the investor realizes that she has a private signal slightly more optimistic than everyone else and hence 
will not be investing. An increase in the public signal shifts the value function v*(s*) to the upper-
right so that it may be profitable for the investor with a signal (s*+ε) to invest. Payoffs exhibit 
multiple equilibria when α > 2π for minor price shifts within the [-0.5, 0.5] interval. An investor with 
a signal (s* + 0.5) always invests. 
 
The main insight to emerge from this framework is that investors overreact to small 
changes in the offer price, with the degree of overreaction depending on the relative 
precision of public and private information. The Morris and Shin’s (2003) 
framework assumes that signal precision is exogenous. However, the IPO offer price 
is an endogenous outcome of investors’ subscription behavior. In the next section, I 
show how private information acquisition changes the size of the publicity 
multiplier. 
 
2.3.2  Information Acquisition, Aggregation and Amplification 
This section establishes the attention-amplification effect. I follow Angeletos and 
Werning (2006) by modelling the book build information aggregation mechanism. I 
then show that the precision of the offer price increases at a rate faster than the 
precision of private signals. Should the book build aggregate information more 
efficiently than individual investors can acquire information, theory proposes that 
increased attention amplifies investor reactions to price revisions.  
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Angeletos and Werning (2006) use the competitive rational expectations 
equilibrium of Grossman (1976) as the price formation mechanism. I substitute the 
Grossman (1976) model in favor of a uniform price auction with m units for sale, 
which mimics the IPO book building process (Biais et al., 2002; Ausubel and 
Cramton, 2002).5 Investors tender bids and the underwriter takes the top m bids when 
setting the offer price. Investors have utility functions of the form:  T U: = −VNW@X 
where the initial wealth endowment w0 is normalized to zero, U(w0) = 0, and risk 
aversion γ = 1. Their bidding strategy is: ": ;:, ;< ∈ argmax*@∈Y E T U- + [ ;:, ;< ":	 	;:, ;< 	. 
Investors bid on m lots of IPO shares on offer. While the supply of shares is known 
in advance, there is uncertainty in rationing, parameterized by σm, since share 
allocations are at the underwriter’s discretion: $\ ] =	^_] 
where m is standard normal distributed. The underwriter collects bids {a1, a2, ... aN-m-
1, aN-m, ... , aN} and sets the clearing price. In the absence of rationing, the market 
clearing price is simply the value of the N-mth highest bid. As N approaches infinity, 
the difference between the aN-m-1th and aN-mth highest bids approaches 0, and the 
auction discount vanishes (Milgrom, 1981).6  For a given initial IPO offer price 
(p=sp), individual demand for shares is therefore: 
																																								 																				
5  IPO book builds resemble an auction imperfectly since the underwriter has discretion in share 
allocation. This is a side issue since our main purpose with this auction framework is to establish that 
the underwriter aggregates private information from bids into a more informative offer price no matter 
how they choose to build the order book. As this section shows, so long as the underwriter aggregates 
bidding information more precisely than individual investors’ private information, the actual pricing 
and share allocation rules the underwriter employs are immaterial and do not change the implications 
of our model. 
6  While auction models appear similar to the Grossman (1976) competitive rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) model of price discovery, they differ in that the former explicitly model how 
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": ;:, ` = 	E [ ;:, ` |;:, ` − `["O([ ;:, ` ) 	. 
Given signal si and initial offer price p, the first and second moments of V(si, p) are 
respectively: 
 E [ ;:, ` |;:, ` = E 1|;:, ` + E G ;: |;:, ` − E D|;:, `   
 E [ ;:, ` |;:, ` = 1 + G E ;: − 	1/2	  
 E [ ;:, ` |;:, ` = 1 + Φ 0 − 	1/2	 (2.4) 
and 
 ["O [ ;:, ` = 	["O(1 + G − 1/2)  
 ["O [ ;:, ` = 	["O 1 + ["O(G)  
 ["O [ ;:, ` = 	["O 1 + 3G ;:3;: E[;:]
d ["O(;:)  
 ["O [ ;:, ` = 	["O 1 + 3Φ( =: ;: − 1)3;: E[;:]
d ["O ;: 	.  
In the derivation above, I approximate the variance of f (a function of si) with a 
Taylor series expansion. Noting that E[si] = θ and e 0 = 1/ 2S, I have: 
 ["O [ ;:, ` = ["O 1 +	 =:e 0 d ["O(;:)  
 ["O [ ;:, ` = 	 1=: + =< +	 12S	. (2.5) 
Substituting (2.4) and (2.5) into the demand function, I get: 
 ": ;:, ` = 	 f;: + 1 − f ` − `["O[[ ;:, ` ] 	 
 ": ;:, ` = 	 f(;: − `)["O[[ ;:, ` ] 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 											
individual actions contribute to price formation whereas the Grossman model assumes prices 
automatically satisfy equilibrium conditions without detailing how such conditions are satisfied.  
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 ": ;:, ` = 	 =:1 + =: + =<2S (;: − `) 
where λ = τi/(τi + τp). The aggregate subscription demand is simply the expectation of 
all individual demand functions: 
$ 1, ` = 	 ": ;:, ` 	3F = =:1 + =: + =<2S ;: − ` . 
Letting the underwriter impose the market clearing condition Ks(m) = K(θ, p): ^_] = =:1 + =: + =<2S 1 − ` , 
and re-expressing the equality in terms of the state fundamental θ plus noise gives: 
`/ = 1 − ^_ :^d 1 +	 :^d + <^d2S :^d <^d ]	. 
The coefficient for the noise term m is the standard deviation on the revised offer 
price p1:  
<^/ = ^_ :^d(1 + g) 
where κ = (τi + τp)/2π. Hence, σp1 decreases at rate σi2(1+κ), which is faster than the 
rate that investors can acquire private information individually, σi. This leads to my 
first testable hypothesis: 
H1:  The magnitude of investors’ reaction (bidding) to price range 
revisions is amplified by investor attention. 
Information acquisition increases the impact of price amendments on subsequent IPO 
demand, i.e., the attention-amplification effect. Empirically, I expect the association 
between price revisions and IPO initial returns is larger for IPO deals that attract 
more investor attention. In the limit as σi approaches zero, the amended price 
becomes a fully revealing price signal. The model is efficient in aggregating 
information. However, this may not always hold as there are cases where information 
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fails to aggregate in competitive multi-unit auctions (Pesendorfer and Swinkels, 
1997) particularly when the number of bidders (N) is not common knowledge 
(Harstad et al., 2008).  
 
2.3.3  Unknown Numbers of Speculative Bidders and Pricing Mistakes 
Suppose we partition the investor population into a finite subset I who invest 
according to the linear threshold rule, and a finite subset of L speculators who 
attempt to predict the underwriter’s price amendments (I ∪ L ⊂ N). Speculators are 
pure scalpers who invest based solely on the probability of price amendments. They 
do not care about the long-term fundamental value of the firm and flip share 
allocations immediately after the IPO lists. The scalper’s payoff is (1 - c) if she 
subscribes and the underwriter revises the offer price upward (au = 1), and (-c) if the 
underwriter does not amend the price. The resulting payoff is: 
": ;:, ;< ∈ argmax*@∈{-,/} ": 1[*+B/] − D 	34(1|;:, ;<) . 
Scalpers predict what the underwriter will do given their posterior belief of θ. They 
believe offer prices will be revised upward when Ei[θ|si,sp] ≥ θ* (eq. 2.2). Their 
indifference condition is a probability weighted average of the two possible 
outcomes: 4 1 − D + (1 − 4O( "]Vj3))(−D) → 4O("]Vj3) = D. 
When Pr(amend) > c, scalpers tender the highest bids because their only objective is 
to maximize the probability of winning share allocations. Scalpers are willing to 
purchase at prices greater than their valuation of future firm cash flows because they 
anticipate a high resale value. They therefore do not care about the state fundamental 
θ and their bids have little information content. The fraction of bids above the offer 
price (am > p) increases monotonically with the number of scalpers: 
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l"_ G*m 1 − G nN*m	.*mo<  
This means that the price P(θ, m) associated with the market clearing condition $pq:r(1, 4(1,])) 	= 	$\(]) 
is upward biased in the presence of scalpers. This leads to my second proposition: 
H2:  Abnormally high investor attention leads to (increased bidding and 
thus) upward price revisions. 
This is the attention-price-pressure effect of Barber and Odean (2008). Note that this 
hypothesis does not distinguish between genuine investors and scalpers and is 
concerned with only the sheer amount of incoming bids. The distinction between 
genuine investors and scalpers merely concerns the fraction of bids that contain 
information content and thus the attention-amplification effect. This implies that 
there is a tradeoff between the attention-amplification effect and the attention-price-
pressure effect. Because a larger fraction of winning bids now contains no 
information, the precision of the amended offer price suffers and the attention 
amplification effect weakens: 
H3:  There is a tradeoff between attention-amplification (H1) and 
attention-price-pressure (H2) effects. 
Informally, this hypothesis provides some intuition as to why discretionary share 
allocations may be socially optimal. In the absence of rationing, the underwriter 
simply takes the top m bids when setting the offer price. If speculators are out in 
force and drawn to “attention-grabbing” IPOs, price discovery suffers. In order to 
reduce the occurrence of pricing mistakes, the underwriter can either commit to a 
policy of rationing share allocations to a certain type of clients or place a lower 
weight on the winning bids than what is ex post optimal. Underwriters may find it in 
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their interest to ignore some of the winning bids they judge speculative in nature, 
understanding that the top N-m speculative bidders will flip shares allocated to them 
in the aftermarket. It would be rather foolish to build the IPO book with bids from 
uncommitted investors. Thus, self-fulfilling beliefs can also influence the 
underwriter’s optimal pricing and share allocation decision. Therefore, what may 
appear to outsiders as deliberate underpricing and favoritism in share allocations may 
in fact be underwriter conservatism. Sherman (2005) notes in their 2004 IPO, Google 
reserved the right to discard excessively high bids which they deemed speculative in 
nature. This is consistent with Krigman et al. (1999) who suggest that underwriters 
wish to avoid allocating shares to speculators, and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) 
and Bubna and Prabhala (2011) who find that discretionary allocations promote 
better price discovery.  
Note that unlike Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) theory, there is no need to 
reward the most informative bids with share allocations. The underwriter merely 
needs to communicate that shares will be allocated to a certain proportion of real 
investors and that speculative bids may be ignored. Ideally, the underwriter wishes to 
form expectations about aggregate subscription demand driven by real investors (I) 
rather than scalpers (L) in order to reduce the occurrence of pricing mistakes: 1 − `["O([(;:, `)|;:, `) 	3st 	. 
Of course, the underwriter may have difficulties discerning investor types. For issues 
in industries that are prone to speculative investing, the number of bidders may be 
highly unpredictable. 7  Hence, in the absence of a conservative underwriter who 
rations share allocations, IPOs may either be wildly over or undersubscribed. For a 
																																								 																				
7 Sherman (2005) and Jagannathan et al. (2015) note that greater numbers of investors can increase 
competition for limited share allocations, which can reduce the entry probability of each bidder 
unpredictably thereby increasing the variance in the number of entrants in an IPO. 
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prospective issuer and exiting venture capitalists, the extreme polarization in IPO 
outcomes may be outside their risk tolerance. This is consistent with the observed 
multiple equilibria in subscription rates in markets where underwriters cannot ration 
share allocations. For example, Amihud et al. (2003) find that in the Tel Aviv market 
where share allocations are pro-rata and price support is illegal, IPOs are usually 
either wildly (over 20 times) oversubscribed or poorly subscribed. Few IPO 
subscription rates are in between. The large discrete difference in subscription rates 
is a classic example of multiple equilibria in a global coordination game (Carlson 
and Van Damme, 1993).  
 
2.4  Data 
A list of all IPOs from 2005Q1 to 2014Q3 is sourced from the SEC EDGAR 
database and NASDAQ’s website which contains complete dates and listings of all 
IPO-related disclosures. These include S-1 registrations, S-1/A amendments, and 
form 424B which are typically filed upon finalization of the IPO offer price. 
Removing all OTC bulletin board deals, the remaining 1,607 IPOs are matched with 
Compustat-CRSP CUSIP identifiers. Firms identified as unit trusts, closed-end 
funds, REITS, and income deposit securities according to Compustat issue type 
codes are removed from the sample. For the remaining 1,405 IPOs, I check their 
industry SIC codes and remove “blank check” special purpose acquisition 
companies, along with federally chartered institutions and asset backed securities. 
IPOs priced below $4 and spin-offs from pre-existing public firms are also removed. 
These filtering procedures are consistent with prior IPO underpricing studies 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Loughran and Macdonald, 2013), and result in a final 
sample of 1,234 IPOs. 
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I use S-1/A filings to track differences between prospectus revisions and 
extract filing price ranges. Underwriters sometimes file price amendments in the 
middle of the roadshow campaign. For example, Facebook Inc’s price amendments 
(filed through SEC edgar) throughout their roadshow appears as in Figure 2.2. A 
price range amendment from $28~$35 to $34~$38 occurs with 3 days from the 
listing day, and there is ample time for prospective investors to act on this 
information. Price ranges are typically withheld in earlier drafts of the S-1 
registration prospectus; these are left as blank “$ - $” placeholders for future 
amendments. 
 
Figure 2.2: Timeline of IPO Filings During Roadshows  
 
Notes: IPO filings are retrieved from SEC EDGAR and www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos, 2005-2014. 
Filing price ranges indicated in prospectus filings are typically left blank initially while the issuer 
completes due diligence with SEC.  
 
For each IPO, I identify the exact date when the first price was filed and verify the 
dates of subsequent price amendments. From these filings, I define two main 
treatment variables: the first price amendment (ΔP) and the final price revision 
(FPR). The first price amendment is defined as the percentage difference between the 
midpoint of the original filing price range (Po) and the midpoint of the first amended 
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offer price range (P1): ΔP = (P1 - P0)/P0. The final price revision is defined as the 
percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price range and the 
final offer price (PF): FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. Of the 1,234 IPOs in the sample, one-third 
amend the offer price at least once.    
 
2.5  Methodology 
The IPO book build setting provides two opportunities to test the attention-
amplification hypothesis. First, price amendments that occur during the roadshow 
can spur subsequent subscription demand resulting in a larger final price revision. 
Second, upon listing, aftermarket traders may condition their buying decision on the 
final price revision, resulting in large returns at the end of the first trading day. 
Hence, the final price revision is the dependent variable in the first case, but becomes 
the treatment variable in the second case. Both scenarios capture market reactions to 
changes in public price signals.  
 
2.5.1  Pre-IPO Price Revisions 
I first examine the pre-listing period before proceeding onto the aftermarket case. 
The attention-amplification hypothesis states that market reactions to public price 
signals, such as price amendments and final price revisions, are strengthened by the 
level of attention an IPO attracts. I test this hypothesis in the pre-listing period in a 
regression model where the final price revision (FPR) is the dependent variable: u4v = w- + w/xyz{ + wd|4#< + w}|4~WÄ + wÅ  u4v = +	wÅ xyz{×|4#< + wÉ xyz{×|4~WÄ + wÑÖpÄrqÜ\ + á (2.6) 
where the cumulative abnormal search interest (CASI) is the measure of investor 
attention developed by Da et al. (2011); ΔP is the first price amendment; and X is a 
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vector of control variables. First price amendments are split into “up” (ΔPup) and 
“down” (ΔPdown) amendments in order to capture asymmetry in market reactions. 
The attention-amplification hypothesis is tested through the interaction 
between investor attention and the initial price amendment (CASI × ΔP). A 
significant positive coefficient on this interaction variable is evidence in favor of 
hypothesis H1: the magnitude of investors’ reaction (bidding) to price range 
revisions is amplified by investor attention. Significant results for CASI as a 
standalone variable provides evidence in favor of the attention-price-pressure 
hypothesis of H2: abnormally high investor attention leads to upward price revisions. 
While the first two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, I suspect the 
publicity multiplier will subsume some of the attention-price-pressure effect 
(hypothesis H3). Unfortunately including both a predictor variable and its interaction 
terms will naturally attenuate the estimated size of the predictor variable coefficient. 
Thus, I cannot reliably test the tradeoff between attention-price-pressure and 
attention-amplification effects (hypothesis H3). 
I control for a number of pre-listing variables which may be related to IPO 
price revisions. The first control variable is Underwriter Rank, measured by Carter-
Manaster ranks,8 sourced from Jay Ritter’s website. For IPOs with multiple lead 
underwriters, I use the average rank for a number of reasons. Many deals are 
underwritten by the top four underwriters, i.e., Goldman Sachs & Co, Citigroup, 
Morgan Stanley & Co., and JP Morgan Securities, which removes much variation 
along this reputation dimension. IPOs that attract multiple lead underwriters appear 
more impressive and are more likely to attract wider analyst coverage (Corwin and 
																																								 																				
8 Banks are separated into tiers on the tombstone advertisement in the S-1 prospectus (similar to the 
placement of actor’s names in movie advertisements), with the lead underwriters at the very top. This 
ordering reflects the way investment banks organize themselves into hierarchies and their relative 
importance in a particular IPO. The Carter-Manaster metric uses this ordering to construct the 9-point 
scale of underwriter prestige. 
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Schultz, 2005). However, since prestigious underwriters occasionally work with 
lowly ranked underwriters, naively assigning the deal a prestigious rank will 
overstate the reputation score. It is unlikely that these deals are as prestigious as ones 
where all underwriters are top four banks. 
Lowry and Schwert (2002), Pástor and Veronesi (2005), and Kaustia and 
Knupfer (2008) show lagged IPO market variables are important in pricing IPOs. 
They document a lead-lag relation between high IPO returns and high volumes of 
IPO deals in subsequent periods. Hence, one would expect that IPO market variables 
are important determinants of IPO price revisions. I add two variables to capture the 
state of the IPO market at the time of IPO registration–Average Industry Returns and 
Average IPO Returns in the three months preceding the IPO. Average Industry 
Returns are calculated by matching SIC codes with the categories defined by the 
Fama & French’s 49 industry portfolios. Average IPO Returns are obtained from Jay 
Ritter’s website. 
I also control for IPOs that are backed by venture capitalists. Early evidence 
suggests that venture capital (VC)-backed IPOs are less underpriced (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991). Venture capitalists may also desire greater publicity to enhance their 
reputational capital to attract limited partners in future fundraisings (Gompers, 1996). 
A Venture Capital dummy is included as a control variable using CrunchBase 
(www.crunchbase.com) to identify venture capital relationships. 
Media coverage leading up to the roadshow may drive both investor attention 
and IPO returns. Cook et al. (2006) and Liu et al. (2014) find a significant positive 
association between pre-listing measures of publicity (media counts) and subsequent 
IPO returns, but Bhattacharya et al. (2009) find that pre-listing media hype explains 
only about 3 percent of the variation in IPO returns. Nevertheless, I control for 
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Media Counts sourced from the Factiva newswire database in my regressions. I do a 
simple search for the term “IPO” and filter article counts to full company names in 
the two weeks before a price update event (either price amendment or final price 
revision). I further partial out the effect of media on attention by using the residuals 
obtained from a regression of CASI on Media Count in order to isolate investor 
attention not driven by media coverage. Thus all measures of investor attention are 
orthogonal to the Media Counts variable. 
I further include deal characteristics such as offer Proceeds, Sales revenues, 
and positive earnings per share (EPS+), as listed in the S-1 prospectus. Finally, 
Share Overhang is included, computed as the ratio of total shares outstanding to total 
shares on offer.  
 
2.5.2  IPO Aftermarket Returns 
To examine the attention-amplification effect in the IPO aftermarket, I follow the 
same procedure outlined above for the pre-listing regressions except that the 
dependent variable is the IPO Initial Return, defined as the percentage difference 
between the final offer price and the closing price at the end of the first trading day 
divided by the offer price. I include each of the two public price signals observed at 
the end of the roadshow (i.e., ΔP and FPR) and their interaction with CASI as 
treatment variables in two separate regressions of the following general form:  {jFàF"â	vVàäOj = w- + w/xyz{ + wd|4#< + w}|4~WÄ  {jFà + wÅ xyz{×|4#< + wÉ xyz{×|4~WÄ + wÑÖpÄrqÜ\ + á (2.7a) 
  {jFàF"â	vVàäOj = w- + w/xyz{ + wdu4v#< + w}u4v~WÄ  à + wÅ xyz{×u4v#< + wÉ xyz{×u4v~WÄ + wÑÖpÄrqÜ\ + á . (2.7b) 
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These public signals are only observed once the roadshow is over and contain 
additional information about roadshow IPO subscription demand. I include the total 
frequency of upward and downward price amendments to the set of control variables 
as some deals will amend prices multiple times and may be interpreted as highly 
oversubscribed (or undersubscribed) deals. I drop two outliers from my sample, 
Baidu Inc. and Dicerna Pharmaceuticals, which have extreme initial returns of 353 
and 206 percent respectively.  
I include a multilevel model to account for the fact that some industries may 
attract more investor attention than others. Historically, new floats in nascent 
industries including semi-conductor firms in the early 1960s and internet stocks in 
the late 1990s have been prone to speculative manias (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2000). To the extent that certain industries are more attention grabbing and 
speculative in nature, the estimated effects of CASI on IPO initial returns are 
expected to vary by industry. To capture industry effects, I use a multilevel model 
which allows specified coefficients to vary across groups. Specifically, I allow the 
intercept and the CASI coefficient to vary across the Fama & French 49 industries as 
IPO initial returns may be higher on average for some industries, and thus may be 
more sensitive to CASI than others. This implies a model of the form: {jFàF"â	vVàäOj:~	l(Qå : + wå : xyz{ + wu4v#< + w xyz{×u4v#<+	wÑÖpÄrqÜ\, 	 t^Yd ) Qçwç 	~	l sésè , ^éd ê^é è^ê^é è^ è^d 	 	, (2.8) 
where i indexes individual IPOs and J indexes industries. FPRup is the first upward 
price amendment. Group intercepts and CASI slopes are normally distributed.  
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A multilevel approach is preferable to OLS with a full set of industry 
dummies as my sample has unbalanced IPO observations across different industries. 
For instance, there are 198 “drugs” IPOs while a number of industries including 
“beer”, “ships”, and “books” have fewer than five observations. Coefficient estimates 
for industry dummies with low observations tend to be extreme and unreliable 
(Gelman and Hill, 2006). The multilevel approach automatically accounts for 
unbalanced observations by partial-pooling (regularization) which pulls coefficient 
estimates for low-observation industries towards the group mean (Gelman, 2012). 
 
2.5.3  Measurement of Attention 
The main treatment variable CASI is measured with interest-over-time (IoT) data 
collected from Google Trends, which represents the volume of searches conducted 
for a phrase relative to the total volume of searches conducted on Google for a 
specified time period. The previous approach to obtaining search interest data (Da et 
al., 2011) involves inputting firm names and stock tickers into Google Trends. This 
introduced a number of problems when deciding which search terms to use with IoT 
queries. Picking the right firm names to query was subjective, and stock tickers may 
coincide with acronyms professionals use across different fields of expertise. Recent 
upgrades to the interface permits filtering of data by business news, finance, and 
investment categories. The new interface also offers entity disambiguation which 
improves the accuracy of entity recognition.9 For instance, “Tesla” queries can be 
filtered by “Tesla Motors Company” or “Nikola Tesla”, and the Google Trends 
interface returns a list of entity types for selection. Combining both entity recognition 
																																								 																				
9 Entity disambiguation features in Google Trends operates through Google’s Knowledge Graph, 
which links semantic-search information to entities. Querying terms such as “Arcos Dorados” (the 
franchisee of Macdonald’s restaurant) will suggest “Macdonald’s” in Google Trends for instance.  
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and category filtering features enhances the financial relevance of search interest 
data.  
With this data, I reconstruct Da et al.’s (2011) measure of daily abnormal 
search interest (ASI), defined as the difference between the natural log of (IoTt + 1) 
and the lagged median value of log(1 + Median[IoTt-1 , ... , IoTt-D]): 
yz{r = log 1 + {ìîr1 + ïV3F"j {ìîrN/, … , {ìîrNó  
where the median is calculated over the previous ò ∈ {15,30} days. Summing ASI 
over the 15 and 30 days before the date of the first price amendment gives my 
measure of CASI, defined as: xyz{ó = yz{rór 	.  
I calculate CASI for the Google Trends categories Business Industrial, 
Finance, and All. Business Industrial category data are sparse in comparison to the 
default All category. This prompts two composite measures: a Weighted Finance 
category which averages over the three mentioned categories, and a Business News 
category which uses values from finance and business news categories where 
possible, defaulting to the All category when data are unavailable. Approximately 21 
percent of sample IPOs (N=256) return zero values of IoT,10 an improvement over 
the 56 percent in Da et al.’s (2011) sample. Hence, I observe some clustering of 
CASI on zero. 
 
2.6  Empirical Results 
2.6.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2.3 displays the distribution of IPO price amendments and final price 
revisions. Panel A shows downward price amendments are typically much larger in 
																																								 																				
10  Google Trends truncates search interest queries that do not return a sufficient level of search 
volume. The exact threshold used to truncate search interest is not disclosed. Data are not missing for 
these firms, just very low.  
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magnitude than upward amendments, which is consistent with the observations in 
Lowry and Schwert (2002). On average, IPOs are priced 50 cents lower than the 
original filing price at the start of the book building period, which translates to an 
average -3.32 percent first price update. Plotting the percentage change in the first 
price update against the final price revision in Panel B shows that many underwriters 
set the final offer price as the midpoint of the updated filing price range. These 
observations are represented as points lying on the 45 degree line. Some upward 
price amendments are eventually revised downward (below the 45 degree line), 
suggesting overoptimistic pricing. In contrast, nearly all downward price 
amendments are either maintained or revised downward further. A full list of 
variable definitions can be found in Table 2.1, and the corresponding summary 
statistics are found in Table 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Price Amendments and Final Price Revisions 
 
The sample consists of 1,234 IPOs from 2005Q1 to 2014Q3. Panel A presents the distribution of price 
amendments across the 415 IPOs that amend offer prices during the IPO roadshow. Panel B plots first 
price amendments against final price revision. 
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions I 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Sample Characteristics of Regression Variables.  
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Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for 15- and 30-day CASI by the 
direction of final price revisions relative to the initial filing range and by underwriter 
ranks. ANOVA results show significant differences in abnormal attention. 
Specifically, firms that experience upward price revisions are those which have 
attracted significantly higher investor attention, as shown in Panel A. Panel B shows 
that deals underwritten by top ranking underwriters also attract significantly more 
attention, suggesting that prestigious underwriters may be more adept at securing 
more marketable deals or better at creating publicity for the issue. Table 2.4 displays 
pairwise correlations for the variables. The predictor variable CASI is only weakly 
correlated with FPRup and ΔPup variables, suggesting there is unlikely to be 
multicollinearity issues in model estimation. 
 
2.6.2  Regression Results 
Table 2.5 provides the OLS regression results for final IPO price revisions, with 
CASI measured over a 15-day interval. For robustness, I also report the results for 
CASI measured over a 30-day interval in Table 2.6. I run two regressions for each of 
Weighted Finance (specifications 2-3), All (specifications 4-5), and Business News 
(specifications 6-7) categories, where the squared and interaction terms of CASI are 
added in the second regression. Specification 1 is a baseline model without CASI 
terms. 
 
  
 39 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Abnormal Attention. 
 
 
CASI is cumulative abnormal search interest (ASI) over 15 or 30 days before price revision, where ASI 
is IoTt minus IoTD-median. All refers to the default Google Trends category. Weighted Finance is an 
average of Finance, Business Industrial, and All Google Trends categories. Business News uses 
business categories where possible, defaulting to All when unavailable. In Panel A, the sample is split 
according to whether the final offer price is above (N=273), within (N=534, not reported), or under 
(N=427) the original filing price range. Panel B stratifies the sample by Carter-Manaster underwriter 
rank. P-values refer to Kruskall-Wallace rank tests of equality. 
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Table 2.4: Pairwise Correlations of Regression Variables 
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Table 2.5: Regression Results for Final Price Revisions, (15-day CASI).  
 
Notes: Sample consists of 1234 IPOs during the 2005-2014 period. The dependent variable is the final 
price revision (FPR), defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing 
price range and the final offer price (PF):  FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. ΔP is the first price amendment, defined 
as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price range (Po) and the 
midpoint of the first amended offer price range (P1): ΔP = (P1 - P0)/P0. The main treatment variables 
are cumulative abnormal attention (CASI) and its interaction with ΔP. CASI is measured over 15 days. 
Weighted Finance, Business-News, and All refer to Google Trends categories. Ln(1 + Media Count) is 
the log of number of media articles in the 2 weeks before the price amendment. EPS+ is one for 
positive EPS and zero otherwise. Ln(Proceeds) and Ln(1 + Sales) are the natural logs of the dollar 
amount of proceeds on offer and dollar amount of sales revenue as reported in the prospectus, 
respectively. Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank. Venture Capital takes the value of 1 if 
the IPO had venture backing, and zero otherwise. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares on offer to the 
shares held by insiders. 3-Month Industry Returns and 3-Month Average IPO Returns are respectively 
returns on the Fama & French 49 industry portfolios and IPO stocks averaged over the 3 months 
before the start of the roadshow. All regressions include calendar-year and industry dummies (not 
reported). t-statistics are reported in brackets with standard errors clustered by industry. *** and ** 
denote significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
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 Table 2.5 shows a positive and significant coefficient on CASI across all 
categories, consistent with the attention-price-pressure hypothesis. Thus, IPOs which 
attract abnormally high investor attention enjoy significantly higher upward price 
revisions, consistent with hypothesis H2. In economic terms, a one unit increase in 
investor attention (about 10 percentage points) is on average associated with a 2.03 
percentage point higher final price revision. The coefficient on the squared CASI 
term is negative and significant only in specifications 4 and 5, suggesting that the 
association between investor attention and the final price revision diminishes at 
higher levels of attention.  
The coefficient on the first price amendment (ΔP) is particularly interesting 
for it sheds light on whether IPO price pops are engineered by bankers or the 
outcome of speculative trading. Partial adjustment theories suggest that underwriters 
deliberately underprice in order to create a momentum effect. In such a case, the first 
price amendment (P1 - P0) should be positively related to subsequent price revisions 
(PF - P1). Because both ΔP and FPR are defined using the same initial filing price 
range, the coefficient on ΔPup should be greater than 1 if there are momentum 
effects, as I am regressing (P1 - P0) on (PF - P0). Given that the coefficient on ΔPup is 
approximately one in all specifications, it appears that upward price amendments are 
efficient at the time of amendment. Thus, a large portion of the conditional 
underpricing effect may be driven by speculative trading rather than deliberate 
underpricing.  
This result is consistent with Lowry and Schwert (2004), who find that 
underwriters who conduct IPO book builds appear to price deals efficiently. The 
coefficient on ΔPdown is -0.89 across all specifications, suggesting that underwriters 
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initially amend offer prices down partially before further revising the offer price 
downward in the final pricing call before the listing day.  
The interaction terms (CASI × Pup) and (CASI × Pdown) test the attention-
amplification hypothesis. Specification 3 shows a statistically significant positive 
coefficient for (CASI × Pup). Thus, IPOs that attract higher investor attention and 
amend offer prices upward have a greater upward revision in offer prices. This 
provides evidence for hypothesis H1. In economic terms, a one unit increase in 
investor attention increases the association between the first and final price 
amendments 1.2-fold (=(1.00+0.19)/1.00). I find no evidence of an attention-
amplification effect for downward price amendments, as expected.  
The results are also robust when CASI is measured over a 30-day period, as 
shown in Table 2.6. I note in particular that the CASI terms retain their statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficients on CASI terms are half 
in size relative to those reported in Table 2.5 due to the standard deviation of 30-day 
CASI variables being twice that of 15-day CASI variables.  
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Table 2.6: Regression Results for Final Price Revisions, (30-day CASI).  
 
Notes: Sample consists of 1234 IPOs during the 2005-2014 period. The dependent variable is the final 
price revision (FPR), defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing 
price range and the final offer price (PF):  FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. ΔP is the first price amendment, defined 
as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price range (Po) and the 
midpoint of the first amended offer price range (P1): ΔP = (P1 - P0)/P0. The main treatment variables 
are the cumulative abnormal attention (CASI) and its interaction with ΔP. CASI is measured over 30 
days. Weighted Finance, Business-News, and All refer to Google Trends categories. Ln(1 + Media 
Count) is the log of the number of media articles in the 2 weeks before the price amendment. 
Ln(Proceeds) and Ln(1+Sales) are the natural logs of the dollar amount of proceeds on offer and 
dollar amount of sales revenue as reported in the prospectus, respectively. Underwriter Rank is the 
Carter-Manaster rank. Venture Capital takes the value of 1 if the IPO had venture backing, and zero 
otherwise. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares on offer to the shares held by insiders. 3-Month 
Industry Returns and 3-Month Average IPO Returns are respectively returns on the Fama & French 49 
industry portfolios and IPO stocks averaged over the 3 months before the start of the roadshow. All 
regressions include calendar-year and industry dummies (not reported). t-statistics are reported in 
brackets with standard errors clustered by industry. *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
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Table 2.7 reports the regression results for IPO initial returns. As before, CASI 
is measured over the 15-day (specifications 1-3) and 30-day windows (specifications 
4-6). Results show that CASI has a positive and significant (at the 1 percent level) 
coefficient in all specifications. Thus, IPOs which attract abnormally high investor 
attention enjoy significantly larger initial returns, consistent with the attention-price 
pressure hypothesis (H2). According to specification 1, a one unit increase in 
investor attention is associated with an average 2.48 percentage point higher initial 
IPO return. Evidence of a non-linear relation between investor attention and initial 
returns is found only for the 30-day CASI measure. 
Both upward and downward price amendments by themselves are 
insignificant in explaining IPO underpricing. In specification 2, upward price 
amendments (ΔPup) are insignificant at the 5% level. Downward price amendments 
(ΔPdown) are significant although the estimated effect is small; a 10 percentage point 
decrease in price amendments is associated with an average 1.3 percentage point 
increase in initial IPO returns. 
The interaction terms (CASI × Pup) and (CASI × Pdown) test the attention-
amplification hypothesis. Results show that, like with final price revisions, the 
coefficient on the (CASI × Pup) interaction term is positive and significant. Thus, 
IPOs that attract higher investor attention and amend offer prices upward are 
associated with a significantly more positive first-day IPO returns. This provides 
supporting evidence for my attention-amplification hypothesis (H1). I find no such 
evidence for downward price amendments. 
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Table 2.7: Regression Results for IPO First-day Returns.  
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Table 2.7 Continued.  
 
 
Notes: Sample consists of 1232 IPOs during the 2005-2014 period. The dependent variable is IPO 
initial return, measured from the final offer price and the closing price at the end of the first day of 
trading. The main treatment variables are abnormal attention (15-day CASI) and its interaction with 
final price revision (FPR). FPR is defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the 
original filing price range and the final offer price (PF):  FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. ΔP is the first price 
amendment, defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price 
range (Po) and the midpoint of the first amended offer price range (P1): ΔP = (P1 - P0)/P0. No. ΔPup is 
the total number of upward price amendments. CASI is the cumulative abnormal search interest in the 
15 and 30 days before price revision calculated as per Da et al. (2001) with measures of search interest 
retrieved from Google Trends. Ln(1 + Media Count) is the log of the number of media articles in the 2 
weeks before the price amendment. Ln(Days from S-1 to Listing), Ln(Proceeds), and Ln(1 + Sales) 
are the natural logs of the number of days from when the S-1 was first filed to the day of the float, the 
dollar amount of proceeds on offer, and dollar amount of sales revenue as reported in the prospectus, 
respectively. Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank. Venture Capital takes the value of 1 if 
the IPO had venture backing, and zero otherwise. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares on offer to the 
shares held by insiders. 3-Month Industry Returns and 3-Month Average IPO Returns are returns on 
the Fama & French 49 industry portfolios and IPO stocks averaged over the 3 months before the start 
of the roadshow. All regressions include calendar year dummy variables (unreported). t-statistics are 
reported in brackets with standard errors clustered by industry. *** and ** denote significance at 1% 
and 5% respectively. 
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In specifications 3 and 6, I replace ΔP with FPR, and obtain similar results. 
The coefficient estimate for the (CASI × FRPup) interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant, consistent with hypothesis H1. Specification 3 shows that for 
each one unit increase in investor attention, the slope relating upward final price 
revision (FPRup) to initial returns increases approximately 1.46-fold (= 
(0.17+0.37)/0.37). This association is even stronger statistically for the 30-day CASI 
measure in specification 6.  
Table 2.8 shows the results are robust to industry effects in multi-level 
regressions. In specifications 2 and 3, I allow the coefficient estimates of CASI to 
vary by industry. The coefficient estimates for the (CASI × FRPup) interaction term 
retain the same size and become stronger statistically. Thus it would appear that 
higher investor attention amplifies the market reaction to offer price revisions leading 
to larger initial IPO returns. The hierarchical linear model provides industry specific 
estimates of CASI which are highest for firms in the restaurant and hotels industry 
(Meals) with a coefficient of 5.50 (omitted). In contrast, the CASI coefficient for the 
telecommunications sector (Telcm) is -3.70 (omitted), suggesting greater investor 
attention is associated with lower IPO initial returns. 
Across all specifications in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, the (CASI × FRPdown) 
interaction term is not related to IPO initial returns, suggesting that investors seem to 
ignore large downward price revisions. In the Morris and Shin’s (2003) framework, 
investors overreact to downward price amendments and take measures to short sell 
the IPO. However, IPO speculators may refrain from short selling the IPO as it is 
well known that underwriters engage in aftermarket IPO price support (Aggarwal, 
2000).  
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Table 2.8: Hierarchical Regression Results for IPO First-day Returns. 
 
Notes: Sample of 1234 IPOs from 2005-2014. The dependent variable is IPO initial return, measured 
from the final offer price and the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The main 
treatment variables are abnormal attention (15-day CASI) and its interaction terms with final price 
revision (FPR). FPR is defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing 
price range and the final offer price (PF):  FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. ΔP is the first price amendment, defined 
as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price range (Po) and the 
midpoint of the first amended offer price range (P1): ΔP = (P1 - P0)/P0. No. ΔPup is the total number of 
upward price amendments. CASI is the cumulative abnormal search interest in the 15 days before 
price revision. Ln(1 + Media Count) is the log of the number of media articles in the 2 weeks before 
the price amendment. Ln(Days from S-1 to Listing), Ln(Proceeds), and Ln(1 + Sales) are the natural 
logs of the number of days from when the S-1 was first filed to the day of the float, the dollar amount 
of proceeds on offer, and dollar amount of sales revenue as reported in the prospectus, respectively. 
Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster rank. Venture Capital is a dummy variable which is 1 if the 
IPO had venture backing, and zero otherwise. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares on offer to the 
shares held by insiders. 3-Month Industry Returns and 3-Month Average IPO Returns are respectively 
the returns on the Fama & French 49 industry portfolios and the return on IPO stocks averaged over 
the 3 months before the start of the roadshow. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Specification 1 is a 
random intercepts model which allows the intercepts of each industry to vary. Specification 2 varies 
the coefficients of CASI across each industry, and specification 3 combines both random intercepts 
and random CASI coefficients for each of the Fama & French 49 industries (random intercepts and 
coefficients omitted). 	
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For a short-selling strategy to be profitable, investors need to be sure that 
their peers are willing to short the IPO. As guarantor of the issue, the underwriter 
retains large share reserves to support the float at the final offer price, effectively 
providing a price peg.11 Aggregate downward price pressure needs to exceed the 
underwriter’s ability to support the price for short selling to be profitable, hence short 
sellers also face a coordination problem.  As underwriters withdraw price support in 
the weeks after the IPO, investors remain unsure that other investors will correctly 
time and short sell the IPO. Prospective short-sellers may thus need to wait until a 
negative earnings surprise or for lockups to expire for an opportunity to sell (Hong et 
al., 2006). This is consistent with the documented price drop in newly-listed firms 
following lockup expiration (Field and Hanka, 2001; Aggarwal et al., 2002, Brav and 
Gompers, 2003). Lockup provisions and escrow dates are known well in advance by 
all investors and thus can serve as a focal point for coordinating a short selling 
attack. 
The results for my control variables are consistent with the extant literature. 
The number of upward price amendments (No. ΔPup) is significantly positively 
related to initial returns, while the number of downward price amendments (No. 
ΔPdown) is negatively related. Specification 3 in table 2.8, which allows intercepts and 
CASI coefficients to vary by industry, shows that each upward price amendment 
produces on average a 10.59 percentage point increase in IPO initial returns. 
Conversely, each downward price amendment reduces first-day IPO returns by 4.47 
percentage points on average. This effect may be driven by deals which amend prices 
downward multiple times. Deals that amend prices downwards multiple times 
experience negative initial returns on average, suggesting that investors are more 
																																								 																				
11 Aftermarket price support is conducted with over-allotment “green-shoe” options, typically up to 
15% of gross shares on offer.   
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sensitive to the total number of downward price amendments than the actual size of 
the price amendment. Highly ranked underwriters are associated with larger initial 
IPO returns (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), as are IPOs with greater share overhang, 
consistent with Bradley and Jordan (2002). Venture capital backed IPOs have larger 
initial returns although the coefficient estimates are only marginally significant. 
 
2.7  Summary and Conclusions 
Existing theories of conditional underpricing argue that underwriters deliberately 
underprice IPOs that appear “hot” while pricing cold deals efficiently. I provide an 
alternative theory where investors selectively bid in IPOs which experience upward 
price revisions. 
I start with the assumption that investors have a motive to coordinate 
investment in hot IPOs. Because underwriters collect and aggregate information from 
bids when revising the offer price, offer price revisions reflect the actions of peer 
investors and serve as a coordination mechanism. Investors with coordination 
motives therefore rationally overreact to upward offer price revisions resulting in 
large initial returns. In my framework, more precise price revisions are more 
effective at coordinating actions, amplifying overreactions. A more precise price 
revision is produced when underwriters collect bids from more informed investors. 
Thus overreactions intensify when investors engage in information acquisition and 
search for IPO related news during the roadshow period. My framework predicts that 
deals which attract more attention amplify market reactions to upward price 
revisions, resulting in abnormally large market reactions. 
I test this attention-amplification hypothesis with measures of information 
acquisition sourced from Google Trends (Da et al., 2011). I focus on two scenarios: 
i) investors’ reactions to price range amendments (during the middle of the 
 
	
52 
roadshow) which I observe in final price revisions; and ii) investors’ reactions to 
final price revisions which I observe in IPO first-day returns. My results indicate that 
upward price range amendments are linked to subsequent upward final price 
revisions, and that this relationship intensifies for IPOs that attract greater investor 
attention. The same effect holds between final price revisions and IPO first-day 
returns. I find that the relationship between final price revisions and IPO initial 
returns (conditional underpricing) is amplified for deals that attract greater attention.  
Some of the broader insights to emerge from my framework highlight the 
hidden consequences of the book build method of conducting IPOs. In particular, 
book builds offer improved price discovery, yet more precise price revisions yield 
greater overreactions from market participants. The fact that investors conditionally 
invest after observing upward price amendments is outside of the underwriter’s 
control. As a result, conditional underpricing is an inevitable consequence of the 
book build method, and will persist over the long run. This may explain the puzzling 
observation that prestigious underwriters are associated with greater underpricing 
and why issuers still choose underwriters with a history of underpricing (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004; Hoberg and Hanley, 2010). Prestigious underwriters with greater 
certification and valuation abilities produce more precise offer prices, resulting in 
greater market overreactions. 
My evidence suggests that conditional underpricing is largely an aftermarket 
phenomenon and not a deliberate attempt by underwriters to create an illusion of 
demand (Shiller, 1990). The first price amendment is unrelated to the final price 
revision after controlling for attention interaction variables, which suggests that 
underwriters are amending prices efficiently during the roadshow period. However, 
traders in the IPO aftermarket still overreact to final price revisions, resulting in large 
initial returns. If underwriters were in fact deliberately underpricing issues, one 
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would expect to find some evidence of momentum effects between the first price 
amendment and final price revision (Aggarwal, 2002). Consistent with Lowry and 
Schwert (2004), I find no such evidence.  
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Chapter 3: Managing Price Expectations with IPO 
Roadshows 
	
3.1  Introduction 
When firm owners wish to float their company on the exchange, they choose a lead 
underwriter from a number of competing investment banks. To increase their chance of 
becoming the lead underwriter for the IPO, the investment banks may promise favorable 
valuations and participation from institutional clientele, inflating the issuer’s 
expectations of the offer price (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). At the same time, the 
underwriters need to ensure that offer prices are set low enough to attract substantial 
interest from their institutional clientele. Failure to mediate the transaction in a way that 
satisfies both the issuer and institutional investors can be problematic for underwriters 
since they will be left with either undersubscribed shares or loss of future business from 
an upset issuer. Since roadshows are a private affair and under the control of the 
underwriter, I argue in this chapter that roadshows offer a strategic opportunity for the 
underwriter to invite comparatively pessimistic investors to present as “evidence” that 
the issuer is over-optimistic about her proposed offering price.  
I show how the underwriter manages the issuer’s offer price expectations using 
Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) Bayesian persuasion framework. The framework 
provides an explanation as to how an underwriter can design an information 
environment so that the issuer rationally agrees with the underwriter’s offer price 
recommendations. My application of the Bayesian persuasion framework to the IPO 
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roadshow predicts a relation between the number of roadshow presentations and the 
timing of downward offer price amendments.  
To see why, suppose that an underwriter proposes an offer price amendment 
during the roadshow and that the issuer must agree with the price change. When the 
underwriter wishes to secure a price lower than what the issuer expects, she must exert 
greater persuasive effort (in the form of roadshow presentations) to convince an over-
optimistic issuer to agree to amend the offer price downward. Thus, downward price 
amendments should occur earlier into the roadshow when the issuer is exposed to a 
greater number of relatively pessimistic roadshows. In contrast, when market response is 
more favorable than what the issuer initially expected, the underwriter can amend offer 
prices upward with little resistance. Hence, downward price amendments occur later 
than upward price amendments, with the number of roadshows before downward price 
amendments reflecting the effectiveness of the underwriter’s persuasion efforts.  
The systematic difference in the timing of upward and downward price 
amendments captures the greater aversion of issuers to perceived losses than to gains 
when pricing an IPO. In their prospect theory explanation of why issuers appear 
indifferent towards underpriced shares, Loughran and Ritter (2002, p. 438) note that 
issuers appear to “bargain hard over the offer price in a bad state of the world, whereas 
they are pushovers in bargaining in a good state of the world”. Issuers appear 
indifferent to underpricing, even going as far as rehiring the underwriter in follow-on 
equity offerings (Krigman et al., 2001).  
I argue that underwriters tactfully persuade issuers into accepting lower offer 
prices by designing a specific roadshow itinerary to manage the issuer’s expectations 
downward. My roadshow persuasion hypothesis asserts that downward offer price 
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amendments occur later than upward price amendments in the roadshow since the issuer 
requires a number of roadshow presentations to become convinced that the IPO market 
response is unfavorable. Varying the number of roadshow presentations should therefore 
change the odds and timeliness of downward price amendments.  
Existing research explains that the roadshow is simply a communication channel 
for investors to voice their concerns and valuation opinions to help the underwriter price 
the issue accurately (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Sherman and Titman, 2002; 
Sherman, 2005). The IPO book-build is typically framed as a mechanism design 
problem and the purpose of the roadshow is abstracted away from consideration.12 I take 
a different approach and provide an example of how roadshows provide strategic value 
to an underwriter. Specifically, IPO roadshows provide a belief design mechanism that 
the underwriter employs in order to manage the issuer’s pricing expectations and to 
reliably secure underpriced shares for favored institutional clients (Cornelli and 
Goldreich, 2001; Reuter, 2006; Goldstein et al., 2009).  
In an account of Microsoft’s IPO, Uttal (1986, p. 5) notes that when Bill Gates 
and his advisors made a counterproposal to raise the offer price, representatives of 
Goldman Sachs, the lead underwriter of the deal, protested that “coming out $1 too high 
would drive off some high-quality investors. Just a few significant defections could lead 
other investors to think the offering was losing its luster”. They further protested that six 
of the largest institutional investors were threatening to withdraw from the IPO, 
suggesting that the pricing decision was out of their (Goldman Sach’s) control. While 
Bill Gates eventually prevailed and secured a higher offer price, this account provides 
																																								 																				
12 One exception is Blankspoor et al. (2015) who argue that the roadshow conveys “soft” information 
regarding the CEO’s trustworthiness, competence, and attractiveness, which influences investors’ 
qualitative judgements about how well the IPO will perform after listing. 
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some anecdotal evidence as to how pessimistic reactions from institutional clients during 
roadshows can be used by underwriters as a negotiation tool with the issuing firm. This 
absolves the underwriter of accusations that they are acting against the issuer’s best 
interests and thus helps the underwriter retain their reputation for integrity. Hence, there 
are strategic applications of the IPO roadshow which provide some insight as to why 
book-build IPOs are more popular than alternative methods of going public, such as 
fixed price offers and auctions (Jagannathan et al., 2015). It turns out that Bill Gates’ 
counter-offer of $21-$22 per share was still underpriced as Microsoft stock jumped to 
$25 immediately upon listing, before closing at $27.75 at the end of the day. It would 
appear that the threats to abandon participation in the IPO from institutional clients were 
empty threats as they remained subscribed to the deal and secured guaranteed profits. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant 
IPO literature which I use to motivate and justify the assumptions I make in the model. 
Section 3.3 develops the model and hypotheses. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 cover sample data 
and methodology respectively. I discuss empirical results in Section 3.6 and follow with 
a discussion of competing explanations in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.  
 
3.2  Literature Review 
In this section, I review the arguments presented in the existing literature which explains 
why underwriters choose to price IPOs conservatively.  
 The literature suggests that IPO underpricing is a “choice” because underwriters 
have discretion in setting both the price and share allocations to bidders during the IPO 
book-build process. As such, underwriters have the ability to allocate shares to favored 
clients who reciprocate with brokerage commissions (Sherman, 2000; Cornelli and 
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Goldreich, 2001; Derrien and Womack, 2003; Reuter, 2006; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). 
Goldstein et al. (2009) find that buy-side firms with established relationships with 
investment banks tend to have better IPO access and allocations on demand, and in 
return, pay abnormally high brokerage commissions to underwriters in profitable IPOs 
(Goldstein et al., 2011). Similarly, in a survey of 49 mutual funds who actively 
participate in IPO roadshows, Jenkinson and Jones (2009) find investor rapport with the 
underwriting bank is the most influential factor in securing favorable share allocations. 
A number of anecdotes support these studies. After confidential documents from 
the eToys vs. Goldman Sachs lawsuit were made public in 2013, email correspondences 
between Goldman Sachs employees made a note that “hot deals are obviously a 
currency which can be used to please institutions, please high net worth individuals, 
acquire new customers (perhaps for GS.com), [...] How should we allocate between the 
various firm businesses to maximize value to GS?” (Nocera, 2013, p. 1). An employee 
even went as far as to ask “has anyone commissioned a study to look at last years IPO 
deal leverage ratio for our clients? (That is.... how much money we are giving our 
clients versus what we are getting in return)” (Nocera, 2013, p. 7), suggesting that 
Goldman Sachs employees were rather sophisticated when it came to determining the 
profitability of their quid quo pro scheme.  
 Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) prospect theory of underpricing argues that issuers 
anchor price expectations on the initial filing price and ignore forfeited proceeds if they 
raise more money than they initially expected (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Issuers 
bargain harder over downward price revisions when it becomes clear that they are 
unlikely to raise the expected amount of money. They are indifferent towards 
underpricing when prices are revised upward. Underwriters supposedly take advantage 
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of these biased price expectations by underpricing when issuers are happy and pricing 
accurately when issuers are unhappy. This results in the conditional underpricing 
distribution. Larger price revisions result in larger and more variable IPO initial returns. 
If issuers suffer from framing biases and are more averse to losses than to gains, 
a lower filing price will work to the advantage of an underwriter who finds it easier to 
adjust prices upward from a low listing price than downward from a high listing price. In 
a similar vein, Northcraft and Neale (1987) find that “low-ball” listing prices in the real 
estate market biases the valuations of prospective buyers and expert realtors. Suppose 
you own a 20-unit apartment complex and sold one apartment through a smooth talking 
realtor who convinces you this is the best price. The same realtor later helps the buyer 
flip the same apartment for twice the price shortly thereafter. While you are mad for 
selling the apartment at a large discount, you are simultaneously informed of the fact 
that the market value of your 19 other apartments are now worth double. In terms of 
perceived wealth, you are now almost twice as wealthy as before.  
This analogy mirrors the IPO setting where only a fraction of shares are on offer. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that loss aversion is responsible for increased 
bargaining effort from the issuer. Therefore, an underwriter will find it easier to 
negotiate with the issuer if she can manage the issuer’s pricing expectations. If the 
underwriter can coerce the issuer into believing that demand for the issue is weak 
initially, then actual subscription inflows in following periods of the roadshow will 
appear abnormally large−a pleasant surprise.  
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3.3  Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I model the roadshow process and the persuasion mechanism. An 
example of roadshow itinerary is described in Appendix B. The model relies on 
assumptions derived from existing empirical literature. The first assumption is that the 
underwriter derives utility from underpricing a hot IPO (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; 
Derrien and Womack, 2003; Reuter, 2006; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). This effect is 
captured in my model by a misalignment in the preferences of the issuer and the 
underwriter. My second assumption is that the underwriter has close relationships with a 
number of institutional investors whom she is able to invite to act as critics (Jenkinson 
and Jones, 2004; 2009). These selected institutional investors give the issuer the 
impression that they are not as excited as they (the issuers) are about the firm’s 
prospects. 
 
3.3.1  The “Bayesian Persuasion” Environment 
I borrow and modify the leading example in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to 
highlight the intuition behind my model. There are two states of the world ω ∈ Ω: 
ω=hot, which corresponds to states where subscription demand is sufficiently high to 
justify a high offer price, and ω=cold, corresponding to a state where the IPO attracts 
insufficient interest amongst investors and must be priced low. There are n roadshow 
presentations, each of which can be thought of as an experiment producing a signal h 
(hot subscription demand) and c (cold subscription demand). Each roadshow response is 
directly observed by the issuer so the underwriter cannot lie or obscure the true 
roadshow response. However, the underwriter does control the roadshow parameters that 
determine roadshow response. The underwriter designs the information environment by 
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selectively inviting institutional clients to attend roadshows. At the end of each 
roadshow presentation, the underwriter makes a recommendation to either amend offer 
prices high or low. The issuer takes an action to either agree to a high price or a low 
price, ai = {high, low}. If the issuer disagrees, no price amendment occurs and the game 
proceeds on to the next stage of the roadshow. 
Initially, the issuer is over-optimistic, placing a 0.8 prior on the probability that 
the true state of investor demand is hot because she has anchored her expectations on the 
initial filing price range which is upward biased. We can think of this bias as a 
consequence of underwriters competing with one another to secure their position as the 
lead underwriter in the ‘bake sale’ (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). To illustrate how the 
belief design problem concerns only the issuer’s beliefs, I assume that the issuer’s 
preferences (ui) are: 
ui(h|hot) = 1 ui(h|cold) = 0 
ui(c|hot) = 0 ui(c|cold) = 1 
The issuer wishes to obtain a high price when the true state of investor demand is hot. 
She wishes to avoid underpricing the company whenever possible. The underwriter’s 
preferences are imperfectly aligned with those of the issuer. The underwriters generally 
wish to price IPOs accurately and they have incentives to price the offer conservatively 
in order to elicit interest from institutional investors. I assume that the underwriter’s 
preferences follow: 
uu(h|hot) = 1 uu(h|cold) = 0 
uu(c|hot) = 2 uu(c|cold) = 1 
Note that the underwriter is not legally bound to act in the issuing firm’s interest 
(DeMott, 2011), although they are inclined to act this way in order to uphold their 
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reputations. Thus if the issuer demands an over-optimistic offer price, the underwriter 
does not need to comply. The key point of these laws is to account for the fact that the 
underwriter must balance the needs of both the issuer and buy-side institutional clientele. 
The EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co. case highlights this point in detail. After a 
lengthy legal battle where the creditors of eToys Inc. accused Goldman Sachs of 
allocating underpriced shares to favored clients for commission kickbacks, the judges 
ruled that an “underwriting agreement did not establish a formal fiduciary relationship” 
(Brown, 2011) and hence underwriters were not required to disclose the full extent of 
their [quid quo pro] relationships with other institutional clients. With the imperfect 
alignment in preferences, the underwriter wants to deliver a signal to the issuer which 
induces the desired action from the issuer (from the underwriter’s perspective). 
 
3.3.2  Optimal signals 
The underwriter chooses a signal structure which takes the form of signal distributions: 
π(s|hot) and π(s|cold), with signals being h (hot) and c (cold). Without any roadshow 
investigations, the issuer always pushes to price the deal high since her prior is π0(hot) = 
0.8. If the underwriter goes about choosing a fully informative experiment, then signal 
structures are: 
π(h|hot) = 1 π(h|cold) = 0 
π(c|hot) = 0 π(c|cold) = 1 
meaning that the issuer agrees to a low price when the true state is hot with probability 
0.2. This is the same outcome as when the underwriter does not engage in any 
persuasion. Hence, by default the underwriter experiences less resistance from the issuer 
when amending offer prices upward than downward. The underwriter can however 
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achieve a more favorable result by choosing to strategically reveal this specific signal 
structure:  
π(h|hot) = ¾ π(h|cold) = 0 
π(c|hot) = ¼ π(c|cold) = 1 
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) prove that the optimal roadshow has the signal 
structure: 
" # $ = 	'( $ )('()',($)  (3.1) 
where µs is the issuer’s posterior belief that the state of subscription demand is hot 
conditional on receiving a signal h, and τ(µs) is the distribution of posteriors. An 
explanation of the distribution of posteriors τ(µ) is warranted. Let Ω denote the state 
space so ∆(Ω) is the set of all possible states. A probability distribution over these states 
is a belief µ, so the set of all possible beliefs over states is denoted: τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)). In 
particular, for a specific distribution of posteriors: ) ' = 	 "(#|$.)',($.)/0∈1(:3453 	. (3.2) 
The first summation sign sums over all signals s for a given issuer’s posterior (µs=µ), 
and the second summation sign sums over all possible states. Kamenica and Gentzkow 
(2011) restrict attention to a set of posterior beliefs satisfying Bayes plausibility: 
'	 7) = ',	89::(;)  (3.3) 
meaning that the only valid distributions (τ) of posteriors (µ) are those whose 
expectation is equal to the prior µ0. In my IPO roadshow example, I only have two 
states, hot and cold, so the distribution of posterior beliefs is rather simple: τ(µs) = 
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π(c|cold)π0(cold) + π(c|hot)π0(hot). Solving for the optimal signal involves rearranging 
the following equation which takes on the form of Bayes theorem: 
 " < ℎ>? = 	"(ℎ>?|<))('()",(ℎ>?)   
 " c ℎ>? = 	" ℎ>? < 	×	 " < ℎ>? ", ℎ>? + "(<|<>C7)",(<>C7)",(ℎ>?)  (3.4) 
where π(c|cold) = 1 since the underwriter never wants to overprice a cold issue. π(hot|c) 
cannot be greater than 0.5 since the issuer cannot think that the deal is hot after 
witnessing a c signal. Plugging these figures into the equation and rearranging for 
π(c|hot) gives ¼. The underwriter will attempt to give a quarter of all “hot” IPOs “cold” 
roadshow responses and so one-quarter of “hot” deals are priced low even when the 
issuer believes that only one-fifth are cold deals (π0(cold) = 0.2). The issuer’s induced 
posterior is now π(cold) ∈ {π(cold|h)=0, π(cold|c)=1/2}. Note that as the issuer’s prior 
becomes more optimistic, π(c|hot) decreases and the underwriter is unable to price the 
deal low as easily.13 Since the underwriter is able to price offers low more frequently 
when the issuer is less optimistic, it is in the underwriter’s interest to expose the issuer to 
additional pessimistic roadshow presentations. The underwriter only needs to persuade 
the issuer when amending offer prices downward and faces no resistance when 
amending offer prices upward. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
H1:  Upward price amendments occur earlier than downward price 
amendments. 
																																								 																				
13 So far, we have assumed that the issuer has a low standard of proof and believes that the state is cold 
whenever observing a c signal, i.e., π(hot|c) = 0.5. One might think that more convincing persuasion is 
more beneficial to the underwriter. That is not the case. Suppose π(hot|c) = 0.4 instead of 0.5. Rerunning 
the calculations gives π(c|hot) = 1/7 which is lower than the original π(c|hot) = 1/4. This result suggests 
that the underwriter wants to provide just enough evidence to convince the issuer that the true state is cold. 
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3.3.3  Number of Roadshows Required 
I have shown the underwriter benefits from persuasion by low-balling approximately 
one in four hot IPOs. Now fix r, the number of pieces of pessimistic news from investors 
during the roadshow that the issuer needs to be exposed to in order for the underwriter to 
secure a low offer price. This might involve roadshows where the majority of investors 
are critiquing that the company’s earnings figures do not justify the price it is seeking to 
raise capital. The underwriter now needs to figure out the number of roadshows (n) that 
is required so that r pessimistic roadshows are revealed. The probability of revealing r 
pessimistic roadshow responses at the nth roadshow presentation can be represented by a 
negative binomial distribution: 
 DE F = E G, ", = G − 1E − 1 ",K(1 −	",)LMK	. (3.5) 
Increasing the number of roadshow presentations (n) increases this probability: 
 DE F = E G ≤ G., ", = 	 G − 1E − 1 ",K(1 − ",)LMKLOL.   
 Pr F = E G ≤ G., ", = 	 G − 12 − 1 0.2T(1 − 0.8)LMTLOV 	. (3.7) 
In my example above, there is a 20% chance that a roadshow response is cold if the 
underwriter randomly invites investors. Therefore, the probability of observing at least 
two pessimistic roadshows [Pr(X ³ 2)] after conducting two, three, or four roadshows is 
4%, 10.4%, and 18.08% respectively. It may be more beneficial for the underwriter to be 
selective about the types of investors they allow in, inviting regular institutional 
investors who place larger priors on π0(cold). If each roadshow has a 50% probability of 
resulting in a cold outcome instead of 20%, then the probability of observing two 
pessimistic roadshows becomes 25%, 50%, and 68.75% respectively. Thus, in order to 
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convince the issuer in a timely manner that the state of subscription demand is cold, it is 
more effective for underwriters to expend more time and effort into designing the 
roadshow itinerary to increase the chances of producing a target number of pessimistic 
roadshows. Thus, I predict that if underwriters selectively invite pessimistic institutional 
investors to roadshows, then: 
H2: IPOs with a greater number of roadshow presentations experience 
earlier downward price amendments. 
 
3.3.4  Competition in Persuasion between Underwriters 
Employing additional lead underwriters to co-manage the deal can undermine the 
persuasion mechanism if a rogue co-managing bank is privately conversing with the 
issuing firm and relaying facts about investor demand that contradict what the other lead 
underwriter reports. Since issuing companies may later return to capital markets for 
additional fundraising, each underwriter wishes the curry favor the issuer so that she 
may be chosen as the lead manager in follow-on offerings. If the lead underwriter 
already experiences some difficulty amending prices downward, then she will 
experience even greater difficulty if another underwriter is secretly rebuffing her 
persuasion attempts. Thus, I predict the following: 
H3:  IPOs with a larger number of lead underwriters experience later 
downward price amendments. 
Corwin and Schultz (2005, p. 448) report that: “In our conversations with 
underwriters, they suggested that co-managers influence pricing by ‘whispering in the 
issuer’s ear’. For example, a co-manager might tell the issuer that the book manager 
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mispriced the IPO and that ‘we would have done better for you’. The positive 
information that co-managers convey to the issuer is likely to be used by the issuer to 
pressure the book manager to revise the price upward during the pricing negotiations.” 
Hence, an underwriter who wishes to manage an issuer’s pricing expectations may face 
unexpectedly high resistance to lower offer prices when there are additional co-
managing underwriters present.  
However, co-managing banks may secure their position in the IPO because they 
are invited by the lead underwriter. If this is the case, they are less likely to act against 
the lead underwriter’s interest out of loyalty. Members of the underwriting syndicate 
however play a minor role in managing the IPO and may have weaker relationships with 
the lead underwriter. As such, these banks may be less obliged to stay loyal to the lead 
underwriter meaning that: 
H4: IPOs with a larger underwriting syndicate experience later downward price 
amendments. 
Why might competitor banks risk incurring the lead underwriter’s wrath with this 
type of behavior? When there are additional lead underwriters co-managing the deal, the 
total fees each bank earns are lower because fees paid by the issuer are split amongst the 
banks in the syndicate. Thus members of the syndicate may be less motivated by fees 
but rather by securing better relationships with the issuer. This explanation fits the recent 
peculiarities in the IPO market where underwriting banks are conceding fees to be a part 
of high-profile deals. Consider the anticipated Facebook IPO where 33 investment banks 
sought to split an underwriting fee of 1.1% (Barr and Oreskovic, 2012), which is 
uncharacteristically low in comparison to the usual 7% fee (Chen and Ritter, 2000). 
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More recently, the Twitter IPO secured a 3.25% fee from top underwriters led by 
Goldman Sachs (Picker and Spear, 2013).  
 
3.4  Data 
I obtain a list of all priced IPOs between 2005 to 2014 from NASDAQ’s website and all 
IPO-related filings directly from SEC EDGAR. This gives us a sample of 1,607 IPOs. 
Deals that are unit trusts, closed end funds, REITS, and income deposit securities are 
removed from the sample, as are “blank check” special purpose acquisition companies 
and federally chartered institutions and asset backed securities. The filtering process is 
standard in the literature. These filters reduce the sample of IPOs 1,234. I further remove 
14 IPOs which took longer than a year to amend offer prices (it is likely that these deals 
officially postponed going public). In this sample of 1,220 IPOs, 809 IPOs never amend 
offer prices, choosing to set the final price in the final conference call mere hours before 
the IPO officially floats. I draw inferences from both the full sample and the subsample 
of 411 IPOs which amend offer prices during the roadshow.  
 Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of price range amendments. Downward price 
amendments are typically much larger in magnitude than upward price amendments. 
The initial filing price range appears upward biased by an average of about 49 cents, 
consistent with my expectation that IPOs are initially priced too high. This translates to a 
-3.47% price amendment on average, which is substantially larger than the average price 
revision of -1.36% in Lowry and Schwert’s (2004) 1986-1997 sample. Corwin and 
Schultz (2005) suggest that underwriters will promise optimistic offer prices during the 
underwriter “bake-off” in an attempt to secure the position of lead underwriter. The offer 
price of more than half (57.8%) of my sample IPOs is amended upward.   
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of First Price Amendments.  
 
Notes: Price amendments are defined as the difference between the midpoints of the original filing price 
range and amended price range (P1 -P0). 
 
In Figure 3.2, I split the sample according to whether the offer price is amended 
upward or downward, and estimate Kaplan-Meier survival functions for each subsample. 
The survival function estimates show how each quantile of the survival function differs 
between Up and Down subsamples. Every quantile of the Up subsample dominates the 
Down subsample for Days to Amendment, implying the relation between the timing and 
direction of price amendments is unlikely to be random. On average, the duration 
between the initial pricing of the offer to the listing date is 46 days, with underwriters 
amending IPO offer prices 30 days after the initial pricing.  
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Figure 3.2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions for Price Amendments. 
 
Notes: Price amendments are defined as the difference between the midpoints of the original filing price 
range and amended price range (P1 -P0). 
	
3.5  Methodology 
3.5.1  Negative Binomial Model Specification 
I take a Bayesian approach to modelling the number of days before the underwriter 
amends the offer price. The dependent variable is Days to Amendment which I assume is 
distributed as a negative binomial distribution: W	~	YZ[ − \]G>^]_C(', `)  `	~	Y>E^_C(0,20)  log ' = de f + dgh^ZG7#	ij + d.FklLmKln( (3.7) 
where Xcontrols is a matrix of control variables. The main predictor variable of interest is 
Amends Up, which is a dummy variable for upward amendments. This allows us to test 
hypothesis H1 directly. I assume that Days to Amendment follows a zero-truncated 
negative binomial distribution, which is a negative binomial distribution that cannot 
produce zeros. This approach is appropriate since the minimum number of days between 
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initial pricing and price amendment is one. The negative binomial distribution describes 
random counts, which is basically a Poisson distribution with an additional parameter to 
account for overdispersion. The Poisson distribution cannot handle count data with large 
variance since the mean and variance are equal (Gardner et al., 1995). The negative 
binomial distribution includes an additional α dispersion parameter which can be 
estimated from the data. I use weakly informative priors; all priors on parameters are 
normal with mean zero and standard deviation of 20.  
Subscript i indexes individual IPOs and J groups intercepts by the Fama and 
French 49 industries. I choose a hierarchical approach to modelling industry effects 
since there may be systematic delays in certain industries which require a lengthier 
roadshow period and which cannot be estimated precisely due to low numbers of 
observations. For instance, there are only two IPOs in the “beer” industry. In my model, 
the intercepts can vary freely across industries under only the restriction that the random 
intercepts come from a common distribution. This produces intercept estimates with a 
lower variance than a model with a full set of industry dummies (Gelman et al., 2013). 
 
3.5.2  Hurdle Model Specification 
Approximately two-thirds of IPOs in my sample do not amend offer prices 
during the roadshow and have Days to Amendment values of zero. Since the decision to 
amend offer prices is discretionary, this may introduce sample selection bias.  That is, 
the sample of IPOs that chooses to amend prices may be different from the sample of 
IPOs that amend prices. 
To address this issue, I use a hurdle specification (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). 
Hurdle models have two components. There is a component specifically for zero counts 
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(no amendments), and a zero-truncated count model which models positive counts (price 
amendments). This allows the underlying data generating process to differ between zero 
counts and positive counts. I use a binomial logit to model the process generating zero 
observations (N=809) and a truncated negative binomial process to model Days to 
Amendment for the remaining 411 deals. The zero process produces nothing but zeros 
and the negative binomial process produces strictly positive integers while allowing for 
overdispersion. Formally, the hurdle model has the form: 
DE Wf = G = 	 o, 0 																																										]o	W = 01 − o, ⋅ okl9Lm G1 − okl9Lm 0 							]o	W > 0 
where f0(0) is the zero hurdle process, and fcount(n) is the count process. I divide the latter 
term by (1 - fcount(0)) to obtain a zero-truncated count process.  The mean regression 
relation is linear: log ' = de f + dgh^ZG7#	ij + dT#sZ_7	iG7ZEtE]?ZE#+	du#vWG7]<_?Z	wZ^xZE#+ dV#v1h	h^ZG7^ZG?# + d.FklLmKln(	. (3.8a) C>[]? W > 0 = `, +	`gh^ZG7^ZG?	yZC_W + `.FklLmKln(.	 (3.8b) 
In equation (3.8a) and (3.8b), I test hypothesis H2 with a predictor variable #S1A 
Amendments, defined as the number of S-1/A amendments filed between initial pricing 
and the first price amendment, divided by the number of days to the first price 
amendment. Since additional S-1/A filings will naturally correlate with time, dividing by 
number of days to price amendment produces a normalized measure. The variable #S1A 
Amendments serves as proxy for the number of roadshows conducted between the initial 
pricing of the offer and the first price amendment. My reasoning is as follows. CEOs 
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making presentations at IPO roadshows often comment that they need to take extreme 
care not to reveal information that is not currently available in the prospectus. For 
instance, in a detailed account of Microsoft’s IPO, Uttal (1986, p. 4) notes that “Neukom, 
Microsoft’s in-house attorney, had admonished Gates to say nothing to anybody that 
deviated from the prospectus or added new information.” However, accidental 
information leaks do occur which prompts the need to file for an S-1A amendment in 
order to avoid material misstatements and potential lawsuits. Therefore, the number of 
S-1A prospectus amendments filed during the roadshow period is likely to be positively 
correlated with the number of roadshows presented. To test hypotheses H3 and H4, I 
define #Lead Underwriters as the number of co-managing underwriters and #Syndicate 
Members as the number of syndicate members in a deal. 
Both the zero hurdle and the count process use the same control variables. The 
only differences between the models are that I exclude #Lead Underwriters, #Syndicate 
Members, #S1A Amendments since I am only interested in the direct effect of these 
variables on Days to Amendment. I also exclude Amends Up from the zero hurdle 
component since it is perfectly correlated with the decision to amend offer prices. I add 
Amendment Delay to the zero hurdle model since this information is known at all points 
during the roadshow and helpful in predicting whether a price amendment will occur. 
Amendment Delay is defined as the number of days from initial pricing to the date of the 
first price update. It is scaled by total number of days from initial pricing to listing. 
Thus, all IPOs have an Amendment Delay score between 0 and 1, with firms that amend 
offer prices more quickly having scores closer to zero. I let the count process fcount(n) 
follow a negative binomial distribution which yields the following likelihood function: 
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DE Wlz( `, d) = DE Wf = 0 {f, ` 	f∉}
×	 1 − DE Wf = 0 {f, `f∈} YZ[x]G(Wf|{f, d)YZ[x]G(Wf ≥ 1|{f, d) 
where A denotes the set of observations (yi) which amend offer prices while α and β are 
parameter vectors for the zero-hurdle and count models respectively. With this 
likelihood function, I am able to sample from the posterior distribution of parameters.  
Parameter estimation works by sampling with Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods. These are a class of algorithms that sample from areas of the 
posterior distributions of the parameters that have a high likelihood: DE d y_?_:l(mKflK ∝ DE y_?_ dnfÅnfÇllÉ ⋅ DE d:KflK . 
Given a long enough sampling period, samples converge to a stationary distribution and 
I am left with the joint posterior distribution of parameter estimates. For this posterior, I 
can average over parameters to obtain the marginal distributions of individual 
parameters and generate predictive distributions. I sample and conduct inference with 
RStan, which is a software package made for the R programming language (Stan 
Development Team, 2015). To check that the model has converged, I examine that the 
trace (the chain of samples) for each parameter has converged to a stationary distribution 
(Gelman et al., 2013). If the trace is stationary then the posterior distribution of a 
parameter will appear normal, otherwise the distribution may appear skewed or bimodal. 
From the conditional posterior distribution of each parameter, I can calculate 95% 
credible intervals along with means, percentiles and other distribution summary 
statistics.  
 
75 
3.5.3  Tests of Hypothesis H2—H4 
The previous hurdle specification models Days to Amendment. However, hypotheses H2 
- H4 concern the timing of downward price amendments, not the timing of either upward 
or downward price amendment. Thus in order to test hypotheses H2 - H4 directly, I 
estimate the previous hurdle model with a new variable, Days to Amend Down, the 
number of days to downward price amendment. The zero-hurdle model estimates the 
probability of downward amendment, while the count model estimates the number of 
days to downward price amendment. Regrettably, the model fit with this specification 
may not be as accurate as the previous hurdle specification. By encoding Days to 
Amendment for deals that amend price upward as zeros, I lose information. As a result 
posterior predictions are noisier as I get an increased number of wrong classifications of 
no-amendment/up-amendment vs. down-amendment. However, I will be able to obtain a 
clean estimate of the effect of #S1A Amendments, #Lead Underwriters, and #Syndicate 
Members on the timeliness of downward price amendments. The hurdle specification is 
exactly the same as equation (3.8a) and (3.8b), only the dependent variable is changed 
from Days to Amendment to Days to Amend Down. 
 
3.5.4  Control Variables 
In each specification above, I include the same set of control variables. My first control 
is Cumulative Abnormal Search Interest (CASI), which is a measure of search interest 
for a particular IPO (see Chapter 2 for a comprehensive definition). As price 
amendments occur several days before final price revisions, CASI is measured on the 
day before the first filing price range amendment. This ensures there is no spurious lead-
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lag relation between attention and price amendments. I expect IPOs with a higher CASI 
to amend offer prices upward sooner, while amending offer prices downward later. 
Next, I control for Underwriter Rank using the Carter-Manaster ranks of 
underwriter reputation obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. Prestigious underwriters have 
a reputation to uphold and may be averse to amending offer prices downward since it 
reflects poorly on their marketing capabilities. Therefore, highly ranked underwriters 
may produce later downward price amendments.  I also include a number of firm- and 
deal-specific measures standard in the IPO literature (Loughran and McDonald, 2013) 
and which may affect the likelihood and timing of downward price amendments. These 
include Share Overhang, the ratio of shares held by insiders to the shares being sold to 
the public; log(Proceeds), the natural logarithm of the offer proceeds; and log(1+Sales), 
the natural logarithm of firm sales revenue as reported in the prospectus. Share 
Overhang and log(Proceeds) are deal characteristics that relate to the fraction of 
ownership on offer. If share overhang is low, insiders are selling relatively more shares 
to the public and hence may bargain harder to secure a higher price (Bradley and Jordan, 
2002). I include Industry Returns and IPO Market Returns to control for hot and old 
markets across industries and IPO markets, and BAA Spread to capture aggregate 
uncertainty in the macro-economy. These variables are measured in the 3 months 
leading up to the IPO, as in essay 1. 
Variable definitions are summarized in Table 3.1. Summary statistics of all 
control variables and pairwise correlations are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively. Interestingly, the variable #Syndicate Members appears highly correlated 
with log(Proceeds) with a correlation of 0.73, suggesting there may be some 
multicollinearity issues here. 
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions II
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Description
Days to Amendment Number of days between initial pricing and first price amendment.
Amendment Delay Days to price amendment as a fraction of total days to listing.
Amends (Up/Down) Dummy variable is 1 if there is an upward/downward price amendment.
#Syndicate Members Number of banks in underwriting syndicate.
#Lead Underwriters Number of co-managing underwriters in the deal.
Underwriter Rank The average of Carter-Manaster ranks of the lead underwriters.
#S1A Amendments Number of S-1/A amendment prospectus filed before price amendment.
Share Overhang Ratio of shares held by insiders to shares offered to public.
log(1+Sales) Natural log of sales revenue, as reported in prospectus.
log(Proceeds) Natural log of sought proceeds, as report in prospectus.
CASI Cumulative abnormal search interest, a measure of search popularity.
IPO Market Returns Avg. IPO market returns in the 3 months before roadshow.
Industry Returns Avg. Fama&French 49 industry returns in the 3 months before roadshow.
BAA Spread Avg. BAA yield spread changes in the 3 months before roadshow.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: The sample is grouped according to whether there was a price amendment during the 
roadshow or not. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum tests results are reported in the final column. 
Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
Amends (N=411) Mean St. Dev. Min Max p-val
Days to Amendment 27.43 36.98 1.00 262.00
Amendment Delay 80.69 21.23 2.21 100.00
#Syndicate Members 6.05 4.62 1.00 35.00
#Lead Underwriters 2.10 0.88 0.00 5.00
Underwriter Rank 6.86 2.62 -1.00 9.00
#S1A Amendments 3.40 2.05 0.00 17.00
Share Overhang 4.29 2.88 1.00 23.18
log(1+Sales) 15.07 6.71 0.00 25.32
log(Proceeds) 18.59 1.12 15.03 23.31
CASI 0.60 1.29 -3.59 8.83
IPO Market Returns 14.78 6.74 -3.67 32.23
Industry Returns 1.78 2.86 -12.55 12.46
BAA Spread -0.02 0.26 -1.07 1.90
No Amendment (N=809)
Days to Amendment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Amendment Delay 100.00 0.00 1000.00 100.00 0.00
#Syndicate Members 6.48 4.40 1.00 45.00 0.00
#Lead Underwriters 2.10 0.85 0.00 6.00 0.74
Underwriter Rank 7.11 2.42 -1.00 9.00 0.46
#S1A Amendments 3.68 2.06 0.00 13.00 0.01
Share Overhang 4.32 4.77 1.00 72.08 0.33
log(1+Sales) 15.20 6.90 0.00 23.76 0.11
log(Proceeds) 18.67 0.99 14.15 23.50 0.12
CASI 0.42 1.12 -3.39 8.10 0.04
IPO Market Returns 14.28 6.51 -6.13 32.23 0.18
Industry Returns 1.44 3.02 -11.76 18.86 0.04
BAA Spread -0.01 0.23 -1.07 0.60 0.88
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Table 3.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Days to Amendment 1 0.05 -0.19 -0.21 -0.42 -0.06 0.04 -0.18 -0.37 -0.14 -0.12 -0.16 0.01
(2) Amendment Delay 0.05 1 0.08 -0.10 0.13 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(3) #Syndicate Members -0.19 0.08 1 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.05 0.28 0.73 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.01
(4) #Lead Underwriters -0.21 -0.10 0.32 1 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.16 0.16 0.09 -0.07
(5) Underwriter Rank -0.42 0.13 0.26 0.27 1 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.43 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.01
(6) #S1A Amendments -0.06 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.21 1 0.00 0.12 0.22 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.13
(7) Share Overhang 0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.00 1 0.14 -0.03 0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.06
(8) log(1+Sales) -0.18 -0.02 0.28 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.14 1 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.00
(9) log(Proceeds) -0.37 0.13 0.73 0.32 0.43 0.22 -0.03 0.25 1 0.28 0.03 0.06 -0.01
(10) CASI -0.14 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.28 1 0.00 0.03 -0.02
(11) IPO Market Returns -0.12 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1 0.08 -0.15
(12) Industry Returns -0.16 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.08 1 -0.17
(13) BAA Spread 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.17 1
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3.6  Empirical Results  
3.6.1  Days to Amendment Count Regression 
Table 3.4 displays the 95 percent credible intervals14 along with estimated medians 
for my coefficients. Interpreting the economic significance of the estimated 
parameters is straightforward. Bayesian inference fixes a credible region which will 
contain 95 percent of all possible estimates of the parameter. Given the observed 
data, there is a 95 percent chance that the true value of the coefficient is within that 
interval. For the purposes of interpreting the marginal effect of a variable, I take the 
median of the posterior distribution of each parameter as the coefficient estimate. To 
interpret the coefficients of a count regression, I first exponentiate the coefficient. 
This gives us a multiplicative term since !"($%&) = !"$ ⋅ !".  Posterior distributions 
of parameters and their corresponding sample traces are displayed in Figure 3.3.  
The 95% credible interval for the Amends Up parameter is [-0.55, -0.26] 
suggesting that the true value of the parameter is likely to be negative. The median of 
the Amends Up posterior distribution is -0.41, which suggests that upward price 
amendments occur approximately 0.41 times earlier into the roadshow relative to 
downward price amendments, consistent with hypothesis H2. Either underwriters are 
reluctant to amend offer prices downwards early into the roadshow, or they have 
trouble convincing issuers to amend offer prices downward until the roadshow is 
almost complete. I address competing explanations of H2 in Section 3.6. 
 
 
																																								 																				
14 The difference between Bayesian credible intervals and Frequentist confidence intervals is that the 
Bayesian approach treats observed data as a fixed quantity. Hence the credible interval (which is a 
function of the data) is also a fixed quantity the true parameter is treated as a random quantity. In 
contrast, the Frequentist confidence interval treats the true parameter as a fixed quantity but views the 
confidence interval as a random quantity. Therefore the 95% Bayesian credible interval can be 
interpreted as a 95% degree of belief that the parameter is within that interval.  
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Table 3.4: Bayesian Count Regression for Days to Amendment 
 
Notes: The dependent variable for the Hierarchical Bayesian count regression is the number of days to 
the first price amendment (Days to Amendment). I assume Days to Amendment follows a zero 
truncated negative binomial distribution. Sample consists of 411 IPO deals from 2005 to 2014 that 
amend offer prices during the roadshow. Amends Up is 1 if offer prices are amended upward. #Lead 
Underwriters and #Syndicate Members are the number of co-managing underwriters and the number 
of investment banks in the underwriting syndicate. Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster 
reputation measure averaged over all lead underwriters. #S1A Amendments is the number of S-1A 
amendments made between the initial pricing of the IPO and the first price amendment. Share 
Overhang is the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. Log(Proceeds) and 
log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. CASI is cumulative abnormal 
search interest, a measure of search interest made with data from Google Trends. Share Overhang is 
the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. Log(Proceeds) and log(1+Sales) are the 
natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. Industry Returns, IPO Market Returns and BAA 
Spread are the Fama&French 49 industry returns, IPO market returns, and BAA bond yield spreads 
averaged over the 3 months before IPO listing. Intercepts have a hierarchical structure and are free to 
vary across Fama&French 49 industry groups and calendar years (omitted). Model parameter sample 
traces and posterior predictive checks are displayed in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. 
  
Percentiles
Parameters 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5% 95% CI
Amends Up -0.546 -0.522 -0.406 -0.290 -0.265 [-0.55, -0.26]
#Lead Underwriters -0.118 -0.106 -0.039 0.027 0.042 [-0.12, 0.04]
#Syndicate Members 0.016 0.019 0.036 0.053 0.057 [0.02, 0.06]
Underwriter Rank -0.100 -0.096 -0.073 -0.050 -0.045 [-0.10, -0.05]
#S1A Amendments -2.934 -2.863 -2.532 -2.198 -2.133 [-2.93, -2.13]
Share Overhang -0.012 -0.009 0.010 0.029 0.033 [-0.01, 0.03]
log(1+Sales) -0.023 -0.021 -0.012 -0.004 -0.002 [-0.02, 0.00]
log(Proceeds) -0.250 -0.238 -0.166 -0.094 -0.081 [-0.25, -0.08]
CASI -0.084 -0.076 -0.030 0.017 0.026 [-0.08, 0.03]
IPO Market Returns -0.020 -0.019 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 [-0.02, 0.00]
Industry Returns -0.050 -0.047 -0.028 -0.009 -0.005 [-0.05, 0.00]
BAA Spread -0.538 -0.502 -0.296 -0.083 -0.043 [-0.54, -0.04]
Intercept 6.144 6.384 7.638 8.868 9.121 [6.14, 9.12]
Neg-Bin Shape (α) 2.783 2.873 3.33 3.833 3.922 [2.78, 3.92]
Inference for model: Zero-Truncated Negative-Binomial model with log-link.
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Figure 3.3: Bayesian Count Regression Sample Traces and Posterior Parameter 
Distributions 
 
 
Notes: Generated posterior densities of each parameter are displayed on the left, sample traces to the 
right. Samples are drawn with two Markov chains running the No-U-turn algorithm from the RStan 
package (Gelman et al., 2013).  
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The credible interval for #Lead Underwriters is [-0.12, 0.04], suggesting that 
the estimated effect is unlikely to be zero given the observed data. The average 
coefficient for #Lead Underwriters is -0.04 and its exponent is 0.96. Hence adding 
an additional lead underwriter decreases the rate of offer price amendment by a 
factor of 0.96 (or 4 percentage points) on average. The average IPO amends offer 
prices 9.5 days after initial pricing, so adding one extra lead underwriter reduces 
Days to Amendment by approximately 0.38 days (=9.5 × 4%). This is weak evidence 
for hypothesis H3 where I predicted that co-managing underwriters may attempt to 
undermine the lead underwriter’s attempts to persuade issuers into amending offer 
prices early.  
The 95 percent credible interval for #Syndicate Members is [0.02, 0.06], with 
a median 0.036. It would thus appear that including an additional investment bank in 
the underwriting syndicate will increase Days to Amendment by a factor of 
exp(0.036)=1.037 (or 3.7 percentage points). While consistent with hypothesis H4, 
the estimated effect is economically small, amounting to just a half day delay for an 
average two week IPO roadshow. 
The variable #S1A Amendments appears to be a highly influential factor in 
determining amendment delay. With a median coefficient of -2.532, the estimated 
effect appears abnormally large. However, recall that #S1A Amendments is defined as 
the number of S-1/A amendments (that report the original price range) filed between 
initial pricing of the offer and the first price amendment, divided by the number of 
days to price amendment. Dividing this value by the number of days turns the 
number of S-1/A amendments into a daily average. Thus an increase in #S1A 
Amendments represents an increase in the daily average number of roadshow 
presentations observed by the issuer in the days before the price amendment. For 
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example, adding one additional roadshow presentation to an IPO that takes 10 days 
to amend offer prices increases #S1A Amendments by only 0.1. This translates to a 
reduced delay in price amendment by a factor of exp(-0.2532) = 0.77, broadly 
consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2. I write “broadly consistent” because I cannot 
tell whether the reduction in waiting time is isolated to downward or upward 
amendments with the current model specification (more on this in section 3.6.4) 
Underwriter rank is an important determinant of days to price amendment. In 
particular, more prestigious underwriters amend offer prices earlier by a factor of 
exp(0.073) = 0.93 (or 7 percentage points), on average. Either prestigious 
underwriters are more capable at marketing the offer and eliciting subscription 
demand, or prestigious underwriters are simply more capable at persuading issuers to 
amend offer prices early. As a sanity check, BAA Spread has a 95% credible interval 
of [-0.538, -0.043] and a median value of -0.296. A one percentage increase in the 
yield spreads between BAA and AAA rated bonds (a measure of aggregate macro-
economic uncertainty) is associated with an earlier price amendment by a factor of 
exp(-0.296) = 0.74 (or 26 percentage points).  
 
3.6.2  Posterior Predictive Checks 
If the model is a good fit, replications of the data (yrep) generated by the model 
should appear similar to the original data (yobs). I can generate a simulated posterior 
predictive distribution *+ ,-./ ,012 = *+(,-./|4)*+(4|,012) 54  by first 
drawing a set of parameters (β) from the joint posterior distribution of parameters, 
then drawing 411 observations from the resulting predictive distribution: yrep ~ Neg-
Binomial(µ(β), α). This can be repeated many times in order to assess model fit.  
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In Figure 3.4, I plot the original distribution of Days to Amendment against 
four simulated distributions (overlaid). Calculating percentiles along with the means 
of the distributions, it appears that posterior predictive distributions match the 
distribution of observed Days to Amendment. 
I can be more specific when evaluating Bayesian model fit. Since test 
statistics are calculated on a sample (of size N=411) for each draw from the posterior 
distribution of unknown parameters, these test statistics have a sampling distribution. 
As such, I can calculate the probability that the test statistics of the replicated data is 
more extreme than the test statistic calculated on observed data: Pr(T(yrep, β) > 
T(yobs, β)|yobs). This is known as the Bayesian p-value (Gelman, 2013). The test 
statistic T(·) can be any summary statistic of interest. For instance, the mean, 
standard deviation, or even a simple count of the number of zeros is appropriate. The 
replicated test statistics should be symmetrically distributed around the realized test 
statistic, so a Bayesian p-value close to 0.5 suggests that the model predictions are 
consistent with the data under the specified test statistic and is able to capture that 
aspect of the observed data. Thus Bayesian p-values are treated as diagnostic tools 
that aim to check goodness of fit for a model, rather than hypotheses tests to obtain 
confidence intervals. 
I evaluate the fit of the Bayesian count regression model by calculating 
posterior predictive p-values for the mean, max, and standard deviation. These 
quantities are displayed in Figure 3.4, panels C, D, and E respectively. The posterior 
predictive p-values for the mean and max are 0.394 and 0.464 respectively which 
suggests that there are no systematic differences between the model and observed 
data according to these test statistics. The p-value for standard deviation is 0.139, 
which suggests that my model may have slight difficulties capturing the variation in  
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Figure 3.4: Posterior Predictive Checks, Bayesian Count Regression 
Panel A-B: Observed vs. Posterior Predictive Distribution for Days to Amendment 
 
Panel C: Test Statistic: Mean 
 
Panel D: Test Statistic: Max 
 
Panel E: Test Statistic: Standard Deviation 
 
Notes: Observed distribution vs. posterior predictive distribution of Days to Amendment (Panel A 
vs. B). Panel D, E, and F displays posterior predictive test statistics from replicated data samples 
(T(yrep)) versus the observed data (T(yobs)).  
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the observed Days to Amendment. There is only a 14 percent chance that future 
replications (yrep) will produce standard deviations that exceed the current observed 
standard deviation. 
 
3.6.3  Hurdle Specification, Full Sample 
The estimation results for the Bayesian hurdle model are displayed in Table 3.5 with 
the zero-hurdle component in the top panel, and the count model in the bottom panel. 
I interpret zero-hurdle model coefficients as the odds of observing a positive count 
vs. a zero count. The intercept of the zero-hurdle model has a median value of -2.20, 
which suggests that there is a low baseline chance of a price amendment. The odds 
increase as the roadshow progresses since the median estimate of Amendment Delay 
is 0.14 (CI95=[1.11, 1.22]). However, the baseline odds of observing no price 
amendment is highly uncertain given the observed data. The 95 credible interval of 
the intercept is [-10.96, 6.03], suggesting that predicting the odds that amendment 
will take place is difficult.  
The parameter estimates for the negative binomial count model are more 
precise. As the top panel of Table 3.5 shows, the median coefficient for #Lead 
Underwriters is -0.05 (CI95= [-0.13, 0.02]) which suggests that deals with more 
underwriters amend their offer prices more quickly. This is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H3. The same effect is observed for deals managed by more reputable 
underwriters. The estimated median coefficient for Underwriter Rank is -0.08 (CI95 
= [-0.10, -0.05]), suggesting that price amendments occur more quickly by a factor of 
exp(-0.08)=0.92 (or 8 percentage points) for deals with higher ranked underwriters.  
In contrast, deals with greater #Syndicate Members tend to delay price 
amendments by a factor of exp(0.03)=1.03 (or just 3 percentage points). Although 
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economically a small effect, it is consistent with hypothesis H4. Turning to #S1A 
Amendments, a one unit increase in #S1A Amendments produces earlier price 
amendments by a factor of exp(-2.2)=0.11 (or 11 percentage points). Note that in the 
zero-hurdle component, a unit increase in #S1A amendments increases the log odds 
of a price amendment occurring by 5.54 (CI95: [4.49, 6.81]). Thus, an increase in the 
number of roadshows, proxied by #S1A Amendments, increases the odds of a price 
amendment occurring earlier. These results are again broadly consistent with 
hypotheses H1 and H2. However, I still cannot tell whether the delay in price 
amendment is isolated to downward or upward amendments. Specifically, I would 
like to find evidence that a greater number of roadshows increases the odds of early 
downward price amendments.   
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Table 3.5: Bayesian Hurdle for Days to Amendment, Full Sample 
 
Notes: Bayesian hurdle regression for the number of days to the first price amendment (Days to 
Amendment) as the dependent variable. I assume Days to Amendment follows a zero truncated 
negative binomial distribution. Sample consists of 1220 IPO deals from 2005 to 2014. Amends Up is 1 
if offer prices are amended upward. #Lead Underwriters and #Syndicate Members are the number of 
co-managing underwriters and the number of investment banks in the underwriting syndicate. 
Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster reputation measure averaged over all lead underwriters. 
#S1A Amendments is the number of S-1A amendments made between the initial pricing of the IPO 
and the first price amendment. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold 
publicly. Log(Proceeds) and log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. 
CASI is cumulative abnormal search interest, a measure of search interest made with data from Google 
Trends. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. Log(Proceeds) 
and log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. Industry Returns, IPO 
Market Returns and BAA Spread are the Fama&French 49 industry returns, IPO market returns, and 
BAA bond yield spreads averaged over the 3 months before IPO listing. Intercepts have a hierarchical 
structure and are free to vary across Fama&French 49 industry groups, each drawn from a normal 
distribution. Sample traces and Posterior predictive checks are found in figure 3.5 and 3.6.  
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Zero-hurdle Model 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5% 95%CI
Amendment Delay 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.20 [0.10, 0.20]
Underwriter Rank -0.28 -0.26 -0.15 -0.03 -0.01 [-0.28, -0.01]
#S1A Amendments 4.49 4.65 5.54 6.61 6.81 [4.49, 6.81]
Share Overhang -0.21 -0.19 -0.09 0.03 0.06 [-0.21, 0.06]
log(1+Sales) -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.00 [-0.09, 0.00]
log(Proceeds) -1.06 -0.99 -0.63 -0.27 -0.20 [-1.06, 2.00]
CASI -0.94 -0.85 -0.42 -0.04 0.03 [-0.94, 0.03]
IPO Market Returns -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 [-0.12, 0.00]
Industry Returns -0.23 -0.21 -0.09 0.02 0.05 [-0.23, 0.05]
BAA Spread -0.42 -0.18 1.18 2.55 2.81 [-0.42, 2.81]
Intercept -10.96 -9.35 -2.20 4.72 6.03 [-10.96, 6.03]
Neg-Bin Shape (α) 2.89 2.97 3.42 3.91 4.02 [2.89, 4.02]
Count Model 0.03 0.05 Median 0.95 0.98 95%CI
Amends Up -0.54 -0.52 -0.41 -0.29 -0.27 [-0.54, -0.27]
#Lead Underwriters -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.02 [-0.13, 0.02]
#Syndicate Members 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 [0.01, 0.05]
Underwriter Rank -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 [-0.1, -0.05]
#S1A Amendments -2.60 -2.55 -2.24 -1.94 -1.89 [-2.6, -1.89]
Share Overhang -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 [-0.01, 0.03]
log(1+Sales) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 [-0.02, 0.00]
log(Proceeds) -0.25 -0.23 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 [-0.25, -0.08]
CASI -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.02 [-0.08, 0.02]
IPO Market Returns -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 [-0.02, 0.00]
Industry Returns -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 [-0.05, -0.01]
BAA Spread -0.52 -0.48 -0.28 -0.08 -0.04 [-0.52, -0.04]
Intercept 6.16 6.38 7.67 8.84 9.07 [6.16, 9.07]
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Figure 3.5: Samples Traces and Posterior Distributions for Bayesian Hurdle Model 
Count Component 
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Figure 3.5 (Continued) 
Zero-hurdle Component 
 
 
Notes: Bayesian hurdle model with Days to Amendment as dependent variable. Posterior distributions 
of estimated coefficients and sample traces for the negative binomial count model in table 3.6. The 
first panel refers to the count component of the model while the second panel provides posterior 
distributions of coefficients and sample traces for the zero-hurdle component. Sampling uses Rstan 
(Stan Development Team, 2015), a MCMC sampling library for the R programming language. 
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Figure 3.6: Posterior Predictive Check, Bayesian Hurdle Model (Full Sample) 
 
Panel A-B: Observed vs. Posterior Predictive Distribution for Days to Amendment 
 
Panel C: Test Statistic: Mean 
Panel D: Test Statistic: Count of Zeros 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
Figure 3.6 (Continued) 
Panel C: Test Statistic: Standard Deviation 
 
Notes: Posterior predictive checks in Figure 8 suggests that the model is able to match the mean and 
count of zeros well with p-values of : Pr(mean(yrep) > mean(yobs)|yobs) = 0.49, and Pr(zero-count(yrep) 
> zero-count (yobs)|yobs) = 0.48 but the model still under predicts the variance in Days to Amendment 
with Pr(s(yrep) > s(yobs)|yobs) = 0.06. 
	
3.6.4  Days to Downward Price Amendment 
Model estimates are presented in Table 3.6. In the zero-hurdle component, the 
coefficient on #S1A Amendments has a median value of 3.15 (CI95=[2.42, 4.03]), 
while in the count model it  has a median of -2.67 (CI95 = [-3.34, -1.99]). These 
values suggest that an increase in #S1A Amendments increases the odds of a 
downward price amendment and decreases the number of days to a downward price 
amendment, consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2 respectively. The effect is 
economically large in comparison to the baseline probability of having a positive 
count; the median value of the Intercept is -1.84 for the zero-hurdle model.  
The estimated effect of #Syndicate Members and #Lead Underwriters is 
consistent with prior model specifications (positive and negative respectively), 
providing evidence for H4, but not H3. However, I cannot rule out competing 
explanations as to why downward price amendments appear delayed. Overall my 
results provide some evidence in favor of the Bayesian persuasion hypothesis. These 
competing explanations are the focus of the next section. 
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Table 3.6: Bayesian Hurdle for Days to Downward Amendment 
 
Notes: Bayesian hurdle regression (N=1220) for downward price amendment as the dependent 
variable, defined as the number of days to price amendment if there is a downwards amendment, 
otherwise 0. #Lead Underwriters and #Syndicate Members are the number of co-managing 
underwriters and the number of investment banks in the underwriting syndicate. Underwriter Rank is 
the Carter-Manaster reputation measure averaged over all lead underwriters. #S1A Amendments is the 
number of S-1A amendments made between the initial pricing of the IPO and the first price 
amendment. Share Overhang is the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. 
Log(Proceeds) and log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. CASI is 
cumulative abnormal search interest, a measure of search interest made with data from Google Trends. 
Share Overhang is the ratio of shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. Log(Proceeds) and 
log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of sought proceeds and sales revenue. Industry Returns, IPO Market 
Returns and BAA Spread are the Fama&French 49 industry returns, IPO market returns, and BAA 
bond yield spreads averaged over the 3 months before IPO listing. Intercepts have a hierarchical 
structure and are free to vary across Fama&French 49 industry groups (omitted). Sample traces and 
predictive checks omitted for brevity. 
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Zero-hurdle Model 2.5% 5% Median 95% 97.5% 95%CI
Amendment Delay -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 [-0.02, 0.00]
Underwriter Rank -0.16 -0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.01 [-0.16, 0.01]
#S1A Amendments 2.42 2.53 3.15 3.91 4.03 [2.42, 4.03]
Share Overhang -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.15 [-0.02, 0.15]
log(1+Sales) -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 [-0.03, 0.04]
log(Proceeds) -0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.33 0.37 [-0.09, 0.37]
CASI 0.17 0.21 0.39 0.60 0.64 [0.17, 0.64]
IPO Market Returns -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 [-0.03, 0.03]
Industry Returns 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.15 [0.00, 0.15]
BAA Spread -0.68 -0.56 0.16 0.89 1.04 [-0.68, 1.04]
Intercept -5.92 -5.25 -1.84 1.50 2.10 [-5.92, 2.10]
Neg-Bin Shape (α) 1.94 2.02 2.47 3.02 3.15 [1.94, 3.15]
Count Model 0.03 0.05 Median 0.95 0.98 95%CI
#Lead Underwriters -0.19 -0.17 -0.06 0.05 0.07 [-0.19, 0.07]
#Syndicate Members -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.07 [-0.01, 0.07]
Underwriter Rank -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 [-0.1, -0.01]
#S1A Amendments -3.34 -3.23 -2.67 -2.10 -1.99 [-3.34, -1.99]
Share Overhang -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 [-0.05, 0.06]
log(1+Sales) -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 [-0.03, 0.01]
log(Proceeds) -0.35 -0.32 -0.19 -0.06 -0.03 [-0.35, -0.03]
CASI -0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.11 0.13 [-0.11, 0.13]
IPO Market Returns -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 [-0.02, 0.01]
Industry Returns -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 [-0.08, -0.01]
BAA Spread -0.78 -0.71 -0.34 0.04 0.12 [-0.78, 0.12]
Intercept 5.24 5.71 8.07 10.38 10.86 [5.24, 10.86]
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3.7  Alternative Explanations 
In this section, I examine competing hypotheses that explain the association between 
the timing and direction of offer price amendments. I wish to discern whether 
underwriters are more likely to delay amending prices precisely because they wish to 
amend prices downward (and face issuer resistance), or whether underwriters are 
more likely to amend prices downward because a longer time has elapsed since the 
initial pricing. The former explanation is consistent with my Bayesian persuasion 
hypothesis. The latter suggests that the direction of causality is reversed.  
 
3.7.1  Reputation Concerns 
Incentives to delay downward price amendments are present when the underwriter’s 
preferences are not aligned with the issuer’s preferences. Verrecchia (2001) suggests 
that managers have career concerns and delay the release of bad news in the hope of 
some reversal of fortune. Kothari et al. (2009) note that firm managers may wait and 
accumulate bad news before cutting dividends. By waiting to disclose unfavorable 
information, offsetting good news might arrive in the meantime in which case 
managers may never need to reveal bad news. This may be the case if status updates 
suggest the bad news is less dire than initially reported. In the context of IPOs, 
investment banks care about their reputation (Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Fernando 
et al., 2005; Corwin and Schultz, 2005) and amending offer prices downward may 
reflect poorly on their ability to market the offer and generate subscription demand. 
Hence, underwriters may wish to wait and see whether subscription demand 
increases later into the roadshow before lowering offer prices. Thus, underwriters 
amend offer prices upward early and delay downward price amendments. 
However, if underwriters strategically accumulate bad news before amending 
offer prices downward, investors could infer that bad news is more severe than good 
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news on average. As a result, market reactions to upward and downward price 
amendments should be asymmetric when the company begins trading. Unfortunately, 
this is unlikely to be a testable hypothesis since underwriters engage in aftermarket 
price support for a number of days after the float (Aggarwal, 2002). Nevertheless, it 
is unclear why underwriters would attempt to make their job more difficult. As 
guarantor of the issue, underwriters purchase shares sold by traders in the aftermarket 
in order to support the IPO. If delaying disclosure of bad news induces larger 
negative market reactions, then the underwriter must exert more effort to support 
overpriced shares which is clearly against their interest. Hence, there is little strategic 
benefit to delaying downward price amendment from the underwriter’s perspective.  
Delaying a downward price amendment could also lead to an 
undersubscribed offer since there may not be enough time for underwriters to 
approach and convince investors to subscribe at the new price. Edelen and Kadlec 
(2005) make a similar point and argue that the underwriter cannot simply subject 
investors to endless rounds of price amendments without incurring reputational costs. 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that underwriters have strong incentives to withhold 
unfavorable information about subscription demand since this could jeopardize the 
success of the IPO. 
From the issuer’s perspective, executives and other large shareholders 
including venture capital firms are under lockup provisions which typically last six 
months. Hence, there should be no benefit to withholding any bad news about the 
current state of subscription demand since the truth will be revealed in the final 
pricing call and once the stock floats. Observed patterns in IPO initial returns are also 
inconsistent with this explanation. Market reactions to upward offer price 
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amendments are larger than downward price amendments on average (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002), which is opposite of what is predicted to happen.  
 
3.7.2  Impresario Hypothesis and Herding 
Underwriter may raise offer prices early into the roadshow even in the absence of 
high subscription demand. Underwriters have purpose to do so in order to create an 
illusion of scarcity to entice skeptical investors to subscribe (Shiller, 1989; 1990). 
Raising offer prices early into the roadshow reflects strong subscription demand, 
while delaying downward price amendments sends negative signals indicating low 
subscription demand. Thus, underwriters may withhold bad news and accelerate the 
disclosure of good news. 
Given the discretionary nature of offer price amendments, investors may 
suspect a systematic association between the timing and direction of offer price 
amendments. In this case, investors will interpret no news as bad news and the lack 
of price amendment causes investors to become pessimistic over time. Investors can 
therefore infer firm quality by unravelling the information embedded in the timing of 
price amendments. To the extent that the timing of offer price amendments acts as a 
signal of subscription demand, speculators in the IPO aftermarket looking to flip the 
stock for a quick profit should condition their trading strategies on the timeliness of 
price amendments. The timeliness of offer price amendments should therefore 
predict IPO first day returns. The idea that there is information content in the timing 
of news is well known amongst accounting scholars who examine the timing of 
earnings announcements (Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Givoly and Palmon, 1982).  I 
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conduct a quick test to see whether Amendment Delay is associated with IPO initial 
returns and obtain the following linear regression15 results: 
 67898:;	=!9>+7	 = 25.66&C.DE + 0.71J.CK L75!+M+89!+	=:7N 	+0.42J.&P Qℎ:+!	ST!+ℎ:7U − 0.03J.JX log 1 + Q:;!\ −2.98J.DE log *+_`!!5\ + 0.13(J.CJ) 675>\9+,	=!9>+7\ +0.16(J.&C) 6*S	a:+N!9	=!9>+7\ + 0.42(C.Eb) cdd	Qe+!:5 + 0.04(J.KX) fdQ6 +17.56(&.Pb) #h*i/ − 0.23(&.PD) #h*j0kl + 0.34(J.JX) m*=i/ + 0.01(J.JK) m*=j0kl +0.24(J.Jn) do!75o!79	p!;:, + 0.14(J.JP) fdQ6×m*=i/ + 0.04(J.JP) fdQ6×m*=j0kl  (3.12) 
The standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the estimated coefficients for 
each variable. Results from equation 3.12 suggest that the timing of the price 
amendment (Amendment Delay) is associated with IPO initial returns. Controlling for 
other price revision related variables, the coefficient on Amendment Delay is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (0.24/0.05=4.8 > 1.96) but does not have the 
expected negative sign. The results imply that later price amendments are associated 
with larger IPO initial returns, contrary to my predictions. One explanation for this 
phenomena is that later price amendments occur closer to the actual listing date and 
are thus more salient in the minds of aftermarket traders who trade optimistically. 
Hence, after controlling for the direction of price amendments, later price 
																																								 																				
15 The dependent variable is IPO initial return, measured as the percentage difference between the 
final offer price and the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. The final price revision 
(FPR) is defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of the original filing price range 
and the final offer price (PF):  FPR = (PF - P0)/P0. #ΔP is the number of price amendments. 
Underwriter Rank is the Carter-Manaster measure of bank reputation. Share Overhang is the ratio of 
shares held by insiders to shares sold publicly. Log(Proceeds) and log(1+Sales) are the natural logs of 
the dollar amount of sought proceeds, and dollar amount of sales revenue as reported in the 
prospectus. Industry Returns, IPO Market Returns and BAA Spread are the Fama&French 49 industry 
returns, IPO market returns, and BAA bond yield spreads averaged over the 3 months before IPO 
listing. CASI is cumulative abnormal search interest, a measure of search interest made with data from 
Google Trends. Model includes random industry intercepts and year dummies (omitted). Standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  
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amendments are perceived by traders in the aftermarket as good news. More analysis 
is required to confirm this result. Despite the fact that my regression estimates run 
contrary to the impresario hypothesis, the result does not preclude the fact that 
underwriters and issuers may still be averse towards early downward price 
amendments for fear of broadcasting bad signals. 
 
3.8  Summary and Conclusions 
Prior literature argues that underwriters conduct IPO roadshows to elicit private 
information from institutional investors in order to price the offer accurately. I 
demonstrate an alternative purpose for the IPO roadshow, and present a model where 
roadshows can be used to influence the issuer’s beliefs about subscription demand. 
Underwriters strategically invite pessimistic investors to the roadshow to present 
biased evidence about the true state of subscription demand, which persuades issuers 
into agreeing to lower offer prices. Since roadshow response is directly observed by 
the issuer, the issuer rationally agrees with the underwriter’s price recommendations, 
and the presence of pessimistic investors in roadshows absolves the underwriter of 
any blame in underpricing the offer. Thus underpricing persists and issuers appear to 
be indifferent towards underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
I derive and test predictions relating to the timing of offer price amendments. 
Specifically, I predict that more roadshow presentations (more engineered 
pessimism) are associated with more frequent and earlier downward price 
amendments. In order to test these predictions, I take advantage of the fact that the 
number of S-1/A amendment filings between the time the deal is first priced, and the 
time of the first price amendment is correlated with the number of roadshow 
presentations before the price amendment. Consistent with my predictions, I find that 
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the number of roadshow presentations increases the odds of a downward price 
amendment and hastens the timing of downward price amendments.  
My model makes further predictions about the effectiveness of persuasion as 
a price bargaining tactic when other underwriters are involved in the deal. Since co-
managing underwriters and other members of the underwriting syndicate observe 
subscription demand, they can undermine the lead underwriter’s attempt to manage 
the issuer’s pricing expectations. Thus, additional co-managing underwriters and 
syndicate members should decrease the probability of downward price amendments 
and the speed with which they occur. My evidence only weakly supports these 
claims, suggesting that there may be a more complex relationship amongst 
investment banks that I am unable to account for, i.e., collusion rather than 
competition. Future studies may examine which underwriting banks tend to form 
syndicates together in order to formulate measures of collusion and competition 
within underwriting syndicates, with applications to studies of IPO pricing and offer 
price amendments. 
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Chapter 4: Coarse Clocks and Adverse Selection 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Some arbitrageurs have better information about firm fundamentals, while others are 
better at anticipating future market movements. The latter is commonly known as 
market timing. One insight originally proposed by Keynes (1936) is that in timing 
financial market movements, it may be far more rewarding to second guess when 
other investors believe prices will adjust. Acting on a pessimistic view is profitable 
only if a majority of other agents form the same beliefs, and coordinate to short sell 
the stock at the same time. Only then can there be a price correction for arbitrageurs 
to close their positions and take profits. Delays in price corrections can result from 
what Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) refer to as synchronization risk, which differs 
from traditional notions of risk in that it refers to the strategic uncertainty 
surrounding the timing of other arbitrageurs’ actions, rather than uncertainty about 
firm fundamentals.  
For arbitrageurs acting under strategic uncertainty, more precise information 
concerning the timing of others’ actions is key to mitigating synchronization risk. 
However, improved synchronization has a nasty implication for short sellers—when 
borrowing stocks, arbitrageurs inadvertently reveal their beliefs about the timing of 
the price correction to the stock lender. Since the lender may observe the frequency 
with which unique arbitrageurs arrive over a set time period, the lender gradually 
learns about the true timing of the price decline. Thus when arbitrageurs borrow 
stocks in a synchronized fashion, lenders infer that a price decline is imminent and 
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take measures to avoid this outcome by increasing borrowing fees or recalling stock 
loans. The arrival of subsequent arbitrageurs imposes a negative information 
externality on earlier arbitrageurs as it allows lenders to recall stocks moments before 
arbitrageurs can profit from a price decline. The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
a form of adverse selection that occurs when arbitrageurs and lenders differ in their 
ability to discern the true timing of an imminent price correction. I refer to this 
concept as coarse clocks. Some agents have fine precise clocks, and are in the 
position to take advantage of agents with comparatively coarse clocks. Other agents, 
such as stock lenders, are uniquely positioned to learn and “fine-tune” their clocks. I 
show how the current structure of the equity loans market gives rise to coarse clocks, 
which expose arbitrageurs to an adverse selection problem. In doing so, I highlight 
how coarse clock-induced adverse selection can act as a hidden short sale constraint 
on many seemingly “obvious” arbitrage opportunities, inhibiting price discovery 
(Miller, 1977).  
My model starts with the assumption that lenders are matched with multiple 
arbitrageurs who arrive sequentially over time. As in Abreu and Brunnermeier 
(2002), the price declines (only) when a critical mass (κ) of arbitrageurs successfully 
borrow and short sell the stock. Lenders know that arbitrageurs’ arrivals follow a 
poisson process, but are unsure as to whether the parameter governing arrivals (λ) is 
high or low. Lenders update their beliefs by observing the arrivals of arbitrageurs, 
becoming increasingly pessimistic in discrete jumps upon each arrival, while 
gradually becoming more optimistic over time when no borrowers arrive. When 
lenders’ belief about the arrival rate exceeds a certain pessimistic threshold, they 
recall loans and sell their stock. This threshold rule captures the idea that lenders are 
only concerned about a successful synchronized short-selling attack. My assumption 
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that lenders behave according to this threshold rule can be empirically justified by 
the observation that lending fees do not appear to react to loan demand (Cohen, 
Deither and Malloy, 2007), except when there is an acute spike in borrowing demand 
(Kolasinski et al., 2013).  
The theory produces a general negative result for arbitrageurs — improved 
synchronization amongst short sellers helps lenders learn rapidly, which intensifies 
coarse clock-induced adverse selection. This result alludes to Lamont’s (2012, p. 4) 
observations that short sellers have incentives to both publicly announce their short 
sales while maintaining secrecy since “the sooner one can convince other investors 
that the stock price is too high, the sooner the price will fall, minimizing holding 
costs and price risk. On the other hand, recall risk [...] gives short sellers an 
incentive for secrecy, since holding costs generally rise when other investors are also 
trying to short.” Thus the distinguishing feature of my model is in its ability to 
capture short sellers’ aversion towards “obvious” arbitrage opportunities, such as the 
expiration of IPO lockups which exhibit abnormal price declines (Ofek and 
Richardson, 2000; Field and Hanka, 2001). Stock recalls disrupt arbitrageurs’ ability 
to collectively correct a mispricing, and more obvious arbitrage opportunities are 
more prone to the adverse selection problem.  
My idea that lenders infer from borrowers’ arrival intensities the timing of 
price movements is related to Easley et al.’s (2012) concept of “volume clocks”. The 
idea is that orders tend to cluster across time so there are periods where there is 
furious activity in trading followed by prolonged periods of silence. Grouping trades 
into volume buckets rather than in chronological time periods may provide a more 
informative measure of order flow. Just as market makers learn from order flow and 
adjust bid-ask spreads in response to order flow toxicity (Glosten and Milgrom, 
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1985), stock lenders use arbitrageurs’ arrivals as an early warning signal of 
impending price corrections.  
As lenders learn about the arrival rate λ, their posterior beliefs about bubble 
burst times shift relative to those of naïve arbitrageurs. I rank and establish stochastic 
dominance results between lenders’ and arbitrageurs’ posterior beliefs. This allows 
me to analyze how various short interest disclosure regimes may lead to more 
socially efficient outcomes for the loans market. In particular, I analyze how 
improving short interest disclosures can reduce the adverse selection problem but 
invite arbitrageurs to short sell more aggressively. I further discuss the implications 
of a switch from the current opaque over-the-counter (OTC) market structure to a 
more transparent stock loans exchange.  
The plan for the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of the existing short-selling literature and the market structure for stock 
loans. Section 4.3 presents the baseline Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2003) model 
where arbitrageurs follow symmetric strategies and do not compete with lenders 
when timing their short selling strategies. Section 4.4 introduces lenders and 
describes their information acquisition process. This is followed by a discussion on 
the comparative statics of lenders’ stopping times after allowing lenders to learn and 
earn lending fees. Section 4.5 analyses the impact of different short interest 
disclosure regimes on the timing behaviors of arbitrageurs and lenders. I introduce 
search frictions and link my results to Duffie et al.’s (2002) search frictions model, 
and highlight conceptual links with other adverse selection frameworks and the 
empirical short sales literature in Section 4.6. A conclusion is provided in Section 
4.7. Equilibrium existence is established in the original Abreu and Brunnermeier’s 
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(2003) paper, and I make use of several established results in the mechanism design 
literature with details provided in Appendices C, D, and E. 
 
4.2  Related Literature 
Before turning to details of my model, it is important to place my contributions in the 
broader context of the short selling literature and their implications for market 
efficiency. Recent papers identify that short selling is considerably risky from the 
arbitrageur’s perspective as lending fees vary day-to-day, and there is a risk that the 
stock loan will be recalled. Two papers that explore this idea are Engelberg, Reed 
and Ringginberg (2014) and Chuprinin and Ruf (2015). Engelberg, Reed and 
Ringgenberg (2014) test relationships between asset prices and ex-ante measures of 
expected short selling risks, which are proxied by measures of variance in lending 
fees and loan supply. They conclude that fee risk and recall risk are associated with 
future returns since long and short portfolios formed by sorting on fee risk and recall 
risk produce 9.7% and 8.6% three-factor alphas respectively. They also find that 
price adjustments are delayed, and aggregate short interest is lower for stocks with 
greater short selling risk, consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). Chuprinin 
and Ruf (2015) examine the loss of arbitrageur profits due to loan recalls. They find 
that institutional lenders recall stock loans most accurately, and extract roughly 20% 
of the total profits from short sales. Arbitrageurs want to act on an early pessimistic 
signal without lenders finding out until much later. The problems described in these 
papers may arise due to the structure of the equity loans market. 
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4.2.1  Structure of the Equity Loans Market 
There is no centralized exchange to obtain stock loans in the United States. In order 
to short sell a stock, an arbitrageur must first locate a lender through a broker. Once a 
match is found, the borrower and lender negotiate the lending fee, also known as the 
“rebate rate”.16 The rebate rate is renegotiated daily, and the lender is allowed to 
cancel the loan at any time by issuing a recall notice. When this occurs, the borrower 
must locate shares from another lender. If a replacement lender cannot be found, the 
borrower is forced to close her position without realizing the full extent of short 
selling profits (D’Avolio, 2002). Reestablishing short positions can be a labor 
intensive affair since some securities can be difficult to locate. For this reason, 
brokers typically have pre-existing relationships with multiple lenders who are 
usually long horizon institutional investors (Kolasinski et al., 2013).  
This over-the-counter (OTC) market structure forms the basis of Duffie, 
Garleanu and Pedersen’s (2002) equilibrium model of lending fees. They argue that 
search frictions present in the OTC market impede matching, giving lenders 
bargaining power to negotiate higher lending fees. In their model, matching occurs 
randomly between short sellers and lenders in each period. As time passes, the pool 
of unmatched short sellers decreases while the population of potential lenders 
increases. Duffie et al.’s (2002) model focuses on the effect search costs have on 
lending fees and stock price dynamics. However, their model does not cover short 
selling risks.  
 
 
																																								 																				
16  Abnormally high rebate rates in excess of the market average rebate rate are referred to as 
“specialness” in the short selling literature. Additional details of the short selling process, including 
margin maintenance and settlement timelines can be found in D’Avolio (2002). 
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4.3  Theoretical Framework 
This section starts with a description of Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2003) clock 
games framework to establish arbitrageurs’ stopping strategies (their exit conditions) 
and equilibrium crash times. These exit conditions are essential in describing the 
adverse selection problem in Section 4.4. Readers familiar with the clock games 
framework may skip this section. 
In Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), there is a mass of arbitrageurs who 
become sequentially aware that prices have departed from fundamentals. They wish 
to act on their private information, but are unsure as to when the price correction will 
occur since a price correction can only occur when a critical mass of arbitrageurs 
successfully borrow and short sell the stock. Any insufficiently large trade 
imbalances are absorbed by uninformed noise traders who see these as random 
fluctuations in trade order flows. Unfortunately, when the arbitrageur becomes aware 
of the mispricing, he is unsure of how many others became aware before him. He 
therefore waits a period of time until he is certain a proportion of peer arbitrageurs 
(κ) have also become aware of the mispricing. 
 
4.3.1  The “Clock Games” Environment 
Let us assume that stock prices grow exponentially at a rate pt = egt, where the 
growth rate g is larger than the risk-free discount rate (g > r). At a random point in 
time 9J ∈ Φ 9J = 1 − !tuvw, prices depart from fundamentals and only a fraction of 
the price (1 - β(t - t0))pt can be justified by fundamentals. The bubble component of 
the price path after t0 is β(t - t0) and is purely a function of the time elapsed since t0.  
The price process is reproduced in Figure 4.1. The inflated stock price is 
maintained by a mass of irrational behavioral traders of size κ < 1 who believe that 
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the price process will grow at rate g indefinitely. This constant κ is commonly 
known, and so aggregate selling pressure of arbitrageurs must exceed κ in order to 
cause a price correction. The price continues growing at rate g otherwise. Note that 
since κ is lower than 1, some arbitrageurs will be late to the party and miss out on the 
short selling opportunity, so there is competition between the potential arbitrageurs 
who wish to time the bubble. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that this leads to 
a preemption motive that causes an earlier price correction. 
 
Figure 4.1: Price Paths of Stock Price and Bubble Component.  
 
Notes: Two price paths of a stock: the inflated bubble price (pt), and the fraction of the price justified 
by fundamentals: (1 - β(t - t0))pt. Arbitrageurs become aware of the bubble at rate 1/η sometime in the 
awareness window [t0, t0 + η], immediately after the bubble begins. At time t0 + ηκ, a fraction κ of 
arbitrageurs have become aware.  The bubble component β(t - t0)) increases over time and crashes 
once a κ fraction of arbitrageurs exit. Arbitrageurs wish to ride the bubble and exit before the crash. 
 
 
At each point in time ti ∈ [t0, t0 + η], a fraction 1/ η arbitrageurs become 
aware that prices have departed from fundamentals. Thus η parametrizes the speed 
with which the bubble rumor spreads throughout the arbitrageur population. Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) refer to the interval [t0, t0 + η] as the “awareness 
window” and denote ti as an individual arbitrageur’s type.  
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Given a random bubble starting time t0, all arbitrageurs are aware of the 
bubble by time t0 + η. However, prices are yet to correct since arbitrageurs are 
unsure how many peers are also aware. The fact that agents are in a bubble is only 
mutual knowledge rather than common knowledge at this point in time. The lack of 
common knowledge causes the bubble to persist. For an arbitrageur who becomes 
aware at a particular time ti, to is somewhere in the interval [ti - η, ti]. Conditioning on 
their awareness time ti, an arbitrageur’s posterior beliefs about t0 is given by: 
Φ 9J 9x) = 	 !uy 	−	!u(vz	t	vw)!uy 	− 	1 	. 
This posterior is a truncated exponential distribution because arbitrageurs’ types ti 
are distributed over the awareness window with bounded support 9x ∈ [9J, 9J + }], 
whereas t0 follows an exponential distribution (see Appendix C). Note that 
arbitrageurs become aware of the bubble sequentially, so arbitrageurs’ beliefs of t0 
are stochastically ordered. Observing a later signal 9x > 9x generates beliefs that the 
bubble began later in terms of first order stochastic dominance: Φ(t0|ti′) ≻FOSD Φ(t0|ti) ∀ ti′ > ti . Figure 4.2 plots the posterior densities of t0 conditional on ti, and shows the 
lower bounds of possible t0 values given by t0supp(ti). 
 
Figure 4.2: Posterior Awareness Distributions.  
Notes: Posterior beliefs about the bubble start time t0 conditional on the arbitrageur’s awareness time 
ti. Arbitrageurs’ belief about bubble start time t0 has bounded support (t0supp(ti)) given by the interval 
[ti - ηκ, ti] where η is the length of the awareness window and κ is the fraction of arbitrageurs required 
to create a price decline. 
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An arbitrageur ti follows cutoff strategies σ(t, ti) ∈ {0, 1} where she is either 
waiting to short sell (σ (t, ti) = 0), or holding a short position (σ (t, ti) = 1). A lender tj 
follows similar cutoff strategies to arbitrageurs. They can loan stocks out to 
arbitrageurs (σ (t, tj) = 0), or they can recall stocks and sell their holdings (σ (t, tj) = 
1).17 The choice to exit the bubble is irreversible so that if σ (s, ti) = 1, then σ (t, ti) = 
0 for all s ≤ t. The set of times where the agent believes the price correction has 
occurred is given by the function: É 9J = 	 9	| Ñ 9, 9x 	59x ≥ Üv	á	vw%yvw , 
which is ordered and monotonic with respect to awareness times so that if s < t , then 
the earliest burst time is an element of T(s) and the latest burst time lies in T(t).18 The 
integral term in the exit time function represents aggregate selling pressure at a given 
point in time t.19 Note that T(t0) maps a single t0 to a single exit time. Therefore, 
arbitrageur ti’s posterior beliefs about bursting times are simply a right shift in the 
awareness distribution: 
m 9 9x = 	 	5Φ(9J|9x)vw%àâv = Φ(9 − ä|9x) 
for some equilibrium delay ξ = τ* + ηκ to be determined. In equilibrium, the agent 
exits the instant she believes aggregate selling pressure exceeds the absorption 
capacity κ at time T*(t0) = inf{T(t0)}. The associated probability density of burst 
times is f(t|ti). 
																																								 																				
17 Alternatively, lenders can instead choose to increase fees dramatically. Lenders would set the fee as 
the expected value of the price correction, given by lt = β(t - t0) · pt. This detail does not change how 
the model works, but may explain why fees only increase sharply in response to acute loan demand 
shocks (Kolasinski et al. 2013). 
18 In particular, T(s) is greater than T(t) in the strong set order: T(s) ≤SSO T(t), meaning that for any x ∈ 
T(s) and y ∈ T(t), inf{x, y} ∈ T(s) and sup{x, y} ∈ T(t). 
19 The term simply sums over all agents who have exited the bubble over the range t0 to t. Repeating 
this for all t ≤ t0+η produces a set of all times where aggregate selling pressure exceeds κ. Note that t0 
is bounded by the preemption lemma: 
Lemma 1: Preemption: In equilibrium, arbitrageur ti believes at time T(ti) that at most a fraction κ of 
arbitrageurs became aware of the bubble prior to her. That is, t0supp(ti) ≥ ti - ηκ, where t0supp(ti) is the 
lower bound of the support of arbitrageur ti’s beliefs about t0 at time T(ti). 
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4.3.2  Synchronization Risk and Stopping Times 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that É∗t& ⋅  has a continuous and monotonic 
inverse É∗t& ⋅  so the arbitrageur can invert a particular burst time (É∗t& 9 = 9J) to 
calculate the size of the bubble: β(t - t0). This allows the arbitrageur to optimize the 
value of riding the bubble against the probability the bubble crashes before she can 
short the stock. Given posterior beliefs about bursting times, the ex-ante payoff to 
agent ti who sells out at time t is: 
å 9 = 	 argmaxv 	 Lx e_\9	`+:\ℎ 	ë \ 9x 5\ +	vvz Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ 	ë \ 9x 5\ív   
å 9 = 	 argmaxv 	 Lx e_\9	`+:\ℎ 	ë \ 9x 5\ +	vvz Lx(e+!	`+:sℎ)(1 − m(9|9x)) (4.1) 
where 	Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ = ! î%ït- v  and Lx e_\9	`+:\ℎ = Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ 	×	[1 −4(9 − É∗t& 9 ]. The arbitrageur is probability weighting the two price paths (plotted 
in Figure 4.1) when deciding on an optimal time to exit. Recall that the price evolves 
according to e 9 = !îv , so that the overall discount rate combines the risk-free 
discount rate (!t-v), the rebate rate (!ïv), and the price growth rate (!îv) to give ! î%ït- v . This is the same payoff function as arbitrageurs in Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003, p. 185) except there is an additional l term that represents the 
lending fees lenders earn (arbitrageur pays) when loaning (borrowing) the stock. In 
the equity loans market, fees are renegotiated day to day so let ; = ;v	59ñ∗  be the 
average rebate rate over the sellout period. Differentiating the value function with 
respect to t gives the agent’s first-order condition: 559 å 9 = 	Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ 1 − 4 ⋅ ë \ 9x+ 	 559 Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ − Lx e+!	`+:\ℎî m 9 9xó . 
Applying the product rule to the right hand term, (gh)′ = g′h + h′g gives: 
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559 å 9 = 	Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ 1 − 4 ⋅ ë \ 9x + 	Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ  
   	−	Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ m 9 9x − Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ ë(9|9x)	. 
Substituting in Lx e+!	`+:\ℎ = ! î%ït- v: 559 å 9 = 	−! î%ït- v4 9 − É∗t& 9 ë 9 9x + U + ; − + ! î%ït- v 1 − m 9 9x . 
Factoring out the exponential terms and rearranging yields the exit condition: 
ℎ 9 9x = 	 ë 9 9x1 − m 9 9x > 	 U + ; − +4 9 − É∗t& 9 	. (4.2) 
I can interpret this indifference condition in terms of the marginal cost (MC) and the 
marginal benefit (MB) for exiting at time t versus time t + dt. The marginal cost of 
waiting is equal to the probability that the bubble will burst at t times the size of the 
bubble component, given by: af	 = 	ℎ(9|9x) · 4(9	–	É∗t&(9)).	 
The opportunity cost of exiting an instant later is the compounded growth rate:  ac	 = 	U	 + 	;	– 	+.	 
The equilibrium strategy solves for a stopping time t that balances these two 
quantities. The core idea of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) is that each arbitrageur 
conditions the timing of her short selling strategy on the length of time elapsed since 
she became aware. Since arbitrageurs become aware at a random time drawn from 
the same distribution, their trading strategies are symmetric. Thus a symmetric 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where arbitrageurs wait τ periods before exiting exists. 
 
4.3.3  Equilibrium Delay and Endogenous Crash 
In order to determine when the price correction occurs in equilibrium, suppose each 
agent believes that the bubble bursts ξ units of time after t0. At time t = ti + τ, an 
agent ti’s hazard rate function can be written as (see Appendix D for derivations):  
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ℎ 9x + ö 9J = 	 õ1 −	!tu(àtú) = 	U + ; − +4(ä) 	. 
For endogenous crashes, the price corrects after κ agents exit, which is at time ξ = τ 
+ ηκ. This is the time it takes for ηκ agents to become aware of the bubble, plus some 
τ (delay) that each agent waits to optimally ride the bubble. Substituting ξ = τ + ηκ 
into the exit condition and rearranging yields the condition for endogenous price 
correction: õ1 −	!tu(yù) ≥ 	 U + ; − +4(ö + }Ü)	. 
Notice that the only parameter which varies is τ, so there exists an equilibrium τ* 
where the left hand term exceeds the right hand term.20 Because all arbitrageurs have 
symmetric strategies, every arbitrageur with ti > ηκ exits after waiting:  
ö∗ = 	4t& U + ; − +õ (1 − !tuyù)	 − }Ü 
while agents with ti < ηκ exit after τ + ηκ periods, causing the bubble to burst 
endogenously at time:  
9J +	ä∗ = 	 9J + 4t& U + ; − +õ (1 − !tuyù)	 . 
The bubble component β(t-t0) must grow at a rate faster than the agents become 
aware (1\η) that prices have diverged from fundamentals. Without loss of generality, 
suppose the fundamental value of the stock grows at rate g until the crash, after 
which the fundamental growth rate decreases to r (see Figure 4.1). Then the bubble 
function takes the form: 
  4 9 − 9J = 	1 −	!t ît- vtvw   
and the corresponding equilibrium delay is expressed as: 
																																								 																				
20 For endogenous crashes, the growth rate must not be too high otherwise all agents ride the bubble 
indefinitely, and must not be too low otherwise all agents exit immediately. The growth rate must 
satisfy λ < (g-r) < λ/(1-exp(-ληκ)). 
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ö∗ = 	 1U + ; − + ;7 õõ − (U + ; − +)(1 − !tuyù) − 	}Ü	. (4.3) 
The equilibrium delay τ* is the maximum amount of time the lender waits minus the 
right hand term (}Ü ) in equation (4.3) which captures the lender’s motives to 
preemptively exit the market before Ü other agents in the population. The right hand 
term captures the exit delay due to the lender’s preemption motive. The Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003) framework ends here. 
 
4.4  Coarse Clocks and Adverse Selection 
In this section, I extend the analysis to include strategic lenders and asymmetric 
beliefs about posterior burst times. My main contribution begins by allowing lenders 
to learn the true arrival rate parameter õ by observing arbitrageur arrivals. I then 
describe how posterior beliefs about bubble burst times change in response to 
changes to the arrival rate parameter õ  with monotone comparative statics 
frameworks (Milgrom, 1981).  These frameworks allow me to compare arbitrageur 
and lender posterior beliefs of bubble burst times according to stochastic dominance 
rankings. In doing so, I describe the conditions under which adverse selection occurs 
and show how lenders will exit the loans market before arbitrageurs only when 
arrival rates are high.  
	
4.4.1  Learning from Arbitrageurs’ Arrivals 
Like arbitrageurs, lenders become aware of the bubble at a random point in time. I 
extend the clock games framework and allow nature to choose an arrival rate λ ∈ {λH, 
λL} which determines the distribution of t0 and bubble burst times. Lenders share the 
same beliefs and strategies as arbitrageurs with a few minor differences. In 
particular, lenders learn the arrival rate λ ∈ {λH, λL} by observing arbitrageurs’ 
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arrivals. In contrast, arbitrageurs do not learn λ as they do not observe each other’s 
actions and therefore their belief of λ is always λavg = ½(λL + λH) = λ.  
Let (û 9 )v∈ℝ be a Poisson process with a random arrival rate λ ∈ {λL , λH}. 
Let (9x)xâ† v  represent a sequence of arbitrageurs’ arrival times so that the realized 
number of arrivals is 7 = #(9x)vâ† v . The arrival rate λ(t, N(t)) is a function of time t 
and the number of arrivals at time t. The lender’s posterior belief of λ(t, N(t)) 
decreases smoothly over time, and jumps up in discrete steps upon each arrival. 
Lenders update their beliefs continuously about the arrival rate over time with Bayes 
rule: õ 9, û = 	 õ° 1 − *+ õ° û 9 = 7 +	õ¢*+(õ¢|û 9 = 7) õ 9, û = 	 õ° + õ¢ − õ° *+(õ¢|û 9 = 7) 
õ 9, û = 	 õ° + õ¢ − õ° *+ õ¢ *+(û 9 = 7|õ¢)*+ õ¢ *+ û 9 = 7 õ¢ + 	*+ õ° *+(û 9 = 7|õ°)	. 
For a given prior λ(0) ∈ [λL , λH], the probabilities that the arrival rate is either high 
(λ=λH) or low are: *+ õ = õ¢ = 	 u J tu£u§tu£  and *+ õ = õ° = 	 u§t• Ju§tu£  , respectively. 
The Poisson process (Pr(N(t)=n)) has the form !vu 9õ l/7!, thus the time evolution 
of arrival rate beliefs follows: 
õ 9, 7 = 	 õ° + 	 õ¢ − 	õ°1 + 	õ¢ − õ(0)õ¢ − õ° 	⋅ !®e 9 õ¢ − õ° − ;7 õ¢õ° 7 	. 
Posterior beliefs about λ decays continuously over time as the denominator term !v(u§tu£) gets larger over time. On the other hand, the denominator decreases with 
each additional arrival, which causes posterior beliefs about λ to jump upward. Note 
that the denominator has a maximum of 1 when (t=0), so the maximum jump size is 
(λH - λL). I require the condition 0 < λL < λH < (g + l - r) for a delayed arbitrage 
equilibrium. For arrival rates satisfying 0 < λ < (g + l - r), the length of time the 
lender waits before exiting (τ*) decreases as λ increases.  
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I simulate this process in Figure 4.3 with 200 samples of hazard rates λH=0.1 
and λL=0.05. Given a long enough period of time, the lender learns the true value of 
the arrival rate λ. As time gets large (t→∞), decay in beliefs becomes steeper since 
the denominator increases exponentially with time (exp(t(λH - λL)), but only increases 
linearly with arrivals: exp(n[ln(λH) - ln(λL)]) = n(λH - λL)). When lenders learn the 
arrival rate λ, posterior distributions of bubble burst times change. In particular, a 
higher λ shifts the probability mass towards the left (earlier), while a lower λ shifts 
the density towards the right (later). Learning leads to posterior beliefs about bubble 
burst times that are stochastically earlier (λ=λH) or later (λ=λL) than the naïve 
arbitrageur’s beliefs.  
 
Figure 4.3: Evolution of Lender Beliefs about Arrival Rates.  
 
Notes: Sample time evolution of lender’s beliefs about the arrival rate of arbitrageurs λ. The simulated 
posterior belief paths use random draws of the Poisson process with parameters λ ∈ {0.02, 0.20}. 
Awareness rate parameter is η=25. Given a long enough period of time, lenders eventually learn λ.  
 
4.4.2  Coarse Clocks and Comparative Statics 
In this section, I show how the solution to the optimal stopping problem 
(argmaxv	å(9∗)) changes when posterior beliefs about the arrival rate parameter λ 
changes. To this end, I borrow techniques introduced by Milgrom and Shannon 
(1994) and Athey (2002), known as monotone comparative statics, which describe 
conditions under which changes in equilibrium actions are monotonically increasing 
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in parameters. I want to know if an agent’s optimal delay in the clock game is 
decreasing in parameter λ. First, I require a few definitions before stating the 
monotonicity theorem.  
 
Definition 1: Single Crossing. A function V satisfies the single crossing condition if 
for all t > t′ and λ > λ′, å(9, õ′) 	> 	å(9′, õ′)	implies that å(9, õ) 	> 	å 9′, õ  and also å(9, õ′) 	≥ 	å 9′, õ  implies that å(9, õ) 	≥ 		å(9′, õ). 
 
Definition 2: Increasing Differences. The function å(9, õ) has increasing differences 
if the marginal value from increasing t to t′, å(9, õ) 	− 	å(9′, õ), is weakly increasing 
in the parameter λ.  
 
Showing that the value function V(t, λ) has increasing differences is sufficient for the 
single-crossing condition. Specifically, increasing differences are satisfied only 
when: V(t, λ) - V(t′, λ) ≥ V(t, λ′) - V(t′, λ′) ≥ 0. Assuming the value function is twice 
differentiable, increasing differences can also be verified by showing that 	™´¨ v,u™≠ ™• 	≥	0 . I can now state the monotonicity theorem (both complete and incomplete 
information variants). 
 
Theorem 1: Monotonicity Theorem (Topkis; 1978, 1979). 
If V(t, λ) satisfies the single-crossing condition, the equilibrium action 9∗(õ) 	=	argmaxv	å(9, õ) is weakly increasing in the parameter λ. For agents operating under 
uncertainty, monotone comparative statics require an additional condition on the 
agent’s beliefs when the beliefs depend on the parameter of interest, namely the 
monotone likelihood ratio order. 
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Definition 3: A distribution FL(t) dominates FH(t) in the monotone likelihood ratio 
(MLR) order, which I write FL(t) ≥MLR FH(t) if the ratio of densities fL(t)/fH(t) is 
increasing in t. 
  
Theorem 2: Monotonicity under uncertainty (Athey, 2002) 
Suppose a function U(t) is single crossing in t, a one-dimensional choice variable. If 
a probability density f(t, λ) parameterized by λ satisfies the MLR property, then å 9 = L 9 ë 9, õ 	59 is single crossing in both t and λ, and t*( · ) is a weakly 
increasing function of λ.    
 
Proposition 1: Equilibrium delay τ*(λ) = argmaxt V(t, λ) is weakly decreasing in λ.  
Proof:  The agent’s payoffs Ui(pre crash) and Ui(post crash) are single-crossing 
functions in t. The optimization problem of an arbitrageur is given by: ÆÆ9 å 9; õ = 	U + ; − +4(9) −	 ë(9, õ)1 − m(9, õ) 
and the first right hand term (g+l-r)/β(t) is independent of λ, so I can focus on just 
the hazard rate term ℎ 9, õ = ∞ v,u&t± v,u . As the sign on h(t, λ) is negative, increasing 
differences is satisfied by showing that the partial derivative of the hazard rate h(t, λ) 
with respect to λ is negative. It is quicker to verify the single-crossing condition by 
showing that distribution FL(t ; λ=λL) dominates FH(t; λ=λH) in the hazard rate order.  
 
Definition 4: A distribution FL(t ; λ=λL) dominates FH(t; λ=λH) in the hazard rate 
order, which I write FL(t; λ=λL) ≥HR FH(t; λ=λH) if: h(t, λ=λH) ≥ h(t, λ=λL) for all t. 
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Hazard rate dominance is implied by MLR order dominance (Appendix E). Therefore 
showing that the family of densities ë 9; õ u∈≤ indexed by parameter λ obeys the 
MLR order satisfies both the single-crossing condition (hazard rate dominance) and 
Athey’s monotonicity theorem. The family of exponential densities ë 9; õ u∈≤  is 
MLR ordered because the ratio of two densities ∞ v,u£∞ v,u§  is increasing in t for any õ¢ 	>	õ° ∈ Λ. Therefore FL(t; λ=λL) dominates FH(t; λ=λH) in both the MLR order and the 
hazard rate order. QED. 
 The optimal delay (t* = ti + τ*) is a weakly decreasing function of the arrival 
rate parameter λ. A higher arrival rate λ reduces the time the lender remains in the 
equity loans market in the clock game. Therefore, when lenders learn that the true 
arrival rate is high (λ=λH), they exit the market earlier than the arbitrageur 
anticipates, forcing the arbitrageur to locate another lender and re-establish the short 
position. Intuitively, if I interpret λ as an agent’s observed signal from which she 
infers bubble burst times, then the MLR ordering has an interesting interpretation 
provided in Milgrom (1981). When an agent observes higher arrival rates, she 
believes that bubble burst times are more likely to be earlier than when she observes 
a lower arrival rate. I can repeat the comparative statics analysis for the lending rate 
parameter l. Intuitively, if lenders are able to secure larger lending fees, they have 
additional incentives to increase delay before exit.  
 
Proposition 2: Equilibrium stopping time τ*(l) = argmaxt V(t, l) is weakly increasing 
in the lending fee parameter l.  
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Proof:  ¥¥v å 9, ; = î%ït-" v − ℎ 9; õ  and ë 9; õ u∈≤  is MLR ordered. Checking the 
increasing differences condition ¥´¨ v,ï¥v¥u = &" v ≥ 0 , implies that the equilibrium 
stopping time is t*(l) increasing in lending fees. QED. 
Hence, even if the lender believes the crash will come sooner than the 
arbitrageur believes, she may stay in the market longer than the arbitrageur if lending 
fees are high enough. The tension between early exit and waiting to earn additional 
lending fees leads to the possibility that a greedy lender does not recall and liquidate 
her holdings before a price correction. The severity of the coarse clocks adverse 
selection problem depends on the spread between the high and low states of arrival 
rate parameter λ. If the difference between λH and λL is large, then the lender 
eventually learns and possesses a larger information advantage. This causes larger 
shifts in the exit times of the lender.   
To illustrate the effects of the previous propositions, Figure 4.4 shows how 
the lender’s exit time changes as we vary the arrival rate λ and the rebate rate l. 
When the true arrival rate is high (λ=λL) and lenders receive low competitive fees 
{l=0%, λ=0.15}, the lender preempts arbitrageurs who believe that λ=0.125. 
However, if lenders are able to secure high lending fees {l=1%, λ=0.15}, they may 
not exit the market before the arbitrageurs. When the true arrival rate is low (λ=λL), 
arbitrageurs sell out too early since the true arrival rate is lower than they expect, and 
hence less than κ arbitrageurs have actually short sold the stock. In this case, the 
optimal delay is given by the function {l=0%, λ=0.10} which is when the price 
correction occurs. 
If a lender learns an arrival rate λ that is excessively high, the lender exits the 
market immediately. Recall that the growth rate must satisfy λ < (g+l-r), thus lenders 
may prematurely exit the market if they learn a λ that is too high and become 
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spooked by a rapid torrent of incoming short sellers. Hence, concentrate loan markets 
will have low loan supply. Prado, Saffi and Sturgess (2014) empirically support this 
hypothesis with proprietary loans data. They find that stocks with concentrated 
institutional ownership tend to have low loan supply. 
 
Figure 4.4: Comparative Statics of Preemption Times 
Arbitrageurs reduce total waiting time before exit by (τ* - ξ) because they are concerned that other 
arbitrageurs will preempt them. The total degree of preemption (units of time) is a function of an 
exogenous bubble burst date ξ. Plot parameters are r: 2%, g: 20%, l ∈ {0%, 1%}, λ ∈ {0.10, 0.15}. 
 
 
On the other hand, if a lender learns too low an arrival rate, the lender never 
exits the market. For growth rates that satisfy u£&	–	.$/(tu£yù) 	< 	 U + ; − + <u§&	t	.$/ tu§yù , the agents with λ=λH will exit the market instantly whereas agents with 
λ=λL will wait before exiting.  
The adverse selection problem occurs because lenders observe short interest 
in real time. This has the effect of concentrating a probability mass of burst times 
towards the left (earlier times). In contrast, arbitrageurs only observe public 
announcements of short interest which are published on a fortnightly basis. The 
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adverse selection problem is particularly sinister because arbitrageurs are naive to the 
fact that they are being adversely selected against as they cannot observe the number 
of peers borrowing from the same lender. Furthermore, they cannot effectively 
screen lenders that may eventually recall loans in the future since equity loans are 
typically negotiated on a day-to-day basis.  
One solution would be to negotiate term loans which are not renegotiated day 
to day, but they do not appear to be popular (Geczy, Musto and Reed, 2002). If 
lenders are strategically learning and recalling stock loans, then the lack of term loan 
popularity is unsurprising since the lender would no longer enjoy the flexibility of 
exiting the market at a whim.  
Another solution is to increase the frequency of public short interest 
announcements which are traditionally published by exchanges on a monthly basis 
(Boehmer et al., 2008; Diether et al., 2009). However, such policies may be 
destabilizing as frequent short interest announcements may invite overreactions from 
speculative short sellers who treat these announcements as a public coordination 
mechanism (Cass and Shell, 1983; Morris and Shin, 2002; Abreu and Brunnermeier 
2003). Short sale restriction policies appear to target and reduce these kinds of short 
selling behaviors. Instead, introducing transparent disclosure laws, which inform 
arbitrageurs about the lender’s current outstanding loans, may reduce the adverse 
selection problem. 
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4.5 Loans Market Transparency 
In this section, I analyse the implications of a switch to a transparent disclosure 
regime where the arbitrageur is made aware of the adverse selection problem.21 For 
example, introducing disclosure policies that require brokers to report the number of 
clients a lender is currently providing loans, increasing the frequency of short interest 
announcements, or policies that make the matching process between lenders and 
arbitrageurs more transparent. These policies allow the arbitrageur to learn whether 
the lender believes λ is high or low. These disclosure policies can mitigate the 
adverse selection problem.  
My approach to comparing the OTC and transparent disclosure market 
regimes is analogous to the comparison of sealed-bid versus open auctions when 
bidders have asymmetric valuation distributions (Maskin and Riley, 2000; 
Kirkegaard 2012). Maskin and Riley (2000) show that agents bid more aggressively 
in a sealed-bid auction when their valuation distribution is “lower” than another 
agent’s in terms of the reverse-hazard rate order, also known as conditional 
stochastic dominance. The difference in clock games is that players with “lower” 
distributions have an advantage since they are more likely to preemptively exit 
before another player. 
I focus on the scenario where a single22 lender learns a high arrival rate. Then 
lender tj believes that λ=λH and an arbitrageur ti believes that λ=λL. Let tH = tj + τ*H  
and tL = ti + τ*L be the exit times of lenders (with λ = λH) and arbitrageurs (λ = λL) 
																																								 																				
21 I analyse disclosure policies rather than a centralized stock loans exchange because introducing a 
centralized stock loans exchange may cause the clock game to completely unravel, meaning that the 
price corrects right away. 
	
22 We focus on single lenders because if arbitrageurs believe λ=λL, they borrow at rate λ=λL and 
lenders on average can only learn that λ=λL. Individual lenders may however randomly observe a 
higher arrival rate, perhaps due to being easier to locate or having closer ties with brokers. 
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respectively. Then an arbitrageur’s awareness distribution dominates the lender’s 
distribution in the reverse-hazard rate order: ΦL(t0|ti) ≥RH ΦH(t0|tj).  
 
Definition 4: A distribution FL(t) dominates another distribution FH(t) in the reverse-
hazard rate order, which I write FL(t) ≥RH FH(t) if: ë° 9m° 9 ≥ ë¢ 9m¢(9)	∀	9. 
It is well known that likelihood ratio dominance implies reverse-hazard rate 
dominance (Appendix E). Reverse-hazard rate dominance in turn implies first order 
stochastic dominance. However, reverse-hazard rate is a more specific condition than 
first order stochastic dominance since it implies that the relative asymmetry between 
a lender’s and arbitrageur’s burst time distributions decreases as the duration of the 
clock game increases. Thus the lender’s information advantage (relative strength) is 
diminishing over time. I need to show that conditional stochastic dominance between 
the lender’s and arbitrageur’s awareness distributions extends to exit time 
distributions. 
 
Lemma 1: If ΦL(t0|ti) ≥RH ΦH(t0|tj) then FL(t|ti) ≥RH FH(t|tj). 
Proof: Given λL < λH , ΦL(t0|ti) ≥MLR ΦH(t0|tj) because ∂° 9J 9x /∂¢(9J|9x)  is 
increasing in t. This is true for FL(t|ti) ≥MLR FH(t|tj) as well. As MLR dominance 
implies reverse-hazard rate dominance, ΦL(t0|ti) ≥RH ΦH(t0|tj) only when FL(t|ti) ≥RH 
FH(t|tj). 
 
4.5.1  Search Frictions and Recall Risk 
Consider two individuals: a lender and an arbitrageur. The arbitrageur wants to exit 
before the price correction, which we know occurs at time t0 + τ* + ηκ. Assume for 
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simplicity that if the lender recalls a loan from an arbitrageur, the arbitrageur is 
unable to re-establish the short position. Then there are three scenarios of interest: 
 9° < 9J + ö∗ + }Ü < 9¢ → Q>``!\\ë>;	Qℎ_+9 
 9¢ < 9° < 9J + ö∗ + }Ü → 67`+!:\!5	Q!:+`ℎ	f_\9 
 9° < 9¢ < 9J + ö∗ + }Ü → =!`:;;	=8\N 
The first scenario is an ideal outcome where the arbitrageur successfully 
locates and short sells a stock before the price correction, and the lender does not 
recall the loan in time. In the second scenario, the lender leaves the market before the 
arbitrageur who in turn short sells before the price correction. In this case, the 
arbitrageur faces greater search costs. This is inconvenient although preferred over 
the third scenario where the arbitrageur locates a loan, but the lender recalls and exits 
the market before the price correction. Recall that by the preemption lemma, 
arbitrageur ti believes at time T(ti) that at most a fraction κ of arbitrageurs become 
aware of the bubble before her. Thus, being preempted by the lender amounts to the 
lender stealing the arbitrageur’s slot.  
The following propositions relate to a switch from the current opaque OTC 
market to a transparent disclosure regime where an arbitrageur is aware of the 
adverse selection problem. 
 
Proposition 3: For endogenous crashes, as the difference in arrival rates λ between 
the lender and the arbitrageur increases, the probability of locating stock loans 
decreases. 
Proof: If λH > λL , then τ*(λL) > τ*(λH) by proposition 1. Thus exit times T*(ti) ≥ T*(tj) 
for all ti = tj ∈ supp(t0), and the length between lender and arbitrageur exit times 
(T*(ti) - T*(tj)) increases as (λH - λL) increases. This implies that both the upper and 
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lower bounds of FL(t) are larger (later) than FH(t) because each point in the burst 
time distribution F(t|ti) = Φ(ti + τ*|ti) is a right shift of the awareness distribution by 
the equilibrium delay τ*. The probability of locating a loan is determined by the 
proportion of lenders remaining in the market 1 - FH(t). Therefore, the probability of 
locating a loan at a given time t decreases as λH - λL increases. 
 
Corollary 1: Greater difference in the lender’s and arbitrageur’s arrival rate 
parameters λH - λL increases search costs, causing arbitrageurs who are aware of the 
adverse selection problem to short sell aggressively. Since search costs increase 
monotonically over time, the marginal benefit of delaying exit reduces. The 
arbitrageur compensates by short selling more aggressively to reduce the difficulty of 
locating loans. 
 
Proposition 4: Aggressive short selling increases the arbitrageur’s perceived recall 
risk. 
Proof: By the preemption lemma, an arbitrageur is only concerned about the 
probability of a stock recall in the instant after she borrows a stock, conditional on 
locating a lender. These concerns are captured by the rate the loan supply decreases 
relative to the portion of lenders remaining in the market, which can be expressed as 
-q′H(t)/qH(t), where qH(t) = 1 - FH(t) is loan supply and the derivative of qH(t) = -fH(t). 
This ratio is the negative of the hazard rate:  
ℎ 9 = 	 ë¢(9)1 − m¢(9) = −∏¢ 9∏¢ 9 	. 
Let j1(t) be an aggressive short selling time of the kth arbitrageur between the naive 
exit time t and the exit time of the kth lender, with r(t) < j1(t) ≤ t. Then h(t) ≥ h(j1(t)) 
since hazard rate functions are monotone increasing, implying that: 
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∏¢(9)∏¢(9) ≤ ∏¢ ∫& 9∏¢ ∫& 9 	. 
An arbitrageur who employs a more aggressive strategy, which short sells 
earlier, is borrowing stocks at an instant in time where lenders are exiting the market 
at a more rapid rate. From corollary 1, the perceived recall risk increases as λH - λL 
increases. The aggressive bid function j1(t) weighs the benefits of reducing search 
frictions against the costs of an increase in perceived recall risk. I can assume that 
search frictions and perceived recall risk are linear so that j1(t) is convex and well 
defined. Then when j1(t) is close to r(t), perceived recall risk is at its highest, 
otherwise when j1(t) is close to t, search frictions are higher. 
 
Corollary 2: Arbitrageurs underestimate actual recall risk when short selling 
aggressively, increasing the overall volume of successful stock recalls. 
 
By the preemption lemma, an arbitrageur only accounts for the instantaneous 
probability of recall at time j1(t). However, the actual increase in recall risk amounts 
to the following question: what is the probability that the lender recalls the loan when 
arbitrageur ti sells out at j1(t) rather than tL? This probability is expressed as FL(tL) - 
FL(j1(tL)), which is larger than the instantaneous probability of recall [FL(j1(tL)) - 
FL(tL)]/[dt × (1 - FL(tL))] for any value of dt as dt approaches zero. As the lender’s 
information advantage increases, arbitrageurs begin to sell more aggressively. This 
has the effect of increasing the overall volume of recalls since arbitrageurs 
underestimate the extent to which they are being adversely selected against. 
In the clock games framework, the critical mass of arbitrageurs κ required to 
induce a price correction is an important exogenous parameter. This parameter is also 
most likely to vary from stock to stock in reality. In my analysis, increasing κ has the 
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effect of intensifying the adverse selection. A direct empirical implication is that 
stocks with a high threshold for price correction (high κ) may attract more aggressive 
short selling than unpopular stocks with a low κ. However, short selling stocks with a 
high κ, such as glamour stocks like Tesla or GoPro may be a difficult affair and 
arbitrageurs may delay short selling or even refrain from arbitrage altogether. This is 
problematic since glamour stocks which attract the most attention are most likely to 
be overvalued and held by optimistic sentiment traders (Miller, 1977; Barber and 
Odean, 2008). 
 
Proposition 5: An increase in the threshold mass of behavioral traders supporting the 
bubble (κ) increases adverse selection costs for arbitrageurs (search frictions and 
recall risk). 
Proof: The difference in equilibrium delay between arbitrageurs and lenders is given 
by: 
  ö°∗ − ö¢∗ = 	 õ° − õ¢ + !yù õ¢!tu£ − õ°!tu§ . 
The term in the brackets is strictly positive. The coefficient eηκ > 1 for any value of κ 
and is increasing in κ. Thus an increase in the absorption capacity of the behavioral 
traders increases the impact of the difference between the lender and arbitrageur’s 
arrival rate parameters: λH - λL. Corollaries 1 and 2 then imply that arbitrageurs short 
sell more aggressively and face increased recall risk. QED. 
 
4.5.2  Aggressive Short Selling 
I wish to describe conditions under which an aggressive arbitrageur may 
preemptively exit before a strategic lender. To do so, I must compare arbitrageurs 
with lenders of the same rank within their burst time distributions. Specifically, I 
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want to see whether an identically ranked arbitrageur has higher or lower sensitivity 
to exiting the bubble at different points in time. 
To this end, I define a matching function r(t) that takes an arbitrageur type, 
and returns the corresponding lender type with the same rank + 9 = m¢t&(m° 9 ). 
The function r(t) maps tL types to tH types of the same rank so that a lender is just as 
likely to have an exit time below r(t) as the arbitrageur is to have an exit time below 
t. As for time sensitivity, the exit condition in equation (1): 
ℎ° 9 = ë°(9)1 − m°(9) > g + ; − +4(9)  
can be rearranged and interpreted as a marginal revenue of exiting the bubble at a 
point in time (Bulow and Roberts, 1989)23: 
a=° 9 = ª 9 −	1 − m° 9ë° 9 	, 
where ν(t) = β(t)/(g+l-r) represents an agent’s payoffs. The marginal revenue is 
increasing in t. I want to see how marginal revenue compares between arbitrageurs 
and lenders of the same rank. To do so, I define a matching function ∫ 9 =a=¢t&(a=° 9 ) which matches arbitrageur and lender types with the same marginal 
revenue.  
In Figure 4.5, I plot the matching function + 9 = m¢t&(m° 9 ). The 45 degree 
line is a naive arbitrageur’s selling time. In the OTC regime, the arbitrageur stays 
naive and always exits later than the lender because r(t) is always below the 450 line. 
In the transparent disclosure regime, short sellers know that their lender believes λH  
																																								 																				
23  To see why this is the case, let ∏° 9 = 1 − m°(9)  be the loan demand function, and the 
corresponding inverse demand function 9 = m°t&(1 − ∏) . Substitute 9 = m°t&(1 − ∏)  in ν(t). The 
marginal revenue, defined as the rate revenue changes in response to quantity, is:  jjº 	∏ ⋅ ª m°t& 1 − ∏ = ª m°t& 1 − ∏ + 	∏ ⋅ jjº [m°t& 1 − ∏ ]  jjº 	∏ ⋅ ª m°t& 1 − ∏ = ª m°t& 1 − ∏ − ∏/ë° m°t& 1 − ∏   jjº 	∏ ⋅ ª m°t& 1 − ∏ = ª 9 − &t±£ v∞£(v)   
Note that the derivative of an inverse CDF follows the rule 5/59	mt& 9 = 1/ë mt& 9 	.	 
130 
 
Figure 4.5: Asymmetric Exit Times and Aggressive Short Selling.  
 
Plot parameters are g=7%, r=1%, λH=0.04, λL=0.01. The functions j(t) and r(t) crosses due to reverse-
hazard dominance, which tells us that the relative asymmetry in burst time distributions diminishes the 
longer the bubble remains uncorrected. MRL(t) and MRH(t) starts off far apart and gradually converges. 
Thus lenders have an information advantage initially, but the advantage diminishes over time. 
Depending on the lender’s actual exit time tH, a simple transparency rule that requires the broker to 
disclose the outstanding number of clients a lender is providing loans to can improve the payoffs of 
arbitrageurs. 
 
> λL, and knows the lender’s beliefs. The kth arbitrageur to exit at time tL knows that 
the kth lender has already left the market at time r(tL) and thus will adjust her strategy. 
As λH - λL increases, the distance between r(tL) and tL increases, so the arbitrageur 
will short sell more aggressively and hasten her exit to a time somewhere in the 
interval [r(tL), tL] as loans become relatively more difficult to locate later into the 
bubble. An arbitrageur who does not short sell aggressively can only locate loans 
from lenders who became aware of the bubble rumor tL - r(tL) time periods later than 
herself. Comparing matching functions j(t) and r(t), I see that aggressive short selling 
may be socially inefficient because agents who value early exit the most may not be 
allocated a piece of the bubble. When j(tL) < r(tL), an arbitrageur who exits at time tL 
has lower marginal revenue than a lender with the same rank in the lender’s burst 
time distribution. In other words, MRL(tL) < MRH(r(tL)). However, due to reverse 
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hazard dominance, FL(t|ti) ≥RH FH(t|tj), the functions that match on MR (j(t)) and rank 
(r(t)) eventually intersect, and j(t) > r(t).  
 From proposition 1, we know that arbitrageurs short sells aggressively in the 
OTC regime and chooses an earlier exit time in [r(tL), tL]. Denote this aggressive 
short selling time as j1(t). If the price correction occurs sometime after j1(t) but before 
but before the lender exits, then the arbitrageur “wins” despite having comparatively 
lower marginal revenue. This corresponds to the first scenario where tL < t0 + τ* + ηκ 
< tH.  
On the other hand, the arbitrageur times his shorts more conservatively when 
there is recall risk. Denote this more conservative sellout time as:  j2(tL), which 
satisfies r(tL) < j1(tL) < j2(tL). The arbitrageur balances the increase in expected 
search costs against the expected costs of recall risk. If expected search costs 
dominate expected recall risk costs, then the arbitrageur bids more aggressively. If 
recall risk dominates, then the arbitrageur is conservative and delays exit. 
Realistically, recalls rob the arbitrageur of the short sale, given by the size of the 
bubble component, p(t) × β(t). An increase in search costs may only amount to a 
couple of basis points multiplied by the price: Δfees × p(t). Thus it is likely that 
arbitrageurs are more conservative and delay their short selling strategies when the 
bubble component is substantially large. 
 
4.6  Empirical Implications and Discussion 
In this section, I highlight testable implications of my framework before discussing 
how my framework relates to the limits of arbitrage literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
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Coarse clocks adverse selection occurs due to differences in beliefs about the 
arrival rate parameter λ. Therefore, the severity of the adverse selection problem 
depends on the lender’s ability to learn about arrival rates. Arrival rates are 
influenced by search frictions in the OTC loans market, and lenders who are easy to 
locate and observe the majority of aggregate arbitrageurs’ arrivals. Therefore, search 
frictions should increase learning frictions.  
 
4.6.1  Search Frictions and Imperfect Learning 
The relationship between search frictions and learning frictions leads to 
several testable empirical implications. First, if a stock has a concentrated lender 
base, arrivals are less dispersed across lenders, and learning occurs rapidly. In the 
extreme case where there is only a single monopolistic lender, the lender learns the 
arrival rate perfectly: 
Hypothesis H1A: Stocks with concentrated loan markets experience a greater 
volume of stock recalls (or dramatic increases in average fees, i.e., 
“specialness”) before a downward price correction. 
More specifically, when the loaning activities of individual lenders and borrowers 
are observable, I can be much more specific about the behavior of individual lenders: 
Hypothesis H1B: Lenders who attract greater proportions of arbitrageurs 
learn short interest rapidly and are more likely to recall stocks (or increase 
fees dramatically) before a downward price correction. 
Chuprinin and Ruf (2015) find that approximately 20% of short selling 
strategies are extracted by lenders. The question is whether lenders who are in better 
position to learn about short interest systematically extract greater profits than other 
lenders. Alternatively, if lenders in a concentrated loans market observe low 
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arbitrageur arrivals, they may be in a position to conduct short squeezes, which is 
when large players in the market buy shares to force arbitrageurs into closing out 
their short positions at a loss. Much like how lenders strategically recall a stock 
before a price decline, they can also strategically short squeeze when prices are likely 
to rise. If an institutional lender is particularly large, it may be able to purchase 
additional shares prior to recalling loans for a tighter squeeze. I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis H2: Lenders who are positioned to learn short interest purchase 
stocks and recall loans before upward price corrections. 
Some existing empirical evidence can be interpreted in favor of the hypothesis that 
lenders use stock loans as an early warning sign for impending stock price 
corrections. In particular, rebate rates are insensitive to changes to share loan demand 
most of the time (Christofferson et al., 2007), except in response to particularly large 
borrowing demand shocks (Cohen, Deither and Malloy, 2007). This suggests that 
lenders are not concerned about large price declines until a critical mass of 
arbitrageurs borrow stocks at the same time, consistent with the Abreu and 
Brunnermeier’s (2003) model. Recall that in their model, a price decline occurs only 
when arbitrageurs coordinate and collectively short sell a stock at the same time. 
Since lenders observe (noisily) short interest in real time, sudden surges in borrowing 
demand may spook lenders from the market, causing them to either recall stocks or 
increase fees dramatically. 
D’Avolio (2002) raises an important empirical issue concerning loan supply 
when there is a sudden loan demand shock. In response to demand shocks or 
pessimistic news, existing lenders may avoid renegotiating rebate rates, instead 
opting to recall and sell shares themselves. A nasty implication is that loan recalls 
have disruptive pricing implications since market participants do not observe the fees 
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of outstanding loans that are instead recalled. This selection bias degrades the 
information content of quoted loan rates. Transparency in fee quotes are further 
obscured because there are no quote screens for potential borrowers and lenders to 
monitor, suggesting that rebate rates may be stagnant and lacking higher resolution in 
frequency. This lack of transparency is problematic since aggregate short interest is 
published fortnightly in the United States, and there is ample opportunity for lenders 
to learn and make abnormal returns. 
 
4.6.2  Learning versus Earning 
Recent research suggests that short sellers are well informed (Boehmer, Jones and 
Zhang, 2008), and aggregate short interest is among one of the strongest predictors of 
aggregate stock returns (Rapach, Ringgenberg and Zhou, 2015). Hence, a natural 
question to ask is to what extent do lenders value arbitrageurs’ arrivals as an early 
warning signal? When lenders provide loans through broker-dealers, brokers 
typically take a cut of the rebate rate as a finder’s fee. Intuitively, I would expect a 
relationship between the finder’s fee and proxies of loan market search costs. 
However, if finder’s fees are systematically high for lenders who receive the lion’s 
share of incoming borrowing requests, then this would provide some evidence that 
lenders value arbitrageurs’ arrivals as an early warning signal. Lenders would then 
appear to implicitly pay broker-dealers for priority in allocating stock loans to 
incoming arbitrageurs. 
Hypothesis H3: Lenders who receive greater allocations of arbitrageur 
arrivals from broker-dealers pay larger finder’s fees. 
Empirical tests of this hypothesis will require proprietary data which allow 
the identification of individual transactions between lenders and brokers, including 
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commissions for allocating the loans. Kolasinski et al. (2013) provide a measure of 
lender concentration by calculating the volume of loans each lender provides as a 
portion of total shares outstanding. From these measures, they calculate Herfindahl 
indices to evaluate lender volume concentration for different stocks. This measures 
how arbitrageurs’ arrivals may be dispersed across lenders over time. Kolasinski et 
al. (2013) also find that lending fees appear to vary substantially across different 
types of lenders. Direct lending from institutional investors produces the lowest fees 
on average, whereas broker-deales quote the highest loan fees. They suggest that 
lender-specific costs are responsible for the variation in fees amongst lender types. 
However, this result is also consistent with the case that lenders quote lower fees in 
order to attract arbitrageurs to learn short interest.  
Variations in loan fees across lender types are consistent with search and 
learning theories where a monopolist attempts to learn market demand by adjusting 
prices. Rothschild (1974) models a single firm which tries to learn the true 
probability distribution of customer valuations by providing a sequence of prices. If 
the firm sets high prices, it learns customer demand slowly but earns higher 
revenues. In contrast, setting a low price helps the firm learn consumer demand 
rapidly at the expense of profits. The main implication is that ex ante optimal pricing 
rules may end up being inefficient (suboptimal if the firm knew the true distribution 
of customer valuations). Even if several firms were to strategically experiment in the 
same market independently, they might come to different conclusions on the 
eventual price. This leads to price dispersion in the long run.  
If lenders were in fact trying to maximize revenues from fees, then we would 
expect fees to be sensitive to changes in loan demand. If however lenders wish to 
learn short interest effectively, they will keep fees low in order to attract as large a 
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proportion of arbitrageurs as possible. As mentioned, loan fees should be generally 
unresponsive to loan demand changes, except when loan demand increases sharply. 
This appears consistent with recent results in Engelberg, Reed and Ringgenberg 
(2014) who document extreme skewness in loan fees that averages 85 basis points 
during tranquil times and jumps to 1,479 basis points in more turbulent times. 
  
4.6.3  Persistence of “Obvious” Arbitrage Opportunities 
My framework sheds light on why certain “obvious” arbitrage opportunities persist 
over time. Take for example the expiration of IPO lockups, which generates 
abnormal short-selling returns consistently (Ofek and Richardson, 2000; Field and 
Hanka 2001). To see why lockups resemble an obvious arbitrage opportunity, 
consider the fact that when a company first floats, only a small fraction of shares are 
sold to the public while the remainder are held by insiders in escrow. The lockup 
expiration date is the first time insiders are allowed to sell their holdings. As there 
are no rules against buying before then, order flow when lockups expire is likely to 
be selling orders. As the terms of the lockup24 are stated in the IPO prospectus 
months in advance, the price drop on expiration is difficult to rationalize. 
Arbitrageurs should correctly anticipate the increase in share supply and price 
reactions should average zero. However, arbitrageurs systematically fail to correct 
the mispricing before lockups expire. The average abnormal buy-and-hold return 
(over 10 days) surrounding the lock-up expiration date is approximately -2% (Field 
and Hanka 2001). Yet most of the price decline (1.5%) occurs on the lockup 
expiration date.   
																																								 																				
24 Lockup provisions include the date lockups expire and the number of shares to be released from 
escrow for employees and managing directors. 
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In my framework, “obvious” arbitrage opportunities are the ones where 
lenders are keenly aware of the fact that arbitrageurs are attempting to coordinate a 
price correction. Thus the learning problem for IPO lockups is easy for lenders since 
the price correction date is known ahead of time. Huszár, Tan and Zhang (2015) note 
institutional lenders may wish to increase lending fees leading up to an earnings 
announcement in hopes of deterring short selling activities. They find that lenders 
appear to price future expected declines in stock prices into current lending fees.  
In earlier literature, arbitrage opportunities persist due to short sale 
constraints from regulation (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Jarrow, 1980, Jones and 
Lamont, 2002) or from limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p. 49) comment that “a great deal of professional arbitrage activity 
[...] is concentrated in a few markets, such as the bond market and the foreign 
exchange market. These also tend to be the markets where extreme leverage, short 
selling, and performance-based fees are common. In contrast, there is much less 
evidence of such activity in the stock market, either in the United States or abroad. 
Why is that so?”  
My framework provides alternative insights on this matter. When shorting 
commodities, there are much larger numbers of distinct lenders to borrow from. 
There may be millions of unique owners for particular currencies, so learning from 
arrival rates will be noisy. However, for individual stocks the number of unique 
lenders is smaller and loan supply is concentrated in the hands of a select number of 
lenders. Oligopolistic loan markets are one in which lenders learn most rapidly, 
leaving arbitrageurs highly susceptible to adverse selection. Therefore stocks that do 
not appear short sale constrained at first glance may turn out to be quite difficult to 
short sell in practice.  
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4.7  Summary and Conclusions 
Price corrections require a mass of arbitrageurs to collectively short sell at the same 
time. However, arbitrageurs do not know the true time of the price correction and 
cannot observe when their peers will sell. This coordination problem leads 
arbitrageurs to delay their arbitrage activities, and short sell in a sequential fashion at 
different times. 
However, in order to short sell a stock, an arbitrageur must locate and borrow 
a stock from a lender. Unlike arbitrageurs, lenders observe the timing and intensity of 
arbitrageurs’ arrivals. From this information, they can infer when the price correction 
is likely to occur. Thus when arbitrageurs attempt to synchronize their short selling 
activities, lenders observe that arrival rates are especially high and know that a price 
correction is imminent. I refer to this specific type of information asymmetry as 
coarse clocks since the information advantage concerns the strategic timing of other 
players’ actions. 
I show how coarse clocks lead to a unique adverse selection problem in the 
equity loans market since lenders can strategically recall loans (or increase fees 
drastically) moments before a price correction occurs. This provides an explanation 
as to why fees rarely adjust to loan demand, except to loan demand shocks 
(Kolasinski et al., 2013). Lenders use stock loans and arbitrageur arrivals as early-
warning signals for impending price corrections. The more effective a lender learns, 
the more severe the adverse selection problem. Hence, oligopolistic lenders operating 
in concentrated loans markets such as equities with low ownership dispersion are 
most prone to the adverse selection problem. This explains why stocks with 
concentrated ownership appear to suffer greater short sale constraints (Prado, Saffi 
and Sturgess, 2014). 
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Coarse clock induced adverse selection acts as a hidden short sale constraint. 
Given the fact that equity loans are conducted in an anonymous OTC matching 
market, arbitrageurs are unaware of lenders’ information advantage. As such, an 
arbitrageur is exposed to substantial uncertainty as to how difficult her short 
positions will be to maintain in the future as the day of reckoning approaches. The 
recent short-selling literature has detailed that short selling is prone to uncertainty in 
lending fees and recall risks (Engelberg, Ringgenberg and Reed, 2014; Chuprinin 
and Ruf, 2015). My theory offers a more insidious perspective—rather than exposure 
to random variation in short selling costs and recall risk, I suggest that arbitrageurs 
are actively being adversely selected against by strategic lenders. The problem is 
particularly severe since strategic lenders incur no cost to learn arrival rates. By 
simply offering stocks up for loan, lenders learn arrival rates. As such, lenders 
passively learn arrival rates and coarse clocks adverse selection is an unavoidable 
consequence of the OTC equity loans market structure. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
	
This chapter provides an overview of the findings of this thesis and a discussion of 
the limitations and future directions of the research. The main aim of this thesis is to 
advance our understanding of “irrational” market phenomena by introducing 
coordination motives into investors’ preferences, and strategic uncertainty. I analyse 
how market anomalies unfold when (i) market participants resolve strategic 
uncertainty by observing IPO price amendments, (ii) manipulate another’s ability to 
learn about strategic uncertainty through IPO roadshows, and (iii) resolve strategic 
uncertainty more effectively than their peers in the OTC market for stock loans. 
 
5.1  Coordination Motives and Overreactions to IPO Price 
Revisions 
My aim in the first essay is to show how in IPO book-builds, investors engage in 
speculative bidding when we introduce coordination motives into their preferences. 
In my model, investors want to coordinate their investment choices with those of 
their peers but are unsure how their peers will act. 
I highlight how offer price amendments can act as a coordination mechanism 
which helps investors resolve strategic uncertainty. In doing so, I show why investors 
rationally overreact to offer price revisions. The main idea is that when investors 
wish to speculate, they must form beliefs about peer investors’ beliefs—higher order 
beliefs. Speculators form higher order beliefs and resolve strategic uncertainty by 
observing IPO price amendments, demanding additional shares after witnessing an 
upward price amendment. 
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What we learn is that overreactions to IPO price amendments are an 
inevitable consequence of the IPO book-build mechanism: IPO price pops will occur 
regardless of whether underwriters are deliberately underpricing or setting the offer 
price accurately. The purpose of the book-build is to aggregate information from 
investors. Unfortunately, the more effectively the book-build aggregates information, 
the greater the weight speculators place on the offer price revision, and the larger the 
subsequent market overreactions.  
By viewing the IPO investment problem in such a way, I divert attention for 
future IPO research towards questions concerning how researchers can design more 
efficient methods for companies to go public which are less prone to speculation. 
The strength of the global games frameworks over existing market sentiment theories 
of IPO pricing such as Ljunqvist et al. (2006) and Derrien (2005) is that global 
games frameworks are a rich and active area of research, with novel topics 
discussing individuals’ incentives to acquire and weigh different sources of 
information (see Vives (2005, 2010) and Veldkamp (2011) for recent developments). 
Thus, future contributions can investigate how the supply and demand of financial 
information behaves in speculative markets such as IPOs. 
Regarding the limitations of the first study, there are a number of assumptions 
made in the global games framework that may not hold in practice. First, there is the 
assumption that investors know the precision of the public signal and know how 
much weight to place on the offer price amendment when forming beliefs. This is not 
a restrictive assumption since investors know that underwriters are able to provide 
more accurate offer prices because they observe all incoming bids. Second, I have 
assumed that when investors search for IPO related information online (filings, news 
articles, etc. on Google), they produce more accurate bids. This assumption is crucial 
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to interpreting the empirical results from this chapter, specifically the attention-
amplification hypothesis. The idea is that acquiring information on upcoming IPOs 
produces more informed bids, which are then aggregated by the underwriter into an 
even more precise offer price. A more precise offer price amendment incites larger 
overreactions from investors with coordination (speculative) motives.  
 
5.2  IPO Roadshows as Persuasion Mechanisms 
My aim in the second essay is to examine how IPO roadshows provide a way for 
underwriters to persuade and manipulate an issuer’s beliefs about subscription 
demand.  
In existing literature, roadshows are viewed as a means for the underwriter to 
learn about the valuations of institutional investors. Underwriters are uncertain about 
the market clearing price for IPO shares and thus embark on roadshows to learn and 
sell the offer to institutional clients. However, this justification for roadshows is 
puzzling since the underwriter observes incoming bids when building the order book, 
and know exactly what the market clearing price should be. 
What we learn from this essay is that the underwriter may instead be focused 
on persuading the issuer to accept lower offer prices than what they initially believed 
the firm is worth. By repeatedly taking the issuer to roadshow meetings where 
investors are relatively pessimistic about the firm’s prospects, the underwriter 
effectively controls the conclusions an issuer will reach concerning whether the deal 
is hot or cold.  
By viewing the IPO book-build as a persuasion mechanism, I provide an 
explanation to the puzzling observation that IPO book-builds are replacing IPO 
auctions as the preferred method of going public around the world despite the fact 
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that auctions are theoretically superior at maximizing revenue (Jagannathan et al., 
2015). The IPO book-build allows the underwriter to retain the appearance that they 
are acting in the issuer’s best interest while strategically revealing pessimistic 
information to manage the issuer’s pricing expectations.  
I use this roadshow persuasion hypothesis to explain the relationship between 
the timing and the direction of price amendments. Since persuasion takes time, 
downward price amendments occur later than upward price amendments. When 
issuers are exposed to greater numbers of pessimistic roadshows, downward price 
amendments occur earlier on. This is also the primary limitation of the study. I 
cannot confirm that roadshows are full of investors with relatively pessimistic 
valuations, nor can I confirm the exact number of roadshow presentations issuers 
pitch before price amendment. Nevertheless, I find that for deals which amend offer 
prices downward, increased exposure to roadshow presentations hastens downward 
price amendments which supports the roadshow persuasion hypothesis. 
Future contributions in this strand of research may look at examining 
alternative explanations and incentives behind why upward price amendments occur 
later into the roadshow than downward price amendments.  
 
5.3  Adverse Selection in the Equity Loans Market 
My aim in the final essay is to examine how certain market structures, such as the 
over-the-counter market for stock loans, may allow some agents to learn about 
strategic uncertainty more effectively than others.  
What we learn is how the structure of the equity loans market enables lenders 
to passively learn and resolve strategic uncertainty more effectively than 
arbitrageurs. By allowing equity lenders to observe the rate arbitrageurs arrive and 
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borrow stocks to short sell, they are able to infer the timing of an imminent price 
correction more precisely than arbitrageurs. Rapid arbitrageur arrivals suggest that a 
price correction is imminent, prompting stock lenders to recall and sell their holdings 
moments before a crash occurs. Resolving this adverse selection problem is not 
straightforward. I find that introducing disclosure policies that reduce the information 
advantage of lenders may help alleviate this problem, but also cause arbitrageurs to 
short sell more aggressively (earlier).  
One of the empirical implications of the framework concerns lenders’ 
dilemma to learn arrival rates. Higher lending fees inhibit the lender’s ability to learn 
about the price correction, but yields higher profits from lending fees. There is 
therefore a trade-off between learning the timing of a crash, and earning greater fees. 
These predictions have support in recent papers (Kolasinski et al., 2013) using 
proprietary data.  
The limitations of this essay concern the assumptions made about the 
arbitrageur and lender’s beliefs. Nearly all games of incomplete information in 
economics rely on the common prior assumption, a consequence of the Harsanyi’s 
(1967-68) approach to analysing games of incomplete information. Harsanyi knew 
that analysing the infinite hierarchy of beliefs was intractable, instead proposing to 
simplify analysis by allowing all strategic uncertainty to be summarized by an 
agent’s “type” drawn from a common prior distribution. By allowing lenders to learn 
arrival rate parameters which determine the shape of the prior awareness distribution, 
I am effectively introducing heterogeneous priors into the framework. This approach 
is philosophically consistent with Morris (1995, p. 228) who argues that “we should 
only resort heterogeneities in [prior] beliefs only when we can imagine an origin for 
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the differences in beliefs”. In my model, the heterogeneities in awareness 
distributions arise due to the structure of the stock lending market. 
In Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2003) clock games framework, 
synchronization risk (strategic uncertainty) delays the time the bubble will crash. 
Any change in the game theoretical framework which resolves this strategic 
uncertainty completely (i.e., by introducing a centralized exchange) will cause the 
game to unravel and the price to correct immediately. Therefore, my analysis of loan 
market transparency is limited to studying the interactions between a single lender 
and arbitrageur so that I do not run into this problem. Extensions to the framework 
may examine how the population of arbitrageurs play the clock game against the 
population of lenders in order to model population dynamics.  
Broadly speaking, future contributions in this area of research may examine 
the strategic interactions in other similar over-the-counter markets (Duffie et al., 
2007) and identify potential sources of market failures stemming from dealer and 
broker behaviour (Bjønnes and Rime, 2005; Green et al. 2007). In each of the 
previous essays, the way in which agents resolve strategic uncertainty depends on the 
structure of the market. Thus, the market anomalies described in this thesis are in 
part due to the design of the market. By endorsing this view, scholars can view 
market anomalies as a market design problem that can be solved by altering the rules 
that govern how the market operates.  
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Appendix A: Proof of Unique Equilibrium in Morris and Shin’s 
Benchmark 
When investors’ value functions in the Morris and Shin’s benchmark are monotone 
(unique solution), there are no overreactions to price amendments. Rearranging the 
payoff function: 
æ∗ + ø öx + ö/ ö/\/ +	öxæ∗ −	 öxøt&	(ë)öx + ö/ − æ∗ − ` = 0 (2.3) 
I have: 
−ö/\/öx +	 ö/öx æ∗ +	øt& öx æ∗ − \x = 	− öx + ö/öx øt& ` − æ∗ 	. 
 
Differentiating the payoff function with respect to θ* yields: 5å∗(⋅)5æ∗ = 	 ö/öx + 1öx∂ øt& öx æ∗ − \x 	&∞¿¡ ¬√ƒ ∞
= 	 öx + ö/öx 1∂(øt& ` − æ∗ )	. 
Where the derivative of øt& ⋅ = 	1 ë∂(øt& ë ). The normal density achieves a 
maximum of 1/ 2≈ at 0, specifically when (θ* = si = sp). Hence the derivative 
dV/dθ* is strictly positive when: ö/öx +	 2≈öx öx = 	 öx + ö/öx 2≈ ö/öx + ö/ − öx 	≤ 	 2≈	. 
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Appendix B: Roadshow Itinerary 
When going public, the issuing firm selects a lead underwriter to manage and 
guarantee full subscription of the issue (depending on full commitment versus best 
efforts underwriting contract). Depending on how prestigious the deal is, 
underwriters will compete with one another to secure the lead managing position. 
After picking a lead underwriter, the underwriting team and issuing firm will spend a 
number of weeks conducting due diligence for the S-1 prospectus. After the SEC 
verifies that the prospectus is accurate, the underwriter and issuing firm are ready to 
conduct a roadshow to market and price the offer. IPO roadshows typically last for 
two to three weeks. Throughout this period, the underwriter may alter the offer price 
at any time depending on the rate of subscription demand by filing a S-1/A 
amendment prospectus. Not all S-1/A amendments change the offer price; for 
instance, some amendments are filed because the issuer accidentally leaked 
information that was not previously public information. The investment bankers, as 
part of the underwriting team, and executives from the issuing firm will travel from 
city to city to pitch the offering to small groups of institutional investors who are 
invited by the underwriter. Roadshow presentations can be a highly private and 
exclusive affair, as exemplified by Facebook’s roadshow itinerary below. 
 
Facebook IPO Roadshow Itinerary (Mitroff, 2012). 
May-07 New York, Sheraton New York. 
May-08 Boston, The Four Seasons Hotel. 
May-09 Philadelphia, Baltimore Stops. 
May-10 New York. Location privately announced to invitees. 
May-11 Menlo Park Lunch, Crowne Plaza, Palo Alto. 
May-14 Chicago. Location withheld. 
May-15 Kansas City. Location withheld. 
May-15 Denver. Location withheld. 
May-16 Menlo Park. Location withheld. 
May-17 Menlo Park. Final conference call at Facebook headquarters. 
May-18 New York. NASDAQ opening bell. 
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Appendix C. Posterior Awareness Distribution 
Let 9J	be a random start time for bubble and 9x	be a random awareness time for an agent 
uniformly distributed on [t0, t0+η]. The probability that 9J	≤ t0 is given by Baye’s rule: *+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	*+ 9x = 9x 9J ≤ 9J *+ 9J ≤ 9J*+ 9x = 9x   *+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	 *+ 9x = 9x 9J = 9 *+ 9J = 9 59vwJ *+ 9x = 9x 9J = 9 *+ 9J = 9 59íJ 	.  
When conditioning on 9J	= t0 , a random ti is uniformly distributed on [t0 , t0+η], so the 
conditional probability of drawing any particular ti is 1/η. The starting time of the bubble 
t0 (Pr(9J = t)) has a density φ(t0) = λe-λt and so: 
*+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	 1} õ!tuv59vwvzty 1} õ!tuv59vzvzty  
 
*+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	 !tu vzty −	!tuvw!tu vzty −	!tuvz 	.  
The 1/η terms cancel and pre-multiplying by exp(λtj)/exp(λtj) gives: *+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	 !uy −	!tu(vztvw)!uy − 1 	.  
Thus lender ti believes t0 is randomly distributed on [ti - η , ti] with distribution: *+ 9J ≤ 9J 9x = 9x = 	 !uy −	!tu(vztvw)!uy − 1 	= 	 ∂ \ 9x 5\vwvzty .  
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Appendix D. Hazard Rate Function 
From section 3.2, the agent’s posterior belief about burst times is: m 9 9x = 5ø 9J 9x = 	ø(9 − ä|9x)vw%àâv 	. 
For t = ti + τ, the posterior burst time distribution has the form: m 9 9x = ø(9x + ö − ä|9x)	  m 9 9x = !uy −	!tu(vzt(vz%útà))!uy − 1 	  m 9 9x = !uy −	!tu(àtú)!uy − 1   
with the associated density: ë 9x + ö 9x = 	 559 !uy − !u(àtú)!uy − 1 = õ!u(àtú)!uy − 1  
and hazard rate function: ℎ 9x + ö 9x = õ!(àtú) (!uy − 1)1 −	!uy − !u(àtú)!uy − 1   ℎ 9x + ö 9x = õ1 − !tu(àtú)	.  
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Appendix E. Stochastic Order Lemmas 
Lemma 1: If FL(t) dominates FH(t) in the MLR order, FL(t) dominates FH(t) in both the 
hazard rate order and the reverse-hazard rate order (Shaked and Shantikumar, 1994). 
 
Proof: Hazard rate order. When FL(t) dominates FH(t) in the likelihood ratio order, 
fL(s)/fH(s) ≤ fL(t)/fH(t) for all s < t. I can rearrange and integrate both sides: 
 ë¢(9)/ë¢ \ 5\	 ≤í2 	 ë°(9)/ë° \ 5\	í2  
to obtain [1 - FH(t)]/fH(t) ≤ [1 - FL(t)]/fL(t), which implies hazard rate dominance 
condition hL(t) ≤ hH(t) for all t. 
 
Proof: Reverse-hazard rate order. Rearranging and integrating the MLR condition:  
fL(s)/fH(s) ≤ fL(t)/fH(t) for all s < t gives: 
 ë°(\)/ë° 9 5\	 ≤vJ 	 ë¢(\)/ë¢ 9 5\	vJ  
which is equivalent to FL(t)/fL(t) ≤ FH(t)/fH(t). This is just the reverse-hazard rate 
dominance condition: fL(t)/FL(t) ≥ fH(t)/FH(t) for all t. 
 
